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FISHING ENTITY ENFORCEMENT IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES 
 
by Ying-Ting Chen 
 
The 1995 UNFSA creates a door for fishing entities’ participation in conservation and 
management regimes regarding straddling and highly migratory fish stocks through 
separate RFMOs. However, fishing entities are different from states, leading to some 
ambiguous circumstances in RFMOs, especially in high seas enforcements. 
This thesis reviews the concepts of fishing entities and considers fishing entities’ status in 
international law of the sea and the RFMOs. Then, it considers the role of fishing entity 
enforcement in high seas with being equivalent to a flag state and non-flag state. This 
thesis then considers the problems that fishing entities may encounter in high seas 
enforcement. Finally, it represents the practices of fishing entity enforcement in high seas 
with a special reference to the role of Taiwan in RFMOs. DECLARATION OF AUTHORSHIP  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
The fishery resources in the oceans used to be viewed as inexhaustible. As fishing 
technology has developed rapidly, however, people have gradually made efforts to adopt 
fishery resources reservation and management methods, rather than ways to catch as many 
fish as possible. Among the many aspects of fishery resources conservation and 
management, straddling and highly migratory stocks (see Figure 1) especially need to be 
protected as they stay in different areas during different stages of life and could easily to 
face the risk of extinction.
1 
Within exclusive economic zones, coastal states can make laws to protect resources. 
As a part of customary law, however, the freedom of high seas results in flag state 
jurisdiction on the high seas. As global concern for the importance of conserving straddling 
and highly migratory stocks has risen, regulations concerning enforcement in the high seas 
to preserve these stocks and decrease their possibility of extinction have been created. To 
protect straddling and highly migratory stocks in various high-sea areas, the 1995 
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNFSA)
2  requires state parties 
to establish regional fishery management organisations (RFMOs) to conserve and manage 
those stocks. Through RFMOs, many conservation and management measures are 
established. For example, the primary method is to calculate the total allowable catch (TAC) 
of each stock and allocate quotas to members of RFMOs according to the TAC. Vessels 
might also be required to carry vessel monitoring systems (VMS) which use global 
positioning systems (GPS) to acquire the position of the vessels. The RFMOs then can 
conduct high seas enforcement, i.e. boarding and inspection, to determine if the vessels 
violate conservation and management measures. 
 
 
                                                      
1  Annex I of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) lists seventeen highly 
migratory species: albacore tuna, bluefin tuna, bigeye tuna, skipjack tuna, yellowfin tuna, blackfin tuna, 
little tuna, southern bluefin tuna, frigate mackerel, pomfrets, marlins, sailfish, swordfish, saury, dolphin, 
oceanic sharks, and cetaceans. UNCLOS was adopted on 10 December 1982 and entered into force 16 
November 1994. For the full text of UNCLOS, see A/CONF.62/122, 1833 UNTS 397. 
2  Oceans and Law of the Sea, A/CONF.164/37, 2167 UNTS 3.  
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Figure 1 
 
 
Source: Evelyne Meltzer, Global Overview of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Final Report of 
Conference on the Governance of High Seas Fisheries and the UN Fish Agreement): 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/consultative_process/documents/6_meltzer.pdf (visited on 
18/12/2012). 
    Enforcement includes both negative and positive actions. The former means to arrest 
or clamp down on the violator, i.e. impose punishments after the law is broken; the latter, 
on the other hand, refers to preventing violation behaviours, i.e. taking proactive measures 
to prohibit a breach of law. Traditionally, flag state jurisdiction applies to most 
circumstances, except for piracy, illegal drugs trafficking, illegal broadcasting, slavery, 
etc.
3  Due to the international community’s increased concern for fishery conservation and 
management, non-flag state enforcement in high seas fisheries has been extended from 
bilateral treaties to regional treaties. Through the management of RFMOs, members can 
not only exert their flag state jurisdiction but may also board and inspect each other’s 
vessels in order to ensure compliance with related conservation and management measures.   
    In addition, Taiwan, officially the Republic of China, is a democratic state in East 
Asia neighboured by the People’s Republic of China to the west, Japan to the northeast and 
                                                      
3  See Article 110 of UNCLOS.  
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the Philippines to the south. Taiwan’s total land area is approximately 14,400 square miles, 
and its population 23 million. It was the world’s 17th largest exporter and 18th largest 
importer of merchandise in 2011 and ranked the 13th in the World Economic Forum’s 
Global Competitiveness Report 2011–2012.
4  However, due to political conflict with China, 
Taiwan has been denied participation in most international governmental organisations 
using the identity of a state or its official name. Therefore, Taiwan seeks to overcome this 
obstacle by using other identity or name in international forum.
5  ‘Fishing entity’ is an 
identity that Taiwan uses in many RFMOs.   
    Although not much literature has discussed the term ‘fishing entity’, some articles 
have focused on the topic of fishing entity. Andrew Serdy discussed the details of Taiwan’s 
entry into the Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)
6, 
including Taiwan’s view on its position in the CCBST, and precisely analysed the CCSBT 
2001 Resolution, which established an extended commission and a scientific committee to 
introduce the concept of the fishing entity to the CCBST.
7  Serdy also examined Taiwan’s 
status and different position than China during process of negotiating, drafting and forming 
the CCBST, International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT)
8, 
                                                      
4  More information about Taiwan can be found on the official websites of Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs <http://taiwanindepth.tw (visited on 03/02/2014) and Tourism Bureau 
http://eng.taiwan.net.tw/m1.aspx?sNO=0000202 (visited on 03/02/2014). 
5  Regarding the origins of the political conflict between Taiwan and China and Taiwan’s participation in 
international governmental organisations using different nomenclature, please see Chapter 7, pp. 119–123, 
of this thesis.   
6  The CCSBT was established in 1994 with the aim to ensure, through appropriate management, the 
conservation and optimum utilisation of the global southern bluefin tuna stock. The CCSBT is 
headquartered in Canberra, Australia; has five members (Australia, Japan, New Zealand, Korea and 
Indonesia); a fishing entity, (Taiwan); and three co-operating non-parties (the Philippines, South Africa and 
the European Union). Complete information on CCSBT can be found at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/about.html (visited on 16/07/2010). 
7  Andrew Serdy, ‘Bringing Taiwan into the International Fisheries Fold: The Legal Personality of a Fishing 
Entity’, in James Crawford and Vaughan Lowe, eds., The British Year Book of International Law 2004 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005 Vol. 75), pp. 183–221. 
8  The ICCAT is an inter-governmental fishery organisation founded in 1969 which is responsible for the 
conservation of tunas and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean and its adjacent seas. It has 47 members: 
Albania, Algeria, Angola, Barbados, Belize, Brazil, Canada, Cape Verde, China, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, 
Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, the European Union, France, Gabon, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, 
Iceland, Japan, Libya, Morocco, Mauritania, Mexico, Namibia, Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, the 
Philippines, Republic of Korea, Russian Federation, Saint Vincent/Grenadines, Sao Tome and Principe, 
Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Syrian Arab Republic, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, the United 
Kingdom, United States of America, Uruguay, Vanuatu and Venezuela. In addition, the ICCAT has five 
co-operators: Bolivia, Chinese Taipei, Curacao, Suriname and El Salvador. Complete information can be 
found on the official ICCAT website <http://www.iccat.int/en/introduction.htm> (visited on 03/02/2014).  
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Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)
9, Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission (WCPFC)
10  and South East Atlantic Fisheries Organization (SEAFO).
11 
Serdy focused on the subject of Taiwan, rather than ‘fishing entity’, which seemed to be a 
consequence of Taiwan’s participation in the RFMOs. It can be argued that the term 
‘fishing entity’ was coined mainly to refer to Taiwan, so addressing Taiwan cannot be 
avoided, particularly when discussing Taiwan’s participation in RFMOs. In ‘The 
Emergence of the Concept of Fishing Entities: A Note’, Hasjim Djalal noted that the 
concept of fishing entities first appeared in the UNFSA in order, he argued, to deal with the 
fishing vessels of Taiwan.
12  Djalal apparently regarded ‘fishing entity’ as equivalent to 
Taiwan. He saw Taiwan as acting as a subject under international law and contended that, 
‘under emerging international law, a fishing entity has also gradually become a subject of 
international law having the rights, obligations, and legal capacity similar to other subjects 
under modern international law’.
13   
    While considering the issue of whether fishing entities have international legal 
personality, Martin Tsamenyi took the positive view. He did not emphasise the links 
                                                      
9  The IOTC was set up in 1997 as an intergovernmental organisation mandated to manage tuna and 
tuna-like species in the Indian Ocean and adjacent seas. Its objective is to promote cooperation among its 
members in order to ensure the conservation and optimum utilisation of stocks and to encourage 
sustainable development of fisheries based on such stocks. Its members are Australia, Belize, China, 
Comoros, Eritrea, the European Community, France, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Korea, 
Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mauritius, Mozambique, Oman, Pakistan, Philippines, Seychelles, Sierra 
Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, the United Kingdom, Vanuatu and Yemen; Senegal and South 
Africa are cooperating non-contracting parties. Complete information can be found on the official IOTC 
website http://www.iotc.org/English/about.php> (visited on 04/02/2014). 
10  The WCPFC was established in 2004 to address problems in the management of high seas fisheries 
resulting from unregulated fishing, over-capitalisation, excessive fleet capacity, vessel re-flagging to escape 
controls, insufficiently selective gear, unreliable databases and insufficient multilateral cooperation in the 
conservation and management of highly migratory fish stocks. The WCPFC’s members are Australia, China, 
Canada, Cook Islands, the European Union, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, France, Japan, Kiribati, 
Republic of Korea, Republic of Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, 
Philippines, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Chinese Taipei, Tonga, Tuvalu, the United States of America and 
Vanuatu. American Samoa, the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands, French Polynesia, Guam, 
New Caledonia, Tokelau and Wallis and Futuna are participating territories. Belize, the Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea, Ecuador, El Salvador, Indonesia, Mexico, Senegal, St Kitts and Nevis, Panama, Thailand 
and Vietnam are cooperating non-members. Complete information can be found on the official WCPFC 
website http://www.wcpfc.int/about-wcpfc (visited on 03/02/2014). 
11  See Serdy, supra note 7, pp. 200-216. The SEAFO was founded in 2003 with the objective to ensure the 
long-term conservation and sustainable use of the fishery resources in SEAFO’s area of competence. Its 
members are Angola, the European Union, Japan, Namibia, Norway, Republic of Korea and South Africa. 
Complete information can be found on the official SEAFO website http://www.seafo.org/index.html (visited 
on 04/02/2014). 
12  Hasjim Djalal, ‘The Emergence of the Concept of Fishing Entities: A Note’, Ocean Development and 
International Law, Vol. 37(2006), pp. 119. 
13  Ibid., p. 120.  
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between Taiwan and fishing entities but analysed international fisheries instruments, such 
as the UNFSA, Convention of the WCPFC, Antigua Convention, Cooperating Non-Party 
Schemes of the CCSBT, Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC)
14  and 
ICCAT.
15  He concluded ‘the international legal personality of fishing entities was 
confirmed by their recognition in international fisheries instruments and the creation of 
obligations for such entities’.
16 
    Michael W. Lodge, who served as the executive secretary to the Multilateral High 
Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks 
in West and Central Pacific from 1997 to 2000, recorded Taiwan’s participation in the 
conference that drafted the Convention of the WCPFC. His article was entitled ‘The 
Practice of Fishing Entities in Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: The Case of 
the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in 
the Western and Central Pacific Ocean’, but he directly used the term ‘Taiwan’, rather than 
‘fishing entities’, throughout the article.
17  Lodge clearly considered fishing entities as 
equivalent to Taiwan, although he described Taiwan as a major fishing entity.
18   
    Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu discussed the concept of fishing entities from Taiwan’s 
perspective.
19  He analysed Taiwan’s agreement to regard itself as a fishing entity as set out 
in the UNFSA and Taiwan’s use of the identity of fishing entity to participate in the 
International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific 
Ocean (ISC)
20, IATTC and WCPFC.
21  Hu stated that a fishing entity is a subject of 
                                                      
14  The IATTC is the first tuna regional fisheries management organisation, set up by United States and Costa 
Rica in 1950 in order to conserve and manage tuna and other marine resources in the eastern Pacific Ocean 
and enhance scientific research and cooperation on these resources. Its members are Belize, Canada, China, 
Chinese Taipei, Colombia, Costa Rica, Ecuador, El Salvador, the European Union, France, Guatemala, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, the United States, Vanuatu and Venezuela. The Cook Islands and 
Kiribati are cooperating non-parties. Complete information can be found on the official IATTC website 
http://www.iattc.org/HomeENG.htm (visited on 07/08/2010). 
15  Tsamenyi had stated that only Taiwan was considered a fishing entity but did not deal with the political 
problems concerning Taiwan’s status in international law. Instead, he focused on the legal status and 
content of a fishing entity. See Martin Tsamenyi, ‘The Legal Substance and Status of Fishing Entities in 
International Law: A Note’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), pp. 123–131. 
16  Ibid., p. 130. 
17  See Michael W. Lodge, ‘The Practice of Fishing Entities in Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: 
The Case of the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), pp. 185–207. 
18  Ibid., p. 200. 
19  Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, ‘Fishing Entities: Their Emergence, Evolution, and Practice from Taiwan’s 
Perspective’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), pp. 149–183. 
20  The United States and Japan founded the ISC in 1995 with the objective to improve scientific research 
and cooperation in the conservation and rational utilisation of the species of tuna and tuna-like fishes which 
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international law and should be regarded as ‘an entity possessing full autonomy in the 
conduct of its external fisheries relations and of all matters provided for in relevant 
international law’.
22  In addition, Peter S. C. Ho discussed the impact of the UNFSA on 
Taiwan’s participation in RFMOs.
23  He observed that, before the adoption of the UNFSA, 
Taiwan did not belong to any RFMO, but the creation of the term ‘fishing entity’ by the 
UNFSA allowed Taiwan to join some RFMOs and become further involved in their 
decision making.
24  Similarly to Hu, Ho also discussed Taiwan’s decision to be regarded as 
a fishing entity and the process through which Taiwan participated in some RFMOs, 
including the ICCAT, WCPFC, CCSBT and IATTC.
25 
    Dustin Kuan-Hsiung Wang examined Taiwan’s role during the drafting of the Antigua 
Convention, including the application of the term ‘fishing entities’ in the convention, 
Taiwan’s viewpoint in each meeting, other states’ views of Taiwan’s position in the 
convention and the conflicts between Taiwan and China.
26  Furthermore, William Edeson 
in his article ‘Some Future Directions for Fishing Entities in Certain Regional Fisheries 
Management Bodies’ identified two types of RFMOs: those outside the Food and 
Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations (UN) framework and those within 
the UN context.
27  Regarding the first type, Edeson roughly described the RFMOs which 
have regulations about fishing entities, including the CCBST, IATTC and WCPFC.
28  He 
suggested that the ICCAT, in particular, consider the experience of the CCSBT in 
establishing an extended commission and scientific committee to ensure that ‘Taiwan 
gained benefits from its participation in the fisheries covered by ICCAT commensurate 
                                                                                                                                                                 
inhabit the North Pacific Ocean during part or all of their life cycle. The ISC was also charged with laying the 
scientific groundwork, if at some point in the future, it is decided to create a multilateral regime for the 
conservation and rational utilisation of these species in this region. ISC members are: Canada, Chinese 
Taipei, Japan, Republic of Korea, Mexico, People’s Republic of China and the United States of America. 
Observers include the IATTC, FAO, North Pacific Marine Science Organization (PICES), Secretariat of the 
Pacific Community (SPC) and WCPFC. Further information can be found on the official ISC website 
http://isc.ac.affrc.go.jp/ (visited on 05/08/2010). 
21  Hu, supra note 19. 
22  Ibid., p. 175. 
23  Peter S.C. Ho, ‘The Impact of the Fish Stocks Agreement on Taiwan’s Participation in International 
Fisheries Fora’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), pp. 133–148. 
24  Ibid. 
25  Ibid. 
26  Dustin Kung-Hsiung Wang, ‘Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Fisheries Management Organizations and 
the Conceptual Revolution on Fishing Entity: The Case of IATTC’, Ocean Development and International Law, 
Vol. 37(2006), pp. 209–219. 
27  William Edeson, ‘Some Future Directions for Fishing Entities in Certain Regional Fisheries Management 
Bodies’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), pp. 245–264. 
28  Ibid., pp. 248–251.  
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with its commitment to comply with applicable conservation and management 
measures’.
29  Edeson mainly focused on the second type of RFMOs, specifically the IOTC, 
which he pointed out was so far the only RFMO concerned with tuna which ruled out the 
participation of fishing entities.
30  He analysed the problem facing the IOTC and suggested 
that the practical option to position the IOTC outside the FAO framework would be to 
adopt amendments to the IOTC Agreement without creating new obligations for the 
contracting parties.
31  In another article, ‘An International Legal Extravaganza in the 
Indian Ocean: Placing the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission outside the Framework of FAO’, 
Edeson focused more about the legal obstacles placed in the way of this process by the 
FAO’s internal legal advisers.
32 
    The only fishing entity at present is Taiwan, so the discussed research on fishing 
entities focused mainly on Taiwan’s participation in various tuna RFMOs. Most authors 
attended the relevant meetings of the RFMOs, so they could provide first-hand records of 
the meetings and share their perspectives of the negotiation process, resulting in significant 
research on fishing entities. Thus, most of the literature discussed Taiwan’s perspective on 
fishing entities, rather than fishing entities themselves. Although the term ‘fishing entities’ 
was coined primarily to resolve the difficulty of Taiwan’s participation in relevant fisheries 
organisations, the term itself needs to be further discussed as it is included in international 
fisheries law. Therefore, this thesis will focus on the topic of fishing entities as a new 
concept in international fisheries law. It is impossible to avoid mentioning Taiwan while 
discussing fishing entities; however, this thesis will concentrate on fishing entities 
themselves and treat Taiwan as an example, not as a synonym.   
    In addition, a fishing entity, as an actor in the international law of the sea, might, like 
Taiwan, possess advanced technology in fishing skills, so it cannot be ignored in global 
and regional conservation and management of fishery resources. Although there is not a 
legal or normal definition of fishing entity, a fishing entity is definitely categorised as an 
‘entity’ rather than a ‘state’, resulting in certain unclear circumstances for its involvement 
in global or regional agreements whose subjects are assumed to be states. This ambiguity is 
                                                      
29  Ibid., pp. 248–250. 
30  Ibid., pp. 251–261. 
31  Ibid. 
32  W.R. Edeson, ‘An International Legal Extravaganza in the Indian Ocean: Placing the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission outside the Framework of FAO’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 22, 
No.4(2007), pp. 485-515.  
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especially strong in high seas enforcement actions concerning the jurisdiction of a state, 
such as boarding and inspection.   
    However, the concept of conservation and management should be based on the 
premise that all actors must be brought under regulations; otherwise, the actors’ efforts 
within regulations would be in vain and lead to failure. Therefore, it is necessary and 
important to study the enforcement of fishing entities on the high seas in order to ensure 
the effectiveness of the rules conserving and managing the straddling and highly migratory 
stocks. Since the WCPFC became the first RFMO to adopt its own boarding and inspection 
procedure, no relevant literature discussing fishing entities’ position in high seas 
enforcement has been produced. This thesis thus stands as the first research to consider 
together fishing entities and high seas enforcement in the international law of the sea. 
    In this thesis, I link fishing entities to high seas enforcement by discussing the role of 
fishing entities in international law of the sea and clarifying their obligations and rights in 
high seas fishery enforcement, especially regarding regulations concerning conservation 
and management of straddling and highly migratory stocks. This thesis also discusses 
RFMOs which focus on the protection of straddling and highly migratory stocks and allow 
participation by fishing entities. Before moving to the linkage between fishing entities and 
high seas fisheries enforcement, it is necessary to review the concept of fishing entities, 
including the international instruments in which the term ‘fishing entities’ originates. Thus, 
the first question this thesis attempts to answer is: (a) Why is the issue of fishing entities 
important? What is the legal status of the fishing entity in the international law of the sea 
and in RFMOs? 
    After introducing the concept of fishing entities, the thesis further considers the 
position of fishing entities in fisheries enforcement on the high seas and seeks to answer 
the following research questions: (b) How does fisheries enforcement on the high seas treat 
the fishing entity which possesses two disparate identities—a flag state and a non-flag state? 
Based on the role that fishing entities should play, the next question asked is: (c) What 
problems might fishing entities and the international community face under present fishery 
regulations? The regulations of fisheries enforcement on the high seas are mostly set out in 
the UNFSA, which requires RFMOs to adopt their own boarding and inspection 
procedures; therefore, while understanding the concept of the fishing entity and its status in 
international fisheries enforcement on the high seas, the thesis examines the practices of 
high seas fisheries enforcement performed by fishing entities within RFMOs. Thus arises  
14 
 
the question: (d) What practices for fishing entity enforcement on high seas do RFMOs 
adopt? 
    To answer these questions, the thesis is divided into three parts: the fishing entity, the 
link between the fishing entity and its fisheries enforcement on the high seas, and the 
practice of fishing entity and of others regarding it in RFMOs. In Part 1 of this thesis 
entitled ‘The Existence of the Fishing Entity’, I first introduce the concept of the fishing 
entity in the first chapter. As the fishing entity exists, it leads us to consider its legal status 
in the international law of the sea, which is the topic of Chapter 2. While discussing the 
fishing entity’s status in international law, especially under the UNFSA, it is found that the 
fishing entity primarily plays a role in many individual RFMOs. Therefore, Chapter 3 
‘Fishing Entities in RFMOs’ addresses the regulations concerning fishing entities in the 
main eight RFMOs governing most high sea areas regarding the conservation and 
management of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.   
    In the second part of this thesis entitled ‘Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries by 
Fishing Entities’, it first is shown that a state’s enforcement on the high seas can be 
categorised as enforcement against its own vessels, which falls under flag state jurisdiction, 
and as enforcement against other state’s vessels, which is called non-flag state enforcement. 
I explore these two concepts in Chapters 4 and 5, specifically whether fishing entities can 
exercise flag state jurisdiction and non-flag state enforcement. Although a fishing entity 
might be similar to a state in flag state and non-flag state enforcement, it is not a state after 
all and moreover is a new concept in the international law of the sea. Thus, it might 
encounter some problems in this field, which are addressed in Chapter 6, ‘The Problematic 
Consequences of Fishing Entity Enforcement on the High Seas’.   
    In the third part of this thesis entitled ‘Practice with RFMOs—The Example of 
Taiwan’, I first introduce the background of and reasons why Taiwan became a fishing 
entity and how it participated as a members in three RFMOs (WCPFC, IATTC and ISC), 
as discussed in Chapter 7. Chapter 8 continues to examine Taiwan’s participation in three 
other RFMOs (CCSBT, ICCAT and IOTC) as a non-member. I do not discuss the North 
Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission (NPAFC)
33  or the SEAFO because Taiwan does not 
participate in the SEAFO at all, and although it has occasionally attended meetings of the 
                                                      
33  The NPAFC was established in 1993 with the objective to promote the conservation of anadromous 
stocks in the convention area. The contracting parties are Canada, Japan, Republic of Korea, the Russian 
Federation and the United States. Complete information can be found on the official NPAFC site 
http://www.npafc.org/new/about_convention.html (visited on 07/02/2014).  
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NPAFC as an observer since 2005, Taiwan’s involvement in this organisation is different 
than in the ICCAT. Taiwan is not bound by the NPAFC’s regulations but only provides 
scientific information to it. Most importantly, while attending NPAFC meetings, Taiwan 
does not use the identity of a fishing entity but the name ‘Taiwan’ and is not introduced or 
recorded as a fishing entity.
34   
   
                                                      
34  See the 2005–2010 and 2012 annual reports of the NPAFC, available at 
http://www.npafc.org/new/pub_annualreport.html (visited on 07/02/2014).  
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I. FISHING ENTITY 
 
 
CHAPTER 1 The Existence of the Fishing Entity 
 
1. Introduction 
After decades of efforts to establish an effective regime to maintain the sustainability of 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, the Fish Stock Agreement was adopted on 4
 
August 1995 and entered into force on 11 December 2001 after deposit of the thirtieth 
instrument of accession by the Republic of Malta. Due to the necessity of cooperating in 
and the indivisibility of the fields of fisheries conservation and management, the UNFSA 
introduces the concept of fishing entity into its regulations.
1  Although the agreement does 
not give the term ‘fishing entity’ a clear definition, it implies not only the special status of 
the fishing entity in the international law of the sea but also the concern that the fishing 
entities should not be excluded from international collaboration in conserving and 
managing fisheries resources. 
According to FAO statistics, more than 70% of fisheries are overexploited or depleted. 
Highly migratory and straddling stocks are affected particularly seriously. Global fish 
production has continued to increase and reached 148.5 million tonnes in 2010.
2  Although 
catches of tuna and tuna-like species have decreased by 1.7 per cent and remained stable 
since 2010 after an upward trend which led to the historical peak catch in 2006,
3  they still 
belong to species urgently needing to be protected. During the 13–25 March 2010 
Conference of the Parties at the 15
th Meeting of the Convention on International Trade in 
                                                      
1  Article 1(3) states that ‘[t]his Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing entities whose vessels 
fish on the high seas’, and article 17(3) also mentions ‘fishing entity’: ‘States which are members of a 
subregional or regional fisheries management organization or participants in a subregional or regional 
fisheries management arrangement shall, individually or jointly, request the fishing entities referred to in 
article 1, paragraph 3, which have fishing vessels in the relevant area to cooperate fully with such 
organization or arrangement in implementing the conservation and management measures it has 
established, with a view to having such measures applied de facto as extensively as possible to fishing 
activities in the relevant area. Such fishing entities shall enjoy benefits from participation in the fishery 
commensurate with their commitment to comply with conservation and management measures in respect 
of the stocks’. 
2  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Yearbook: Fishery and Aquaculture 
Statistics (Rome: FAO Fisheries Department, 2012), p. xvi. 
3  Ibid., also see Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, FAO Yearbook: Fishery and 
Aquaculture Statistics (Rome: FAO Fisheries Department, 2009), p. xxii.  
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Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES)
4  in Doha (Qatar), Morocco 
proposed a ban on the trade of Atlantic bluefin tuna.
5  Although this proposal was not 
adopted, it proved useful in drawing international attention to not only the high possibility 
of commercial extinction faced by the bluefin tuna but also the importance of the 
conservation and sustainable development of fishery resources. Due to the vulnerability of 
the highly migratory and straddling stocks, their conservation and management is of global 
concern. A fishing entity would be exempt from international fishery conservation and 
management regimes if it were not regarded as an actor in international fishery regulations, 
a situation which would worsen if the entity possessed the ability to severely deplete the 
stocks and cause tension within the regime. 
This chapter aims to introduce the concept of fishing entity and review the 
stipulations on fishing entities concerning fishery resources conservation and sustainable 
development by considering the relations between the fishing entity and the related 
international instruments. 
 
2. The Concept of the Fishing Entity 
States are the primary subjects in the traditional international law of the sea, as well as the 
main actors in international society.
6  After the two World Wars, actors other than states 
have emerged as subjects of international law have emerged, such as international 
organisations, international non-government organisations, and entities.
7  It is thought that 
an entity with limited rights and obligations and limited capacity to make an international 
claim can be regarded as a legal person.
8  However, an entity which does not satisfy those 
conditions might still have a legal personality generated by certain international 
                                                      
4  CITES is an international agreement between governments. It was drafted as a result of a resolution 
adopted in 1963. The text of the convention was finally agreed upon at a meeting of representatives of 80 
countries in Washington, D.C. on 3 March 1973, and it entered into force on 1 July 1975. The aim of CITES is 
to ensure that the international trade in specimens of wild animals and plants does not threaten their 
survival. For further information, see the official CITES website, <http://www.cites.org/> (visited on 
15/03/2010). 
5  See CITES, http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/15/sum/E15-Com-I-Rec08.pdf (visited on 30/09/2010). 
6  In the theory of international relations, the neo-realist emphasises the role of state as an actor, whereas 
the idealist focuses on the important roles of other actors, such as international organisations, 
transnational corporations and individuals, etc. However, both claim that states are the primary, not the 
only actors, in international relations. 
7  Hasjim Djalal, ‘The Emergence of the Concept of Fishing Entities: A Note’, Ocean Development and 
International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 117. 
8  Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6
th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 
57.  
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agreements.
9  The most prominent example is the Holy See, whose exclusive sovereignty 
and jurisdiction over the City of the Vatican was recognised in the international domain by 
Italy in the 1929 Treaty and Concordat;
10  afterward, it was recognised by most states as 
well.
11 
    In addition to this religious entity, non-self-governing territories are another 
well-known entity. The mandate territories under the League of Nations and the trust 
territories of the UN are regarded as political entities. National liberation movements can 
also be recognised as political entities, for example, the Palestine Liberation Organization 
(PLO) was granted observer status in the UN General Assembly.
12  Similar to national 
liberation movements, insurgent communities de facto occupy and control a specific 
territory during a civil war within a country and can be recognised as belligerents, which 
possess a certain international personality.
13   
In addition to religious and political entities, the concept of entity extends to the 
economic sphere. All members of the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) are 
called ‘economies’, which are economic entities.
14  Parallel to its status as an economic 
entity, Taiwan became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) under the 
identity of customs entity using the name ‘the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, 
Penghu, Kinmen and Matsu’ in 2002.
15 
    Another type of entity characterised by its economic functions is the fishing entity. 
The 1995 Fish Stock Agreement marked the first time that the concept of fishing entity was 
written into the provisions of a formal international agreement. However, the agreement 
does not definitely define a fishing entity’s legal status and its specific rights and 
obligations in international law. Further regulation directly related to fishing entities can be 
seen in the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.
16  Article 1(2) states that 
                                                      
9  Ibid. 
10  Ibid., p. 63. 
11  See Robert A. Graham, Vatican Diplomacy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1959), pp. 19–21. 
However, it now recognised as a state, instead of an entity. 
12  Brownlie, supra note 8, pp. 61–62. 
13  Ibid., p. 63. 
14  APEC, http://www.apec.org/apec/member_economies.html (visited on 19/02/2010). 
15  See Andrew Serdy, ‘Bringing Taiwan into the International Fisheries Fold: The Legal Personality of a 
Fishing Entity’, in James Crawford and Vaughan Lowe, eds., The British Year Book of International Law 2004 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005, Vol. 75), pp. 217–218. Also see WTO, 
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/chinese_taipei_e.htm (visited on 19/02/2010). 
16  To ensure the sustainable development of global fisheries, the FAO in 1995 adopted the Code of Conduct 
for Responsible Fisheries, which regulates the principles and international standards of behaviour for 
responsible practices in order to ensure the effective conservation, management and development of living 
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‘[t]he Code is global in scope, and is directed toward members and non-members of FAO, 
fishing entities, subregional, regional and global organizations, and ‘ Article 4(1) that ‘[a]ll 
members and non-members of FAO, fishing entities and relevant subregional, regional and 
global organizations … management and utilization of fisheries resources and trade in fish 
and fishery products should collaborate in the fulfilment and implementation of the 
objectives and principles contained in this Code’.
17 
    Provisions related to fishing entities can usually be seen in RFMOs as well. To 
encourage entities with vessels fishing for southern bluefin tuna to implement the 
CCSBT’s conservation and management measures, the commission’s members tried to 
settle the difficulty of Taiwan’s participation as a member in CCSBT, leading to the 
Resolution to Establish an Extended Commission and an Extended Scientific Committee 
adopted in April 2001.
18  Taiwan, named ‘Fishing Entity of Taiwan’, became a member of 
the Extended Commission in 2002 through an exchange of letters.
19 
    In addition to the CCSBT, the Charter of the ISC provides that coastal states, other 
states, and fishing entities in the region, or with vessels fishing for these species in the 
region are eligible to become members of ISC. Pursuant to the charter, Taiwan, as a fishing 
entity, became a member under the name of ‘Chinese Taipei’ in 2002.
20 
Furthermore, in July 2003, the IATTC replaced the 1949 IATTC Convention with the 
Convention for the Strengthening of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
Established by the 1949 Convention between the United States of America and the 
Republic of Costa Rica (hereinafter the Antigua Convention),
21  with stipulations 
concerning fishing entities as well. Article XIX states that ‘Article XVIII of this 
Convention applies, mutatis mutandis, to fishing entities that are members of the 
Commission’, while Article XXI stipulates that the responsibilities of fishing entities as 
members of the commission are the same as those of other flag states outlined in Article 
XX. Article XVIII contains further provisions directly applicable to fishing entities. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
aquatic resources with respect for the ecosystem and biodiversity. It is a non-binding instrument but 
contains a large number of regulations in 12 articles. 
17  See FAO, http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/005/v9878e/v9878e00.htm (visited on 22/02/2010). 
18  See Serdy, supra note 15, pp. 184–199. The full text of the resolution can be seen on the CCSBT website, 
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/the_Extended_commission.pdf (visited on 
16/08/2010). 
19  Peter S.C. Ho, ‘The Impact of the Fish Stocks Agreement on Taiwan’s Participation in International 
Fisheries Fora’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 141. 
20  The full text of the charter can be seen on the official ISC website, 
http://isc.ac.affrc.go.jp/about_isc/charter.html (visited on 05/08/2010). 
21  See IATTC, http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Antigua_Convention_Jun_2003.pdf (visited on 05/08/2010).  
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Previously an observer, Taiwan became a member as a fishing entity with the name of 
‘Chinese Taipei’ when the Antigua Convention entered into force on 27 August 2010. 
    In addition to the Antigua Convention, Annex I of the Convention on the 
Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
Central Pacific Ocean
22  has particular stipulations for fishing entities. Article 9(2) states 
that ‘[a] fishing entity referred to in the Agreement, which has agreed to be bound by … 
this Convention in accordance with the provisions of Annex I, may participate in the 
work … of the Commission’. Annex I of the convention further clarifies fishing entities’ 
status in the IATTC. Firstly, any fishing entity whose vessels fish for highly migratory fish 
stocks in the convention area has the right to agree to be bound by the convention and 
withdraw from such agreement. Secondly, fishing entities shall participate in the work of 
the commission and comply with the obligations in this convention. References to the 
IATTC or its members include, for the purposes of the convention, such fishing entities as 
well as contracting parties. In addition, the Permanent Court of Arbitration will settle any 
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of the convention involving a fishing 
entity. Under those articles, Taiwan, as a fishing entity, signed a document called 
‘Arrangement for the Participation of Fishing Entities’
23  under the name of ‘Chinese 
Taipei’. 
    Obviously, although most RFMOs established certain provisions related to fishing 
entities in order to fulfil the organisations’ conservation and management measures, they 
do not create any definition or give any explanation of ‘entity’ and ‘fishing entity’ but 
simply use this term. The term ‘fishing entities’ is used by most RFMOs; however, their 
status within RFMOs is different than that of states and varies among RFMOs. 
 
                                                      
22  The full text of the convention is available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/convention-conservation-and-management-highly-migratory-fish-stocks-western
-and-central-pacific- (visited on 22/08/2010). This convention established the WCPFC, which was the first 
regional fisheries agreement to be drafted after the adoption of the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement. 
23  See WCPFC, http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/arrangement-participation-fishing-entities (visited on 
22/08/2010). This arrangement states, ‘The Conference HEREBY INVITES Chinese Taipei, as a fishing entity, 
and Chinese Taipei HEREBY DECLARES its intent: 
(a) to participate in the Preparatory Conference established by the resolution attached to the Final Act of 
the Conference, 
(b) subject to the fulfilment of its domestic legal requirements, to agree to be bound by the regime 
established by the Convention in accordance with article 9, paragraph 2, of the Convention, and to 
participate in the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the Convention’.  
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3. International Instruments Concerning Fishing Entities 
3.1 Food and Agriculture Organization 
In the 1992, the FAO Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing made the first reference 
to fishing entities in a paper entitled ‘International Fishery Bodies: Considerations for High 
Seas Management’.
24  In this paper, the issue of non-contracting parties is emphasised in 
paragraph 45: ‘The treatment of non-contracting parties is an important and real issue that 
should be addressed in the context of high-seas fisheries management. Some nations or 
other entities operating in a fishery may opt not to participate in a high seas management 
body or they may be excluded from it (e.g., for political or other reasons). The 
effectiveness of high seas management will therefore be significantly reduced if a major 
entity in a fishery does not participate in determining management decisions and in turn is 
not bound by those decisions’.
25 
Although paragraph 45 uses the phrases ‘entities operating in a fishery’ and ‘a major 
entity in a fishery’ rather than ‘fishing entities’, paragraph 46 makes an explicit reference 
to ‘fishing entities’: ‘The exclusion of parties from management bodies for political or 
other reasons poses particular difficulties. Taiwan (Province of China) is a major 
international fishing entity. Its high seas fishing capacity is extensive and likely to increase, 
especially in the Indian and South Pacific Oceans. However, due to political 
non-recognition, Taiwan (Province of China) does not participate fully in any fishery 
management bodies. Similarly, legal constraints prevent the EEC from participating in 
some fishery bodies’.
26 
    This FAO document not only discusses the problems that the non-contracting parties 
and fishing entities may face but also implies the close connection between 
non-contracting parties and fishing entities: fishing entities are usually also non-contracting 
parties in RFMOs.
27  This paper also clearly points out that non-contracting parties can 
cause the problem of unregulated fishing, which undermines the benefits generated by 
                                                      
24  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Fisheries Report No. 484 Supplement, 
FIPL/R484(Suppl.), Papers presented at the FAO Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing, Rome, 7–15 
September 1992, pp. 44–54. Also see Jean-Pierre Lévy and Gunnar G. Schram, eds., United Nations 
Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks—Selected Documents (Hague: Kluwer 
Law International, 1996), pp. 346–358. Also see Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, ‘Fishing Entities: Their Emergence, 
Evolution, and Practice from Taiwan’s Perspective’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 
37(2006), p. 150. 
25  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, ibid., p. 52. 
26  Ibid. 
27  For example, Taiwan is a member of the IATTC and WCPFC as a fishing entity, but is not a contracting 
party of the conventions that created them.  
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conservation and management measures. This document intimates the importance and 
necessity of bringing fishing entities into the decision-making process of high seas 
management measures in order to ensure that each body will be bound by those decisions, 
increasing the effectiveness of the related measures. 
 
3.2 The United Nations Fish Stock Agreement 
The provisions in the Fish Stock Agreement which mention fishing entities are Articles 1(3) 
and 17(3). Article 1(3) states ‘[t]his Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing 
entities whose vessels fish on the high seas’. Article 17(3) requires members of RFMOs to 
cooperate with fishing entities.
28  These two provisions try to cover the activities of fishing 
entities with different objects. Article 1(3) applies to any contracting parties of the 
agreement with the identity of fishing entities; therefore, all fishing entities that have 
acceded to or ratified this agreement would have the same rights and responsibilities as 
‘normal’ contracting parties. This provision also seems to imply that the agreement does 
not exclude fishing entities from becoming parties of it. Strangely, though, articles 37 and 
39 concerning signature and accession, respectively, do not allow all fishing entities to 
participate.
29  However, the objects of Article 17(3) are the members of the RFMOs 
concerning straddling and highly migratory stocks. This article requires those members to 
cooperate with the fishing entities mentioned in Article 1(3) to enforce the organisations 
conservation and management measures of. In addition, under Article 17(3), fishing 
entities which agree to conform to the conservation and management measures for these 
stocks should receive the commensurate benefits of fishing entities from participation in 
the fishery. 
 
3.3 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries 
The scope of geography and objects to which the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible 
Fisheries applies are indicated by Article 1(2). This article specifies that the code is global 
and targeted toward members and non-members of FAO, fishing entities and government 
and nongovernmental subregional, regional and global organisations. As well, it applies to 
all persons concerned with the conservation of fishery resources and management and 
                                                      
28  For the text of Article 17(3), please see supra note 1. 
29  Whether the fishing entities could become parties of the agreement is discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 34–43, 
of this thesis.    
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development of fisheries, such as fishers, those engaged in processing and marketing of 
fish and fishery products and other users of the aquatic environment in relation to fisheries. 
In addition, Article 4(1) states that all related actors, which include fishing entities, 
should collaborate in the fulfilment and implementation of the code’s objectives and 
principles concerning the conservation, management and utilisation of fisheries resources 
and trade in fish and fishery products. Clearly, in these two articles, fishing entities are 
regarded as an actor with responsibilities for their fisheries. Although the code is hortatory 
and has no direct binding effect in international law, that does not reduce the importance of 
fishing entities as actors of responsible fisheries. 
 
3.4 Four International Plans of Action by the Food and Agriculture Organization 
In 1998, the FAO Committee on Fisheries (COFI) found it necessary to establish certain 
forms of international agreement in order to achieve or implement the 1995 Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries.
30  Therefore, two intergovernmental meetings, open to 
all FAO members, were held in 1998 at which discussions resulted in three international 
plans of action (IPOAs).
31  Those three texts were finalised as the IPOA for the 
Management of Fishing Capacity, the IPOA for the Conservation and Management of 
Sharks and the IPOA for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Long-line Fisheries. 
They were adopted at the 23
rd Session of COFI in February 1999.
32 
    At the same session, COFI determined that it was necessary to prevent, deter and 
eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated (IUU) Fishing.
33  Next, an Expert 
Consultation was held in Australia from 15–19 May 2000, leading to a basic text for the 
subsequent FAO Technical Consultations on IUU Fishing in October 2000 and February 
2001.
34  Finally, the IPOA for IUU Fishing was approved by COFI consensus on 2 March 
2001 and endorsed at the 120
th Session of the FAO Council on 23 June 2001.
35 
    The provisions in these four IPOAs concerning fishing entities are as follows. 
                                                      
30  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Plan of Action for Reducing 
Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Longline Fisheries, International Plan of Action for the Conservation and 
Management of Sharks, International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (Rome: FAO, 
1999), p. iii. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Ibid. 
33  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter 
and Eliminate illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (Rome: FAO, 2001), p. iii, p. 1. 
34  Ibid. 
35  Ibid.  
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I. International Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity 
Paragraph 5 reads: ‘This document is in furtherance of the commitment of all States to 
implement the Code of Conduct. States and regional fisheries organizations should apply 
this document consistently with international law and within the framework of the 
respective competencies of the organizations concerned’.
36  Note 7 clearly explains that, in 
this document, the term ‘state’ includes members and non-members of the FAO and also 
applies mutatis mutandis to ‘fishing entities’ other than states.
37 
 
II. International Plan of Action for the Conservation and Management of Sharks 
Similarly, paragraph 10 of the IPOA for the Conservation and Management of Sharks 
states that it has been elaborated within the framework of the Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries…. The provisions of Article 3 of the Code of Conduct apply to the 
interpretation and application of this document and its relationship with other international 
instruments. All concerned States are encouraged to implement it’.
38  Note 6 explains that, 
in this document, the term ‘state’ includes members and non-members of FAO and applies 
mutatis mutandis to ‘fishing entities’ other than states.
39 
 
III. International Plan of Action for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Long-line 
Fisheries 
Paragraph 8 of this IPOA for Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Long-line Fisheries 
is almost a duplicate of paragraph 10 of the IPOA for the Conservation and Management of 
Sharks and it reads: ‘IPOA-Seabirds … has been elaborated within the framework of the 
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. … The provisions of Article 3 of the Code of 
Conduct apply to the interpretation and application of this document and its relationship 
with other international instruments. All concerned States are encouraged to implement 
it’.
40  Like the IPOA for the Management of Fishing Capacity, note 3 of the IPOA for 
                                                      
36  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, supra note 30, p. 19. (emphasis added) 
37  Ibid. 
38  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, supra note 30, p. 12. (emphasis added) 
39  Ibid. 
40  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, supra note 30, p. 2. (emphasis added)  
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Reducing Incidental Catch of Seabirds in Long-line Fisheries interprets that the term ‘state’ 
as applying mutatis mutandis to ‘fishing entities’ other than states.
41 
 
IV. International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and 
Unregulated Fishing 
The provisions of paragraph 3(3) defining ‘unregulated fishing’ mention fishing entities. 
Paragraph 3(3)(1) reads: ‘Unregulated fishing refers to fishing activities in the area of 
application of a relevant regional fisheries management organization that are conducted 
by … a fishing entity, in a manner that is not consistent with or contravenes the 
conservation and management measures of that organization’.
42  That the IPOA for IUU 
places fishing entities under the definition of unregulated fishing, instead of illegal fishing 
or unreported fishing, implies the special status of fishing entities whose fishing activities 
might not rise to illegal or unreported fishing but have some potential to involve the 
problem of unregulated fishing. This potential can reasonably highlight the need to 
regulate the conduct of fishing entities. 
In addition, paragraph 5 echoes the related provisions of the 1995 Code of Conduct 
for Responsible Fisheries on fishing entities. It states that ‘[t]he IPOA is also directed as 
appropriate towards fishing entities as referred to in the Code of Conduct’.
43   
These four IPOAs implement the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. 
Although these are all hortatory, their provisions explicitly concern international society. 
As the existence of fishing entities cannot be denied, they are regarded as the subject of the 
provisions of these four IPOAs and the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. 
Therefore, fishing entities should be participants in related agreements and RFMOs so that 
their regulations can be complied with and implemented completely. 
 
4. Conclusion 
This section introduces the international instruments with provisions that directly address 
fishing entities. A review of these stipulations gives a picture of the general concept of the 
fishing entity. It can be concluded that fishing entities are considered as important as states 
in fishery resources conservation and sustainable development. In addition to these 
                                                      
41  Ibid. 
42  Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, supra note 33, p. 2. 
43  Ibid., p. 3.  
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international instruments, still other RFMOs’ conventions and guidelines bring fishing 
entities into their systems, including the CCSBT, Guidelines for the Interim Scientific 
Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean, WCPFC 
Convention, Antigua Convention and Convention on the Conservation and Management of 
Fishery Resources in the South-East Atlantic Ocean. These conventions and related 
documents are discussed in the third chapter. 
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CHAPTER 2 The Legal Status of the Fishing Entity 
 
1. Introduction 
The UNFSA brought the concept of fishing entities into international fisheries law. 
However, it neither defines fishing entities not clearly addresses their legal status, rights 
and obligations under international law. Given the significant role that fishing entities play 
in international fisheries law, it is necessary to determine if they possess international legal 
personality and what their legal status is under international law. Firstly, this chapter 
discusses what personality is in international law and the role that fishing entities play 
under international fisheries law. Next, it examines the legal status of fishing entities under 
the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), which is regarded 
as a significant convention in international fisheries law. Finally, this chapter reviews the 
process by which the concept of fishing entities was introduced into the UNFSA during the 
UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks and analyses 
whether fishing entities are a subject of the UNFSA, in other words, their legal status under 
the 1995 agreement. 
 
2. Personality in International Law 
The subjects of international law are entities with international legal personality which 
possess the capacity to bear rights and obligations under the international legal system.
1  In 
the past, states were regarded as the only subject of international law. However, the 
concept of subject in international law is not invariable. An advisory opinion of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the 
United Nations declares that ‘[t]he subjects of law in any legal system are not necessarily 
identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights, and their nature depends upon the 
needs of the community’.
2  The development of international society has created various 
subjects of international law. This ICJ opinion states that the international organisation ‘is a 
subject of international law and capable of possessing international rights and duties, and 
that it has capacity to maintain its rights by bringing international claims’.
3 
                                                      
1  Bin Cheng, ‘Introduction to Subjects of International Law’, in Mohammed Bedjaoui, ed., International 
Law: Achievements and Prospects (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1991), p. 23. 
2  Reparations for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion: ICJ Reports 1949, 
p. 174, 179. 
3  Ibid., p. 178. Also see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 6
th ed. (New York: Oxford 
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    As the subjects of international law have varied over time, the capacity which entities 
possess to bear rights and duties differs for each subject. However, the variations of 
capacity are not the criteria by which to judge whether entities possess international legal 
personality. O’Connell explains this point clearly. 
Capacity implies personality, but always it is capacity to do those 
particular acts. Therefore ‘personality’ as a term is only shorthand for the 
proposition that an entity is endowed by international law with legal 
capacity. But entity A may have capacity to perform acts X and Y, but not 
act Z, entity B to perform acts Y and Z but not act X, and entity C to 
perform all three. ‘Personality’ is not, therefore, a synonym for capacity to 
perform acts X, Y and Z; it is an index, not of capacity per se, but of 
specific and different capacities. … So a State may have capacity to do acts 
X, Y and Z, the United Nations to do acts Y and Z, the International Labour 
Organisation to do act X, and the human being to do acts X and Y. All four 
entities have capacities. To deny that the last three have personality is to 
argue that only entities with all capacities are persons, an argument that 
removes all meaning from the term ‘personality’. This was the error made 
by generations of international lawyers who asserted that ‘States only are 
the subjects of international law’.
 4 
    As an international personality cannot be judged by its various capacities, how then 
can it be decided if an entity possesses international personality? In slave-holding societies, 
slaves were regarded as human beings but were not endowed by the legal system with 
rights and duties; in other words, they were the object, instead of the subject, of the law.
5 
In contrast, the Roman Emperor Caligula conferred on his horse a Consul status, with all 
the attendant legal rights and duties of the Roman office superior to normal citizenship.
6 
These examples illustrate that legal personality can be endowed to different types of 
entities and that the rights and duties that each entity possesses can be different as well.
7 
                                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 2003), p. 57. 
4  D.P. O’Connell, International Law, 2
nd ed. (London: Stevens and Sons, 1970, Vol. 1), pp. 81-82. 
5  Cheng, supra note 1, p. 24. 
6  Ibid. 
7  Ibid., p. 25.  
29 
 
Therefore, an entity possessing legal personality in legal systems A, B and C does not 
necessarily possess legal personality in legal system X.
8 
    An international law system can be created by any two autonomous entities not 
restrained by any superior legal authority. These entities decide to enter legal relations by 
making a treaty or contract on the basis of equality and reciprocity, thus establishing an 
international legal system.
9  These entities possess international legal personality in the 
international legal system which they have created. Any third party or entity can also 
possess, or be endowed with, international legal personality in that system provided that 
the original founding entities agree. As Dr Bin Cheng states:   
Once an international legal system has been established among a limited 
number of entities, it is obvious that the entrance of new members will 
require the consent of existing members who, as the legislative and 
administering authorities of the legal system, will have to be satisfied with 
the factual ability of the applicant to bear legal rights and duties under the 
system before granting it the status of a subject of the system.
10 
Consequently, the existing members’ approval for a new member to participate in their 
international legal system indicates that they recognise that the applicant possesses the 
capability to bear the rights and duties of that system, and this recognition endows the new 
member with international legal personality in their legal system. 
    Accordingly, fishing entities are regarded as possessing international legal personality 
in the international legal system if the existing contracting parties or members view them 
as having the capability to bear rights and obligations of the legal system and agree that 
they may become the member. As a result, the decision whether a fishing entity can 
possess international legal personality crucially depends on recognition from the members 
of a specific legal system. Traditionally, recognition theories in international law are 
applied to states or governments. According to constitutive theory, a state or government 
can become an international person and a subject of international law only after it is 
recognised by other states; thus, recognition becomes a necessary condition for 
                                                      
8  Even in a single system, there might be different outcomes: See also the infamous Dred Scott v. Sandford 
decision by the US Supreme Court. As a slave, Scott was a subject of the law in some states but an object in 
others. 
9  Cheng, supra note 1, p. 31. 
10  Ibid., p. 35.  
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construction of a state or government.
11  The other doctrine concerning recognition is 
declaratory theory, according to which the existence of a state or government is a fact, and 
recognition is an acknowledgement of that fact; hence, a newly established state has a right 
to be treated as a state regardless of whether it has been recognised by other states.
12   
    Fishing entities are entities that perform the function of fishing, that is, they have the 
capability to fish. However, possessing the capability to fish does not mean they also have 
the capability to bear the rights and obligations of the international legal system because 
even a private fishing company or an individual fisherman has that capability. Therefore, 
recognition becomes a key element in whether fishing entities have international 
personality. In the case of states or governments, most scholars adopt declaratory theory
13 
because constitutive theory could result in the confusing and complicated legal 
consequence that a state is recognised by State A but not State B and thus simultaneously is 
and is not an international personality.
14   
    However, in the case of fishing entities, different thinking is adopted, and constitutive 
theory is often applied to fishing entities. When a state exists as a state, it means that it is 
an entire international person who can bear rights and obligations under international law 
in various fields, not merely a particular field. Hence, the problem that a state faces is not 
whether it has international personality in certain fields of particular international legal 
systems but whether the existence of the state itself is an established fact. However, a 
fishing entity is different from a state and focuses solely on the function of fishing. 
Whether it has international personality in the field of international fisheries law cannot 
depend only on whether the existence of the fishing entity is a fact but also whether it can 
bear rights and obligations under international fisheries law. Therefore, this capability is a 
crucial element for a fishing entity to be regarded as possessing international personality. 
Consequently, recognition by other states in separate international legal systems, i.e. 
international agreements or instruments, becomes a necessary condition for a fishing entity 
to be the international person in those legal systems.   
    In addition, fishing entities face a different situation as the subjects of general 
international law than states. Although the term ‘fishing entity’ gained attention through the 
                                                      
11  See D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 7
th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), p. 
130. 
12  Ibid. 
13  Ibid., p. 131. 
14  Ibid., p. 130.  
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UNFSA, not every international fisheries agreement or instrument confers subject status 
upon fishing entities. Within those legal systems which do not allow fishing entities to 
become a subject, fishing entities have no opportunity to possess international legal 
personality. Thus, it is an overstatement to conclude that a fishing entity can be recognised 
as possessing international legal personality in the general international fisheries law. In 
other words, whether a fishing entity has international legal personality can be assessed 
only in separate legal systems. Only if the legal system confers upon a fishing entity the 
right to become a subject and if other parties in the legal system recognise that the fishing 
entity possesses the capability to bear the rights and obligations of the legal system can the 
fishing entity be regarded as possessing international personality in that legal system. 
    Regarding Taiwan, a fishing entity in many RFMOs, the Taiwanese government 
formed after withdrawing from mainland China in 1949 amid a civil war with the 
Communist Party, which has since controlled mainland China. Both the Beijing and the 
Taiwan governments claim to be the government of the one state of China. Consequently, 
they have both sought recognition. The Taiwanese government was recognised as the 
government of the one state of China until 1971 when its seat in the UN was replaced by 
the Beijing government. From that time, the Beijing government has been recognised as 
the government of the one state of China and has claimed Taiwan as part of its territory.
15 
The Taiwan government, although not recognised, still claims to be the legal government 
of China, i.e. seeks recognition of itself. In 2000, Taiwanese President, Shui-Bian Chen, 
described Taiwan as an independent state, and the Taiwan government has sought to join 
the UN, not as a replacement for the Beijing government, but as the government of a new 
member state.
16  Although the majority of states have not recognised Taiwan as a state, the 
Taiwan government has changed its claim from seeking the recognition of its government 
to recognition of its statehood.   
    Pursuant to the 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States
17, the 
conditions that constitute a state are a permanent population, defined territory, government 
                                                      
15  For details of the history of the Taiwan and Beijing governments, please see Chapter 7, pp. 119–126, of 
this thesis. 
16  See UN Doc. A/58/197. Also see D.J. Harris, Cases and Materials on International Law, 7
th ed. (London: 
Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), p. 96. The Beijing government opposed recognising Taiwan as a state; its full 
statement can be seen on the website of the Permanent Mission of the People’s Republic of China to the 
UN, available at http://www.china-un.org/eng/lhghyywj/smhwj/wangnian/fy03/t29409.htm (visited on 
26/03/2014)   
17  For the full text of the convention, please see Malcolm D. Evans, International Law Documents, 8
th ed. 
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and the capacity to enter into relations with other states. Taiwan has 23 million inhabitants, 
the territory of Taiwan and its surrounding islands, the Taiwan government, and formal 
diplomatic relations with 23 states.
18  Therefore, Taiwan unarguably can be regarded as a 
full state. In addition, according to declaratory theory, the existence of Taiwan as a state is 
a fact, so it possesses international personality. However, the majority of other states do not 
recognise Taiwan as a state due to the Beijing government’s claim that Taiwan is part of 
China; in other words, they have not established formal diplomatic relations with Taiwan, 
but continue to deal with Taiwan in foreign affairs.
19  Facing opposition from the Beijing 
government, Taiwan cannot participate in RFMOs under the identity of a state, leading to 
the present circumstances of its participation in RFMOs under the identity of a fishing 
entity. However, a fishing entity is different than a state, particularly its legal status. Thus, 
a fishing entity possesses personality only in certain specific international legal systems. 
    Whether fishing entities possess international legal personality is usually decided 
through checking the constitution, charter, treaty or other documents of the legal system 
and determining whether any provisions or regulations confer on fishing entities the 
possibility of becoming contracting parties or members.
20  Therefore, each RFMO can be 
regarded as a separate legal system in which fishing entities might possess different legal 
status. This trend also applies to each fisheries agreement. Accordingly, we will analyse 
whether fishing entities possess international legal personality under the following 
agreements, which are two of the most significant agreements in the international fisheries 
context. 
 
3. United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
The UNCLOS does not use the term ‘fishing entities’; however, Article 1, paragraph 2(2) 
states that ‘[t]his Convention applies mutatis mutandis to the entities referred to in article 
305, paragraph l(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), which become Parties to this Convention in 
accordance with the conditions relevant to each, and to that extent “states parties” refers to 
those entities’. Article 305 describes the subjects who may sign the convention. In addition 
to all states and some specific international organisations, the convention is open to other 
                                                                                                                                                                 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 8–9. 
18  Regarding the 23 states, please see Chapter 7, p. 122, footnote 22, of this thesis. 
19  The examples are shown in Chapter 7, p. 122, footnote 23, of this thesis. 
20  Martin Tsamenyi, ‘The Legal Substance and Status of Fishing Entities in International Law: A Note’, Ocean 
Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 125.  
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entities, which Article 305, paragraph l(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f) identifies these entities as 
‘Namibia, represented by the United Nations Council for Namibia;’ ‘all self-governing 
associated States which have chosen that status in an act of self-determination supervised 
and approved by the United Nations in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 
(XV) and which have competence over the matters governed by this Convention, including 
the competence to enter into treaties in respect of those matters;’ ‘all self-governing 
associated States which, in accordance with their respective instruments of association, 
have competence over the matters governed by this Convention, including the competence 
to enter into treaties in respect of those matters;’ and ‘all territories which enjoy full 
internal self-government, recognized as such by the United Nations, but have not attained 
full independence in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and which 
have competence over the matters governed by this Convention, including the competence 
to enter into treaties in respect of those matters’. These provisions concerning the 
conditions of ratification, formal confirmation and accession are similar to Article 305. 
Article 306 states that ‘[t]his Convention is subject to ratification by States and the other 
entities referred to in article 305, paragraph l(b), (c), (d) and (e), and to formal 
confirmation, in accordance with Annex IX, by the entities referred to in article 305, 
paragraph l(f),’ and Article 307 that ‘[t]his Convention shall remain open for accession by 
States and the other entities referred to in article 305. Accession by the entities referred to 
in article 305, paragraph l(f), shall be in accordance with Annex IX’. 
    Although this international instrument does not define the term ‘fishing entity’, it can 
be regarded as an entity that performs the function of fishing and is recognised as 
possessing the capability to bear the rights and obligations in certain legal system. Thus, 
Article 305, paragraph 1(d)(e) of UNCLOS can be applied to fishing entities; in other 
words, any entity with the function of fishing may, pursuant to Article 305, paragraph 1(d) 
or (e), apply to become a party to UNCLOS. Such participation confirms that they 
recognise it as possessing the capability to bear the rights and obligations of the UNCLOS 
and agree that it possesses international personality as a result of becoming a party under 
these two articles. In practice, Taiwan may be a fishing entity but not a party to UNCLOS 
because Taiwan is not a ‘self-governing associated state. Taiwan might ‘enjoy full 
self-government, recognized as such by the UN, but has not attain full independence in 
accordance with General Assembly resolution 1514(XV)’. Although UNCLOS does not 
clearly state criteria for a fishing entity, any entity that performs the function of fishing and 
corresponds to Article 305, paragraph 1(d) or (e) of UNCLOS has the possibility of  
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becoming a party to UNCLOS. Nevertheless, no fishing entity may apply to be a party 
pursuant to these articles. 
    Obviously, UNCLOS is open for some specific but not all fishing entities may sign or 
accede to UNCLOS. Fishing entities possibly lack the opportunity to be a subject of 
UNCLOS, which excludes some fishing entities such as Taiwan from joining. 
 
4. United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement 
The UNFSA is the first international agreement with provisions concerning fishing entities. 
It not only reveals the significance of fishing entities in high seas fishery conservation and 
management measures but also increases the possibilities for fishing entities to participate 
in RFMOs. Articles 1(3) and 17(3) introduced fishing entities into this particular legal 
system. These concepts and provisions gradually developed through successive drafts in 
the six sessions of the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks. 
 
4.1 The Organisational Session 
The UN convened a conference to effectively implement the provisions of Articles 63
21 
and 64
22  in UNCLOS concerning straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks, 
gradually leading to the UNFSA. During the framing of the agreement, the FAO played an 
important role. Pursuant to UN General Assembly Resolution 47/192
23, one task of the UN 
                                                      
21  Article 63 of UNCLOS reads:   
‘1. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur within the exclusive economic zones of two 
or more coastal States, these States shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or 
regional organizations, to agree upon the measures necessary to coordinate and ensure the conservation 
and development of such stocks without prejudice to the other provisions of this Part. 
2. Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both within the exclusive economic zone and 
in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal State and the States fishing for such stocks in the 
adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional organizations, to 
agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these stocks in the adjacent area’. 
22  Article 64 of UNCLOS reads: ‘The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for the 
highly migratory species listed in Annex I shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international 
organizations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilization of 
such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions for 
which no appropriate international organization exists, the coastal State and other States whose nationals 
harvest these species in the region shall cooperate to establish such an organization and participate in its 
work’. 
23  A/RES/47/192. The full text can be found at http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/47/a47r192.htm 
(visited on 28/02/2011).  
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Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was to make 
recommendations based on scientific and technical studies conducted by the FAO.
24 
    The Organizational Session of the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks was held in New York 19–23 April 1993.
25  During this 
session, the FAO representative informed the conference that FAO would provide it with 
several documents
26, including reports and documents of the 1992 Technical Consultation 
on High Seas Fishing. Of these, the most relative to fishing entities is ‘International 
Fishery Bodies: Considerations for High Seas Management
27‘. Paragraph 9 of this 
document states that the effectiveness of fishery bodies might be constrained if 
‘unregulated fishing by non-contracting parties undermines efforts to promote rational 
resource use by fishery bodies. A country or an entity may opt not to participate in such 
bodies or may be prevented from doing so for political or other reasons. The impact of 
fishing by non-contracting parties on management efforts in a fishery can be severe, and in 
the extreme, is capable of negating attempts to secure sustainable resource use’.
28  Here, 
the term ‘entity’ refers to the entities described in Article 305, paragraphs 1(c), (d) and (e) 
of UNCLOS as possess the right to become contracting parties
29  In addition, the FAO 
“International Fishery Bodies Document” may also refer to Taiwan, as proved in paragraph 
46 of the document. Paragraph 9 of the document clearly points out that fishing by 
                                                      
24  Paragraph 2 of the resolution states that the General Assembly ‘ decides that the intergovernmental 
conference, in accordance with the said mandate, shall take into account relevant activities at the 
subregional, regional and global levels, with a view to promoting effective implementation of the provisions 
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea on straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks, and that it, drawing, inter alia, on scientific and technical studies by the Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, should: (a) Identify and assess existing problems related to the 
conservation and management of such fish stocks; (b) Consider means of improving fisheries cooperation 
among States; (c) Formulate appropriate recommendations’. This part of the resolution is also mentioned in 
A/CONF. 164/7, Statement Made by the Chairman of the Conference at the Opening of the Organizational 
Session, as compiled in Jean-Pierre Lévy and Gunnar G. Schram, eds., United Nations Conference on 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks—Selected Documents (Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1996), p. 40. 
25  Oceans and the Law of the Sea, the UN website of Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 
http://www.un.org/Depts/los/fish_stocks_conference/fish_stocks_conference.htm (visited on 28/02/2011). 
26  Those documents were reports and documents from the 1992 Technical Consultation on High Seas 
Fishing; Declaration of Cancun, adopted by the 1992 International Conference on Responsible Fishing, 
Cancun, Mexico; Strategy for Fisheries Management and Development, adopted by the 1984 World 
Conference for Fisheries Management and Development; Draft Code of Conduct for Responsible Fishing; 
and Draft Agreement on Flagging and Reflagging of Fishing Vessels on the High Seas. 
27  The full text of this document is compiled in Jean-Pierre Lévy and Gunnar G. Schram, eds., supra note 24, 
pp. 346-358. 
28  See Lévy and Schram, eds., supra note 24, p. 348. 
29  Namibia has been an independent state since 1990, so Article 305, paragraph 1(b) of UNCLOS was not 
included here.  
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non-contracting parties, whether a state or another entity, would undermine the 
conservation and management measures of the RFMOs, implying that this problem should 
be solved. This consideration is mentioned again in paragraphs 45–47 with references to 
‘non-contracting parties’. Paragraph 45 of the document further emphasised the importance 
of fishing entities’ participation in RFMOs; it reads: Some nations or other entities 
operating in a fishery may opt not to participate in a high seas management body or they 
may be excluded from it (e.g., for political or other reasons). The effectiveness of high seas 
management will therefore be significantly reduced if a major entity in a fishery does not 
participate in determining management decisions and in turn is not bound by those 
decisions’.
30  Paragraph 46 cites Taiwan as an example of a major fishing entity and argues 
that ‘[t]he exclusion of parties from management bodies for political or other reasons poses 
particular difficulties. Taiwan is a major international fishing entity. Its high seas capacity 
is extensive and likely to increase, especially in the Indian and South Pacific Oceans. 
However, due to political non-recognition, Taiwan (Province of China) does not participate 
fully in any fishery management bodies’.
31  Paragraph 47 emphasised that the problems 
caused by non-contracting parties must be addressed; otherwise, attempts to achieve 
sustainable use might be thwarted.
32  These principles and concerns indirectly encouraged 
including fishing entities in the legal framework of international fishery management, 
particularly through stipulations concerning fishing entities in the UNFSA. 
    In addition, another important principle of this document suggests that, for effective 
management of the high seas, RFMOs should possess a significant degree of independence 
in the execution of their functions.
33  This principle helps each RFMO maintain the 
independent exercise of authority, whether in the establishment of a commission or 
decision-making during meetings of the commission. 
                                                      
30  Lévy and Schram, eds., supra note 24, p. 355. 
31  Ibid. 
32  Paragraph 47 states that ‘[t]he non-contracting parties problem must be addressed. This is because, 
despite efforts to manage high seas fisheries, attempts to achieve sustainable use may be thwarted by 
unregulated fishing by non-contracting parties. Such unregulated activity will erode benefits accruing from 
measures designed to promote rational exploitation’. 
33  Lévy and Schram, eds., supra note 24, p. 350. Paragraph 17 of the document reads: ‘To be effective 
vehicles for high seas management, fishery bodies need to have a significant degree of independence in the 
execution of their functions, be assigned powers consistent with their management tasks and receive 
support from contracting parties. While the following list of issues is not exhaustive in terms of matters that 
should be addressed to encourage efficiency in management, it covers issues that would, as a minimum, 
need to be considered’.  
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    At the organisation session, a concrete context concerning straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks was not discussed. Instead, the rules of procedure and the agenda for 
the Conference were adopted. Those documents and technical reports prepared by FAO 
were intended to serve as references in the next session. 
 
4.2 The Second Session 
In the second session of the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks held in New York 12–23 July 1993, the chairman of the conference 
prepared and proposed the negotiating text
34  with the purpose of providing a basic text 
issues discussed by delegates.
35  Paragraph 4 of the Negotiating Text states that ‘[c]oastal 
States and States fishing on the high seas shall cooperate to ensure long-term sustainability 
of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks on the high seas. States shall give 
effect to the duty to cooperate by establishing conservation and management measures for 
straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks and commit themselves to 
responsible fishing, in a manner consistent with the relevant provisions of the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea’. This paragraph is accompanied by a note 
stating that any provisions referring to states should be regarded as covering states, the 
European Economic Community and fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas. 
Unlike in Article 17(3) of the UNFSA, fishing entities are not mentioned in the provisions 
concerning ‘Non-parties to Subregional or Regional Organizations or Arrangements’ in 
paragraphs 35–38 of the Negotiating Text. However, the chairman stressed the importance 
of the non-parties issue and argued that, as non-parties can undermine conservation and 
management efforts by international agreements and RFMOs, their roles were of concern 
to the Conference.
36  He indicated that, in order to achieve sustainable straddling and 
highly migratory stocks through conservation and management, ways and methods of 
dealing with new entrants and non-parties should be established.
37 
                                                      
34  A/CONF. 164/13, compiled Lévy and Schram, eds., supra note 24, pp. 73-94. The full text also can be 
found at http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/702/41/IMG/N9370241.pdf?OpenElement 
(visited on 15/02/2011). 
35  Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UN website for the Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, 
supra note 25 (visited on 15/02/2011). 
36  Statement Made by the Chairman of the Conference at the Closing of the Second Session, A/CONF. 
164/15, compiled in Lévy and Schram, eds., supra note 24, pp. 95-99. Also available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N93/443/82/PDF/N9344382.pdf?OpenElement (visited on 
15/02/2011). 
37  Ibid.  
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4.3 The Third Session 
The third session of the UN Conference on Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory 
Fish Stocks was held in New York 14–31 March 1994.
38  At this session, the Negotiating 
Text was discussed and modified into the Revised Negotiating Text
39. Following Paragraph 
4 of Negotiating Text, Paragraph 1 of the Revised Negotiating Text stipulates that ‘[s]tates 
have a duty to ensure the long-term sustainability of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks’. An attached note reads, ‘For the purposes of these provisions, 
references to States should be interpreted as including the European Economic Community 
in matters within its competence. These provisions also apply to the fishing entities whose 
vessels fish on the high seas’. 
    Fishing entities were not mentioned in stipulations in paragraphs 40–43 on 
‘non-participants in subregional or regional organizations or arrangement’.
40  As well, 
neither the Negotiating nor the Revised Negotiating Text contained provisions regulating 
signature, ratification, acceptance, approval and accession in a general international 
convention or agreement. However, the basic structure and content of the 1995 agreement 
appeared in this Revised Negotiating Text. 
 
4.4 The Fourth Session 
At the fourth session held in New York 15–26 August 1994,
41  the Revised Negotiating 
Text was revised, restructured and reformatted into a document entitled Draft Agreement 
for the Implementation of the Provisions of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea of 
10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
42, which aimed to ensure the long-term 
conservation and sustainable use of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks.
43  The 
                                                      
38  Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UN website of Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, supra 
note 25 (visited on 17/02/2011). 
39  A/CONF. 164/13/Rev.1, as compiled in Jean-Pierre Lévy and Gunnar G. Schram, eds., supra note 24, pp. 
437-461. 
40  Ibid., p. 450. 
41  Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UN website of Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, supra 
note 25 (visited on 17/02/2011). 
42  A/CONF. 164/22, compiled in Jean-Pierre Lévy and Gunnar G. Schram, eds., supra note 24, pp. 621-652. 
The full text also can be found at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/338/70/IMG/N9433870.pdf?OpenElement (visited on 
17/02/2011). 
43  See Statement Made by the Chairman of the Conference at the Closing of the Fourth Session, on 26 
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Draft Agreement was an important milestone in the UN Conference on Straddling Fish 
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks because it combined the form and substance of a 
straddling and highly migratory stocks conservation and management agreement, leading 
to a model for the 1995 final agreement. 
    Unlike the Negotiating Text or the Revised Negotiating Text, the Draft Agreement did 
not include a note describing ‘states’ as the European Economic Community and fishing 
entities. Rather, the Draft Agreement defines ‘states parties’ as states which have agreed to 
be bound by it.
44  Furthermore, the Draft Agreement contains provisions concerning 
fishing entities. Article 1(2) reads, ‘This Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to the entities 
referred to in article 305, paragraph l(c), (d), (e) and (f), of the Convention which become 
Parties to this Agreement in accordance with the conditions relevant to each and, to that 
extent, ‘States Parties’ refers to those entities’.
45  Article 1(3) states that ‘[t]he relevant 
principles of the Convention and this Agreement are applicable mutatis mutandis to other 
fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas’.
46  This marks the first time that the 
conference put the term ‘mutatis mutandis’ into articles. It continued to employ this usage 
in a later revised agreement and a final version. 
    According to Black’s Law Dictionary, ‘mutatis mutandis’ means ‘with the necessary 
changes in points of detail, meaning that matters or things are generally the same, but to be 
altered when necessary, as to names, offices, and the like’.
47  Therefore, this term refers to 
necessary changes in details, such as the subject, object, name of an institution or title 
which do not change the original meaning of regulations. In this case, Article 1(3) can be 
explained as follows: Although the agreement is designed to be applicable to contracting 
parties, it can also apply to fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas. 
Fishing entities were not written into the provisions concerning non-participants in 
subregional or regional fisheries management organisations or arrangements, as well as the 
Negotiating Text and the Revised Negotiating Text. As a mature agreement compared to 
the Negotiating Text and the Revised Negotiating Text, the Draft Article includes 
                                                                                                                                                                 
August 1994, A/CONF. 164/24, compiled in Jean-Pierre Lévy and Gunnar G. Schram, eds., supra note 24, pp. 
653-656. Also available at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N94/354/13/PDF/N9435413.pdf?OpenElement (visited on 
17/02/2011). 
44  See Article 1(1)(b) of the Draft Agreement, A/CONF. 164/22, supra note 42. 
45  Ibid. 
46  Ibid. 
47  Henry Campbell Black, Black’s Law Dictionary, 5
th ed. (St. Paul Minn. West Publishing Co., 1979) p. 919.  
40 
 
provisions concerning signature, ratification, acceptance, approval, formal confirmation 
and accession were contained in Articles 37–39, entering into force in Article 40 and 
reservations and exceptions in Article 41. 
 
4.5 The Fifth Session 
The Draft Agreement was discussed and revised at the fifth session held in New York 27 
March–12 April 1995.
48  The provisions define ‘states parties’, and Article 1(2), 
concerning the entities referred to in Article 305, Paragraph l(c), (d), (e) and (f) of 
UNCLOS, was reproduced without change in the Revised Draft Agreement
49. However, 
Article 1(3) was revised to state that ‘[t]he provisions of this Agreement shall apply mutatis 
mutandis to other fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas’. In the Draft 
Agreement, ‘the relevant principles of UNCLOS’ can apply to fishing entities whose 
vessels fish on the high seas; however, this stipulation was removed from the Revised 
Draft Agreement. In the Draft Agreement, ‘[t]he relevant principles of UNCLOS’ should, 
at least, contain Articles 63–64 of UNCLOS concerning straddling and highly migratory 
fish stocks. Pursuant to these two articles, distant fishing states and coastal states have the 
common obligation to cooperate directly or indirectly through RFMOs. Specifically, 
‘indirectly cooperate through RFMOs’ could be accomplished through two methods: one, 
through existing RFMOs and two, through a new RFMO established by both categories of 
state. Whatever the situation, distant fishing states may not exclude coastal states from 
participating in the cooperation process; neither may coastal states refuse or prevent distant 
fishing states participating. Both possess the right and obligation to cooperate 
simultaneously. In the Revised Draft Agreement, fishing entities whose vessels fish on the 
high seas cannot access these principles of UNCLOS. The sources of rights that fishing 
entities could claim clearly were restricted compared to the Draft Agreement, though the 
limitation might not have made any difference in practice. 
    In addition to UNCLOS, another change from the Draft Agreement to the Revised 
Draft Agreement is that ‘the principles of this Agreement’ apply to fishing entities whose 
                                                      
48  Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UN website of Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, supra 
note 25 (visited on 21/02/2011). 
49  A/CONF. 164/22/Rev.1, compiled in Lévy and Schram, eds., supra note 24, pp. 671-704. The full text also 
can be found at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N95/105/06/IMG/N9510506.pdf?OpenElement (visited on 
21/02/2011). This revised version has the same title as the Draft Agreement of the Fourth Session. To 
distinguish between these two documents, the latter is called ‘Revised Draft Agreement’ in this chapter.  
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vessels fish on the high seas under the former; however, under the latter one, ‘the 
provisions of this Agreement’ can apply only to fishing entities. This language creates a 
slight difference. ‘The principles of the Agreement’ indicate not only the concrete 
provisions of the agreement but also its important spirit. Thus, while applying the 
agreement, the context, comprising any implied and explicit meanings, is applied, in 
addition to the written provisions. Although this change makes weak texts stronger, it is not 
necessarily advantageous to fishing entities. Fishing entities usually do not have the same 
as states within the legal system of fisheries agreements and consequently seek for rights as 
close to those of states as possible. Therefore, it might be advantageous for fishing entities 
to draw upon the broader sources of international fisheries law, rather than a fixed 
regulation, allowing them more flexible in claiming their rights. To a certain extent, then, 
the change in applying this agreement might further narrow fishing entities’ rights. 
Furthermore, the provisions of Article 17 in the Revised Draft Agreement entitled ‘States 
which are not Members of or Parties to Subregional or Regional Fisheries Management 
Organizations or Arrangements’ are mostly the same as the 1995 agreement. However, the 
content of Article 17(3) of the 1995 agreement appears for the first time in the Revised 
Draft Agreement. It reads: ‘States which are members of, or parties to, a subregional or 
regional fisheries management organisation or arrangement shall, jointly or individually, 
request the fishing entities referred to in article 1, paragraph 3 which have fishing vessels 
in the relevant area, to cooperate fully with such organisation or arrangement in 
implementing the conservation and management measures of that organisation or 
arrangement, with a view to having such measures applied de facto as extensively as 
possible to fishing activities in the relevant area. Such fishing entities shall enjoy benefits 
from participation in the fishery commensurate with their commitment to comply with 
conservation and management measures in respect of the stock(s)’. Article 17(3) implies 
that fishing entities are non-members or non-parties in RFMOs and should be asked to 
cooperate with other parties or members. In other words, fishing entities should comply 
with the conservation and management measures of RFMOs; otherwise, their vessels 
fishing on the high seas might be hindered by states which are members or parties to 
RFMOs which take related measures.
50 
                                                      
50  Article 17(4) states that ‘[s]tates which are members of, or parties to, a subregional or regional fisheries 
management organization or arrangement shall exchange information with respect to the activities of 
fishing vessels which fly the flags of States which are neither members of, nor participate in, the 
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    On the other hand, Article 17(3) stipulates that, as fishing entities which cooperate 
with other parties or members are non-members or non-parties in RFMOs, they cannot 
possess the ‘rights’ which belonged to a party or member but can receive the ‘benefits’ in 
the fishery commensurate with their participation. Articles 1(3) and 17(3) do not exclude 
fishing entities from being parties or members of a RFMO or enjoying the rights of the 
distant fishing states. However, if they do not become parties or members, they at least 
should cooperate with RFMOs in order to enjoy the commensurate benefits. This principle 
concerning fishing entities had matured by this stage and continued to be used in the sixth 
session. 
 
4.6 The Sixth Session 
The sixth session in New York 24 July– 4 August 1995 adopted the UNFSA.
51  Compared 
to the Revised Draft Agreement, Article 1(3) of the UNFSA changed ‘[t]he provisions of 
this Agreement shall apply mutatis mutandis to other fishing entities whose vessels fish on 
the high seas’ to ‘[t]his Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing entities whose 
vessels fish on the high seas’. Article 17(3) of the UNFSA also underwent slight changes 
that did not affect its meaning. 
Although the UNFSA contains provisions concerning fishing entities, the problem of 
whether fishing entities may become states parties to the UNFSA remains. Pursuant to 
Article 1(3), all the regulations can also be applied to fishing entities, theoretically 
including the provisions for signature, ratification and accession. However, Article 37 of 
the UNFSA states that the agreement is open to signing by all states and ‘other entities’ 
referred to in Article 1, paragraph 2(b), which means the entities referred to in Article 305, 
paragraph 1(c), (d), (e) of UNCLOS and the specific international organisations stipulated 
in Annex IX, Article 1 of UNCLOS. As well, Articles 1(3) and 1, paragraph 2(b) use the 
term ‘mutatis mutandis’ to describe how the UNFSA applies to those entities.
52  Using 
similar provisions distinguishing between ‘other entities’ and fishing entities, Article 37 
                                                                                                                                                                 
organization or arrangement and which are operating in the fishery for the relevant stock(s). They shall take 
measures consistent with the Convention and this Agreement to deter activities of such vessels which 
undermine the effectiveness of subregional or regional conservation and management measures’. 
51  Oceans and the Law of the Sea, UN website of Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea, supra 
note 25 (visited on 03/03/2011). 
52  Article 1, paragraph 2(b) of the 1995 Agreement reads: ‘This Agreement applies mutatis mutandis: (i) to 
any entity referred to in article 305, paragraph 1 (c), (d) and (e), of the Convention and (ii) subject to article 
47, to any entity referred to as an ‘international organization’ in Annex IX, article 1, of the Convention which 
becomes a Party to this Agreement, and to that extent ‘States Parties’ refers to those entities’.  
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allows the former but not the later to sign under clear identification. The same condition 
governs the provisions concerning ratification of and accession to the UNFSA.
53  It is 
assume that the UNFSA is not open to being signed by fishing entities.
54  Therefore, 
fishing entities may not become states parties to the UNFSA. However, the UNFSA 
provisions concerning fishing entities recognised the importance of the concept of fishing 
entities to RFMOs. The UNFSA helps fishing entities to participate in RFMOs and even to 
become a subject in the regulations of individual RFMOs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Fishing entities can possess international legal personality in the international legal system 
if they are viewed and recognised by the existing contracting parties as having the 
capability to bear the rights and obligations of the legal system and agreed to become 
members. The UNCLOS allows some specific but not all fishing entities to sign or accede 
to it. The fishing entity Taiwan cannot match the conditions stipulated by the UNCLOS; 
thus, it cannot join the UNCLOS as a party. In other words, it cannot be a subject of the 
UNCLOS. In addition, the UNFSA, although it can apply mutatis mutandis to fishing 
entities, may not be signed by fishing entities. However, the UNFSA provides fishing 
entities the opportunity to be the subject of agreements which create RFMOs and plays a 
crucial role in helping fishing entities participate in RFMOs. The next chapter discusses 
fishing entities’ status in several RFMOs. 
 
 
                                                      
53  Article 38 of the 1995 Agreement states: ‘This Agreement is subject to ratification by States and the 
other entities referred to in article 1, paragraph 2(b)’. Article 39 reads: ‘This Agreement shall remain open 
for accession by States and the other entities referred to in article 1, paragraph 2(b)’. 
54  Hasjim Djalal, ‘The Emergence of the Concept of Fishing Entities: A Note’, Ocean Development and 
International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 119.  
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CHAPTER 3 The Fishing Entity in Regional Fisheries Management Organisations 
 
1. Introduction 
To support cooperation in the field of regional fisheries resources, several RFMOs were 
established to conserve and manage those resources. These organisations adopted measures 
including data collection and exchange, scientific research, catch quotas, conservation and 
management policies and enforcement. Those measures and procedures require states 
whose vessels are fishing in the areas covered by the RFMO to cooperate and comply with 
their regulations. Traditionally, states are the main subjects of international law; thus, 
RFMOs’ regulations are aimed at the states who participate as members. However, the 
conservation and management of fish stocks usually need each participant to cooperate to 
reach an effective outcome. Fishing entities which are different from states would be 
excluded from the conservation and management measures in RFMOs, although they play 
an important role in such issues. Therefore, each RFMO adopts a different legal gateway to 
bring fishing entities into its regime.   
    The purpose of this chapter is to explore fishing entities status in RFMOs by 
examining several selected, important RFMOs in each ocean area. In chronological order 
from the date on which the relevant negotiations, these organisations are the WCPFC, 
ICCAT, IATTC, ISC, CCSBT, NPAFC, IOTC and SEAFO.
1 
 
2. Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
    The Western and Central Pacific Ocean has abundant tuna fisheries resources. 
Following UNCLOS’s entry into force on 16 November 1994, the Pacific Islands Forum 
Fisheries Agency
2  convened the Multilateral High-Level Conference on the Conservation 
                                                      
1  This chapter does not discuss the Southern Indian Ocean Fisheries Agreement (SIOFA) because it is still an 
agreement, which was adopted in 2006 and entered into force on 21 June 2012, rather than a RFMO, 
although its next move might be to establish a new fisheries organisation. The main organ of the SIOFA is 
the Meeting of Parties which takes place at least once a year and decides on arrangements for carrying out 
secretariat services or establishing a secretariat. Further information can be found at 
http://www.fao.org/fishery/rfb/siofa/en (visited on 30/04/2013). 
2  The FFA was established in August 1979 with the aim to help countries sustainably manage their fishery 
resources within their 200 mile exclusive economic zones. The FFA is an advisory body providing expertise, 
technical assistance and other support to its members who make sovereign decisions about their tuna 
resources and participate in regional decision making on tuna management through agencies such as the 
WCPFC. There are 17 members: Australia, Cook Islands, the Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji, Kiribati, 
Marshall Islands, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tokelau, 
Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. Further information can be found on the FFA website, 
http://www.ffa.int/about (visited on 01/11/2010).  
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and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific 
(MHLC) on South Pacific tuna fisheries in the Solomon Islands. It met 1–5 December 
1994 with the gaol to promote responsible fishing operations in the South Pacific region. 
After the UNFSA was adopted in 1995, MHLC2 was held in the Marshall Islands 
10–13 June 1997 and issued the Majuro Declaration. Paragraph 2 of the declaration reads: 
‘ [Participants] Decide to ensure that the fishing activities in the region are conducted in a 
manner fully consistent with the respective rights, obligations and responsibilities of 
coastal States and territories and other States and fishing entities fishing on the high seas in 
the region under the Convention and the Implementing Agreement’.
3  This paragraph not 
only explicitly mentions ‘fishing entities’ but also puts fishing entities in the same position 
as states, implying that fishing entities possess equal rights and obligations as coastal states 
and other states under the UNFSA. 
Amid the political conflict between Taiwan and China which both participated in the 
MHLCs, the drafting of the WCPFC Convention’s position on fishing entities did not go 
smoothly.
4  Through the efforts of the chairman of and states in the MHLCs, the 
Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean (the WCPFC Convention)
5  was adopted on 4 
September 2000. The WCPFC Convention deals with fishing entities in Annex I–Article 
9(2)
6, instead of in the main body of the convention. Paragraph 1 of Annex I provides that 
‘[a]fter the entry into force of this Convention, any fishing entity whose vessels fish for 
highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area, may, by a written instrument 
delivered to the depositary, agree to be bound by the regime established by this Convention. 
Such agreement shall become effective thirty days following the delivery of the 
                                                      
3  Netherlands Institute for the Law of the Sea, International Organizations and the Law of the Sea: 
Documentary Yearbook (Netherlands: Kluwer Law International, 1985, Vol. 1), pp. 171–174. 
4  At that time, Taiwan was a potential fishing entity. Hence, during the MHLCs, it sought to gain equal 
status for fishing entities as states. At the same time, China tried to prevent any recognition or implication 
that Taiwan was a state. Therefore, the dispute between these two parties extended from politics to the 
forum on fisheries conservation and management. For more information about the conflict between 
Taiwan and China during the MHLCs, please see Chapter 7, pp. 128–138, of this thesis. 
5  The convention is one of the first regional fisheries agreements to be adopted since the conclusion in 
1995 of the UN Fish Stock Agreement. The full textof the convention can be found on the WCPFC website, 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/convention-conservation-and-management-highly-migratory-fish-stocks-western
-and-central-pacific- (visited on 01/11/2010). 
6  Article 9(2) reads: ‘A fishing entity referred to in the Agreement, which has agreed to be bound by the 
regime established by this Convention in accordance with the provisions of Annex I, may participate in the 
work, including decision-making, of the Commission in accordance with the provisions of this article and 
Annex I’.  
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instrument’.
7  Paragraph 2 reads: ‘Such fishing entity shall participate in the work of the 
Commission, including decision-making, and shall comply with the obligations under this 
Convention. References thereto by the Commission or members of the Commission 
include, for the purposes of this Convention, such fishing entity as well as Contracting 
Parties’. This provision implies that fishing entities may be members of but not contracting 
parties to the WCPFC. In fact, during the MHLCs, it was proposed to distinguish the 
concept of ‘contracting parties’ from that of ‘member of the commission’ in the WCPFC 
Convention.
8  Under that proposal, a fishing entity which affirmed its acceptance of the 
convention was categorised as a ‘member of the commission’. Thus, fishing entities could 
only become members of the commission, not contracting parties. Although this idea was 
not explicitly stated in the final version of the convention, it can be seen in Paragraph 2 of 
Annex I.
9   
    Paragraph 3 of Annex I explains the method to solve disputes over the interpretation 
of the convention involving fishing entities: ‘If a dispute concerning the interpretation or 
application of this Convention involving a fishing entity cannot be settled by agreement 
between the parties to the dispute, the dispute shall, at the request of either party to the 
dispute, be submitted to final and binding arbitration in accordance with the relevant rules 
of the Permanent Court of Arbitration’. The final paragraph of the Annex implies that its 
provisions do not set a precedent for other RFMOs: ‘The provisions of this Annex relating 
to participation by fishing entities are solely for the purposes of this Convention’. 
    During MHLC7, the ‘Arrangement for the Participation of Fishing Entities’
10  was 
drafted through informal consultations between the chairman and the delegation of Taiwan. 
The purpose of the arrangement was to invite and reassure Taiwan that, as a fishing entity, 
it could ‘participate in the Preparatory Conference established by the resolution attached to 
                                                      
7  The full text of the annex, see supra note 5. 
8  See MHLC/WP.1/Rev.4, available at 
http://www.spc.int/coastfish/Asides/conventions/MHLC/mhlc_sep99.htm (visited on 01/11/2010). Also see 
Chapter 7, p. 132, of this thesis. 
9  In the West and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission Boarding and Inspection Procedure (WCPFC 
Boarding and Inspection Procedure) adopted in 2006, it can clearly be seen that fishing entities are 
categorised as members of the commission, differently than contracting parties. The full text of the 
procedure is available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2006-08/western-and-central-pacific-fisheries-commission-boarding-and-in
spection-procedures (visited on 05/01/2012). Regarding fishing entities in the procedure, please see Chapter 
5, pp. 96–101, Chapter 6, pp. 111–118, Chapter 7, pp. 138–143, of this thesis. 
10  The full text of the arrangement can be found on the WCPFC website, 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/arrangement-participation-fishing-entities (visited on 01/11/2010).  
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the Final Act of the Conference’ and, ‘subject to the fulfilment of its domestic legal 
requirements, agree to be bound by the regime established by the Convention in 
accordance with article 9, paragraph 2, of the Convention, and participate in the 
Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean in accordance with the Convention’. Taiwan signed this 
arrangement as a fishing entity under the name of ‘Chinese Taipei’ on 5 September 2000.
11 
    After another four annual preparatory conferences, the convention established the 
WCPFC in 2004 with the aim of ensuring, through effective management, the long-term 
conservation and sustainable use of highly migratory fish stocks in the Western and Central 
Pacific Ocean in accordance with UNCLOS and the UNFSA. 
 
3. International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
Following the adoption of the International Convention for the Conservation of Atlantic 
Tunas (the ICCAT Convention)
12  in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1966, the ICCAT, which is 
responsible for the conservation of tunas and tuna-like species in the Atlantic Ocean and 
adjacent seas, was established in 1969.
13  The ICCAT Convention does not have any 
regulations concerning fishing entities; it only allows the UN members and specialized 
agencies to send observers to participate meetings of the commission.
14  There was no 
gateway for a fishing entity to participate formally in the ICCAT until 1997.   
At the 9
th Special Meeting of the ICCAT in 1994, the Resolution on Coordination with 
Non-Contracting Parties was adopted for the purpose of contacting all non-contracting 
parties known to be fishing in the convention area for species under the competence of the 
convention in order to urge them to become contracting parties or cooperating parties 
                                                      
11  Michael W. Lodge, ‘The Practice of Fishing Entities in Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: The 
Case of the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 198. 
12  The full text of the convention can be found on its official website, 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/Commission/BasicTexts.pdf (visited on 09/02/2011). 
13  The ICCAT directly concerns approximately 30 species: Atlantic bluefin, skipjack, yellowfin, albacore and 
bigeye tuna; swordfish; billfishes such as white marlin, blue marlin, sailfish and spearfish; mackerels such as 
spotted Spanish mackerel and king mackerel; and small tunas such as black skipjack, frigate tuna, and 
Atlantic bonito. Further information can be found on the ICCAT website, 
http://www.iccat.int/en/contracting.htm (visited on 21/12/2010). 
14  See Article XI(3): ‘The commission may invite any appropriate international organization and any 
Government which is a member of the United Nations or of any Specialized Agency of the United Nations 
and which is not a member of the Commission, to send observers to meetings of the Commission and its 
subsidiary bodies’.  
48 
 
which could attend ICCAT meetings as observers.
15  However, the 1994 resolution still 
does not mention any cooperation specifically related to fishing entities. In November 
1997, the Resolution by ICCAT on Becoming a Cooperating Party, Entity or Fishing Entity 
was adopted by the Commission at the 15
th Regular Meeting in Madrid, Spain, and entered 
into force on 13 June 1998.
16  The 1997 resolution expands the category of non-contracting 
parties from ‘cooperating parties’ in the 1994 resolution to ‘cooperating party, entity or 
fishing entity’. This was the first ICCAT regulation with provisions explicitly on fishing 
entities. The purpose of this resolution was to continue to encourage all non-contracting 
parties, entities and fishing entities with vessels fishing for the ICCAT species to 
implement the ICCAT conservation measures.
17  Pursuant to paragraph 2 of the 1997 
resolution, any non-contracting parties, entities and fishing entities that would like to 
acquire the status of cooperating party, entity or fishing entity in the ICCAT may apply 
annually to the executive secretary. 
    Chinese Taipei, as an observer at the ICCAT, proposed to amend the 1997 resolution 
at the 12
th Special Meeting of the ICCAT in 2000.
18  The proposal by Chinese Taipei 
suggested that, while recommending to the commission whether an applicant could be 
considered a cooperating party, entity or fishing entity, the Permanent Working Group for 
the Improvement of ICCAT Statistics and Conservation Measures (PWG) should consider 
granting the status of a cooperating party, entity or fishing entity for no more than three 
years for the applicant entitled to become a member of the commission.
19  Furthermore, 
paragraph 4 of the proposed amendment would automatically renew cooperating party, 
entity or fishing entity status annually, instead of requiring separate applications every year, 
unless revoked by the commission due to non-compliance with the ICCAT conservation 
and management measures or the commission received a written request for withdrawal of 
                                                      
15  See the Report of the 9
th Special Meeting of ICCAT, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_94-95_I_1.pdf (visited on 21/12/2010). 
16  See the Report of the 15
th Regular Meeting of ICCAT, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_96-97_II_1.pdf (visited on 21/12/2010). 
17  Ibid. 
18  The full text of the proposal can be found in the 12
th Special Meeting of ICCAT, 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_00-01_I_1.pdf (visited on 29/12/2010). Chinese Taipei 
began to attend meetings of the ICCAT as an observer in 1972. At that time, the concept of the fishing 
entity had not developed, and Chinese Taipei regarded itself as a state at the ICCAT meetings. The 
statehood of Chinese Taipei was raised as an issue after the People’s Republic of China acceded to the 
ICCAT Convention in 1996. For a discussion the attendance of Chinese Taipei as an observer in 1972 and the 
issue of its statehood as related to its conflict with the People’s Republic of China, see Chapter 8, pp. 
163-168, of this thesis. 
19  Ibid.  
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the status.
20  This proposal would be beneficial to the ICCAT objective to obtain the 
cooperation from non-contracting parties because automatically renewing cooperating 
party, entity or fishing entity status could further stabilise the relationship between the 
ICCAT and those non-contracting parties, extending their cooperation period rather than 
limiting it to one year. However, this proposal was not adopted but slated to be 
reconsidered at the next meeting. 
    At the 17
th Regular Meeting of the ICCAT in November 2001, the People’s Republic 
of China proposed another draft, the revised 1997 ICCAT Resolution by on Becoming a 
Cooperating Party, Entity or Fishing Entity to amend the 1997 resolution.
21  This 
amendment modifies paragraph 4 of the 2000 proposal by Chinese Taipei, while the rest of 
the provisions are almost the same as the 1997 resolution.
22  The 2001 amendment was 
adopted to replace the 1997 resolution and entered into force on 21 September 2002. 
In 2003, at the 18
th Regular Meeting of the ICCAT, a Recommendation on Criteria for 
Attaining the Status of Cooperating non-Contracting Party, Entity or Fishing Entity in 
ICCAT (Recommendation 03-20) was discussed and adopted by consensus to replace the 
2001 amendment.
23  Recommendation 03-20 nearly duplicates the stipulations of the 2001 
amendment but requires the PWG to ‘consider information regarding the applicant 
available from other Regional Fisheries Management Organizations (RFMOs) as well as 
data submission of the applicant to the Commission. Caution shall be used so as not to 
introduce into the Convention area the excessive fishing capacity of other regions or IUU 
fishing activities in granting Cooperating Status to the applicant’ while reviewing a request 
for cooperating status.
24  Furthermore, applicants requesting the status of cooperating 
non-contracting party, entity or fishing entity are required to confirm their commitment to 
respect the commission’s conservation and management measures and to inform ICCAT of 
the measures it takes to ensure that its vessels comply with ICCAT conservation and 
management measures.
25  Under paragraph 3 of Recommendation 03-20, the applicant 
should also provide the following information: 
                                                      
20  Ibid. 
21  See the Report of the 17
th Regular Meeting of ICCAT, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_00-01_II_1.pdf (visited on 29/12/2010). 
22  Ibid. 
23  See the Report of the 18
th Regular Meeting of ICCAT, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_02-03_II_1.pdf (visited on 29/12/2010). 
24  See Paragraph 5 of the Recommendation 03-20. 
25  Ibid.  
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‘a) where available, data on its historical fisheries in the Convention area, including 
nominal catches, number/type of vessels, name of fishing vessels, fishing effort 
and fishing areas; 
b) all the data that Contracting Parties have to submit to ICCAT based on the 
Recommendations adopted by ICCAT; 
c) details on current fishing presence in the Convention area, number of vessels and 
vessel characteristics and; 
d) information on any research programs it may have conducted in the Convention 
area and the information and the results of this research’.
26 
    In addition to the conditions for applicants, the ICCAT lays out the obligations for 
cooperating non-contracting party, entity or fishing entity in the Recommendation by the 
ICCAT Concerning the Duties of Contracting Parties and Cooperating non-Contracting 
Parties, Entities or Fishing Entities in Relation to their Vessels Fishing in the ICCAT 
Convention Area (Recommendation 03-12). Cooperating non-contracting parties, entities, 
fishing entity and contracting parties must effectively control their vessels fishing in the 
ICCAT convention area, including authorising their vessels to fish in the ICCAT 
convention area only with fishing authorisations, licenses or permits; ensuring that vessels 
are authorised to fish in the ICCAT convention area only if they can effectively perform 
their responsibilities, including monitoring and controlling their fishing activities; ensuring 
that their vessels do not conduct unauthorised fishing in areas under the jurisdiction of 
other states; requiring their vessels fishing on the high seas to carry their license, 
authorisation or permit on board at all times and produce it on demand for inspection by a 
duly authorised person; investigating and following on alleged violations by vessels and 
reporting the results of such investigations; establishing and maintaining an up-to-date 
record of fishing vessels; and ensuring that its fishing vessels authorised to fish species 
managed by ICCAT in the convention area, as well as their fishing gears, are marked in 
such a way that they can be readily identified in accordance with generally accepted 
standards, such as the FAO standard specification for the marking and the identification of 
fishing vessels.
27  Although fishing entities cannot become contracting parties, their 
vessels conducting fishing in the convention area have no different obligations under 
Recommendation 03-12. 
                                                      
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid.  
51 
 
Although the ICCAT does not distinguish between contracting parties and members in 
the way the WCPFC does, it offers fishing entities the opportunity to participate in the 
operation of the ICCAT through the creation of the status of cooperating non-contracting 
party, entity or fishing entity. However, in the ICCAT, fishing entities can only attend 
meetings under the identity of observers, which is not a secure status as in the WCPFC. 
The WCPFC allows fishing entities to become members, which is a status different but 
equal to that of state members who are contacting parties; furthermore, fishing entities’ 
qualifications to participate do not need to be reviewed annually. The ICCAT needs the 
cooperation of fishing entities or non-contracting parties to effectively carry out its 
conservation and management measures, but its cooperation with fishing entities is based 
on a relationship in which the ICCAT sets and reviews the fishing entities’ qualifications. 
However, the effectiveness of ICCAT conservation and management regimes need the 
compliance of each actor whose vessels conduct fishing in the convertion area. From this 
perspective, fishing entities appear to be in the dominant, or at least the significant, 
position; their need to cooperate with the ICCAT is less than the ICCAT’s need to 
cooperate with them. Thus, the ICCAT has placed itself in an unrealistic position facing 
fishing entities or non-cooperating parties which is not beneficial for the effectiveness of 
its conservation and management measures. 
 
4. Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
The IATTC was set up by the Convention for the Establishment of an Inter-American 
Tropical Tuna Commission
28, which was signed by the United States and Costa Rica in 
1949 for the purposes of conserving and managing tuna and other marine resources in the 
eastern Pacific Ocean and enhancing scientific research and cooperation concerning these 
resources. In 1998, it was decided that, since the 1949 IATTC Convention had existed for 
almost 50 years, it should be changed to take into account the relevant principles of 
international law related to the conservation and management of living marine resources, 
such as the UNCLOS, 1992 Agenda 21
29  and Rio Declaration
30, 1993 FAO Agreement to 
                                                      
28  Further information about the IATTC can be found on its official website, 
http://www.iattc.org/HomeENG.htm (visited on 10/11/2010). 
29  Agenda 21 is a UN action plan related to sustainable development which came out of the UN Conference 
on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janerio, Brazil, in 1992. The plan is a 
comprehensive blueprint for action to be taken globally, nationally and locally by organisations of the UN, 
governments and major groups in every area in which humans directly affect the environment. The full text 
of Agenda 21 is available at the UN website, 
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Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by 
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas
31, 1995 FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, 
and UNFSA. Therefore, an ad hoc working group to review the 1949 convention was 
established in 1998.
32 
    The 1949 convention did not create an opportunity for fishing entities to participate.
33 
In the second session of the working group in January 1999, the Nicaraguan delegate 
proposed that the term ‘parties’ should cover three categories: states, regional economic 
integration organisations and separate customs territories. Meanwhile, Venezuela proposed 
that it cover states and regional economic integration organisations.
34  Nicaragua’s 
proposal was supported by Costa Rica and El Salvador but received some questions as 
well.
35  The Ecuadorian delegate noted that the term ‘separate customs territories’ was 
derived from the WTO, which was designed to deal with trade issues. As such, the term 
might be inappropriate for use in a fishery resources management organisation.
36  The 
French delegate referred to the term ‘fishing entity’, as provided for in the UNFSA.
37 
                                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/agenda21/english/Agenda21.pdf (visited on 15/02/2011). 
30  The Rio Declaration is a short document produced at the 1992 UNCED. It lays out 27 principles intended 
to guide future sustainable development around the world. The full text can be found on the official 
website of UN Environment Programme, 
http://www.unep.org/Documents.Multilingual/Default.asp?DocumentID=78&ArticleID=1163 (visited on 
15/02/2011). 
31  The full text can be found on the official FAO website, 
http://www.fao.org/DOCREP/MEETING/003/X3130m/X3130E00.HTM (visited on 15/02/2011). 
32  See Resolution 98-02, ‘Resolution on the Establishment of a Working Group to Review the IATTC 
Convention’, June 1998, available on the IATTC website, 
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles/C-98-02%20Convention%20WG%20resolution%20Jun%2098.pdf (visited on 
10/11/2010). 
33  The only article concerning application for membership to the IATTC is Article V(3): ‘Any government, 
whose nationals participate in the fisheries covered by this Convention, desiring to adhere to the present 
Convention, shall address a communication to that effect to each of the High Contracting Parties. Upon 
receiving the unanimous consent of the High Contracting Parties to adherence, such government shall 
deposit with the Government of the United States of America an instrument of adherence which shall 
stipulate the effective date thereof. The Government of the United States of America shall furnish a 
certified copy of the Convention to each government desiring to adhere thereto. Each adhering government 
shall have all the rights and obligations under the Convention as if it had been an original signatory thereof’. 
34  See Dustin Kung-Hsiung Wang, ‘Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Fisheries Management Organizations 
and the Conceptual Revolution on Fishing Entity: The Case of the IATTC’, Ocean Development and 
International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 210. 
35  Ibid. 
36  Ibid., p. 211. 
37  Ibid.  
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    As a result of the discussions in the second, third and fourth sessions, Chairman 
Ambassador Pulvenis in the fifth session in September 2000 proposed a ‘Main Pending 
Issues’ paper, which presented four options for the definition of the term ‘parties’:
38 
‘Option A: 
1. Delete the brackets
39  and consider that the entities mentioned can be Parties to the 
Convention; 
2. Agree [on] the most appropriate term for referring to such entities: 
— ‘different [should be separate] customs territories’ 
— ‘entities’, ‘fishing entities’, ‘entities/fishing entities’. 
Option B: 
1. Based on the tentative formula in the draft Convention for the Central and Western 
Pacific (April 2000), introduce a distinction between the Parties, strictly speaking, 
and the members of the Commission. 
2. Introduce a new paragraph, to read as follows: 
‘“Members of the Commission” means the Parties to this Convention as well as 
any [entity] [fishing entity] [entity/fishing entity] that has formally expressed its 
acceptance of the regime established by this Convention’. 
3. Consider the advisability of adding, at the end of this new paragraph, a provision 
likewise based on the draft Convention for the Central and Western Pacific, as 
follows: 
‘The status of Member of the Commission in no way prejudice the legal or political 
status of that [entity] [fishing entity] [entity/fishing entity]’. 
Option C: 
1. Introduce in the Convention the concept of ‘Non-Parties/entities/collaborating 
fishing entities’, already used in ICCAT, with the insertion of a new paragraph 
reading as follows: 
‘Non-Parties/entities/collaborating fishing entities’ means any State or [entity] 
[fishing entity][entity/fishing entity] that has formally expressed its acceptance of 
the regime established by this Convention and its intention to collaborate actively 
with the Commission’. 
                                                      
38  Ibid., pp. 212–213. 
39  Before this paper, in 1999, the Mexican delegate suggested bracketing the definition of parties and 
discussing it after solving other issues. For details, see Chapter 7, p. 145, of this thesis.  
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2. Proceed to the necessary adjustments to the text of the Convention, in particular the 
provisions relating to observers. 
Option D: 
Delete the words in brackets in the Revised Chairman’s Text, not introduce any 
specific provision regarding this situation and let it be regulated by the rules of 
general international law, and by the decisions adopted by the Commission, as 
appropriate, in the light of the provisions of the 1995 [UNFSA] and of current 
practice on this issue (in particular in the framework of ICCAT)’. 
    Many delegates were inclined to adopt Option B, or the WCPFC model, as reflected 
in the sixth session of the Working Group in March 2001. There, the chairman presented 
the Chairman’s Consolidated Text which divided the participants into two categories: 
contracting parties, which included states and regional economic integration organisations, 
and members of the commission, which would be contracting parties and fishing entities.
40 
At the ninth session of the working group in September 2002, a Revised Consolidated Text 
provided by the chairman confirmed that the WCPFC model would be the final version.
41 
It reads:
42 
‘Article I. Definitions 
6. “Parties” means the States and regional economic integration organizations which 
have consented to be bound by this Convention and for which this Convention is in 
force, in accordance with the provisions of Articles XXVII, XXIX, and XXX; 
7. “Members of the Commission” means the Parties and any fishing entity which has 
expressed in accordance with the provisions of Article XXVIII its formal 
commitment to abide by the terms of this Convention and comply with any 
conservation and management measures adopted pursuant thereto’. 
    The completed draft of the Antigua Convention by the working group was adopted at 
the 70
th meeting of the IATTC on 26–28 June, 2003.
43  At the same meeting, the 
commission adopted a Resolution on the Participation of a Fishing Entity in the Antigua 
Convention, which reads:
44 
                                                      
40  Wang, supra note 34, p. 213. 
41  Ibid., p. 215. 
42  Ibid., pp. 215-216. 
43  The Record of Decision, Resolution C-03-02, is available on the IATTC website, 
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Antigua%20Convention%20-%20Record%20of%20decision.pdf (visited on 
10/11/2010). 
44  Resolution C-03-09, available at 
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  ‘….Recognizing its active participation as an observer under the name Taiwan in the 
work of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission, due to its significant 
presence in the Eastern Pacific Ocean for over 30 years, and in the negotiation 
leading to the adoption of the Antigua Convention; 
Calls upon that observer to sign the instrument and/or provide the written 
communication referred to in Article XXVIII of the Antigua Convention, drafted in 
accordance with the texts attached to the Resolution on the adoption of the Antigua 
Convention, in its character as a fishing entity under the name Chinese Taipei’. 
    Articles I(6) and I(7) define ‘parties’ and ‘members of the Commission’, respectively 
in nearly the same terms as the Revised Consolidated Text.
45  Article XIX stipulates that 
Article XVIII concerning implementation, compliance and enforcement by parties applies 
mutatis mutandis, to fishing entities that are members of the commission.
46  Similarly, 
Article XXI provides that Article XX concerning the duties of flag states applies mutatis 
mutandis to fishing entities that are members of the commission. Article XXVI(1) 
encourages the fishing entities mentioned in article XXVIII to become members or to 
adopt laws and regulations consistent with this convention. Article XXVIII is an important 
provision for fishing entities and provides the approach for fishing entities to participate 
the commission:
47 
1. Any fishing entity whose vessels have fished for fish stocks covered by this 
Convention at any time during the four years preceding the adoption of this 
Convention may express its firm commitment to abide by the terms of this 
Convention and comply with any conservation and management measures 
adopted pursuant thereto, by: 
(a) signing, during the period referred to in Article XXVII, paragraph 1 of this 
Convention, an instrument drafted to this effect in accordance with a resolution to 
be adopted by the Commission under the 1949 Convention; and/or 
                                                                                                                                                                 
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Resolutions/C-03-09%20Participation%20of%20fishing%20entity.pdf 
(visited on 10/11/2010). 
45  Article I (6) reads: ‘Parties’ means the States and regional economic integration organizations which have 
consented to be bound by this Convention and for which this Convention is in force, in accordance with the 
provisions of Articles XXVII, XXIX, and XXX of this Convention; Article I (7) reads: ‘Members of the 
Commission’ means the Parties and any fishing entity which has expressed in accordance with the 
provisions of Article XXVIII of this Convention its formal commitment to abide by the terms of this 
Convention and comply with any conservation and management measures adopted pursuant thereto. 
46  The full text can be found on the IATTC website, 
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Antigua_Convention_Jun_2003.pdf (visited on 10/11/2010). 
47  Ibid.  
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(b) during or after the above-mentioned period, providing a written 
communication to the Depositary in accordance with a resolution to be adopted by 
the Commission under the 1949 Convention. The Depositary shall promptly 
provide a copy of this communication to all signatories and Parties. 
2. The commitment expressed pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article shall be 
effective from the date referred to in Article XXXI, paragraph 1, of this 
Convention, or on the date of the written communication referred to in paragraph 
1 of this Article, whichever is later. 
3. Any fishing entity referred to above may express its firm commitment to abide by 
the terms of this Convention as it may be amended pursuant to Article XXXIV or 
Article XXXV of this Convention by providing a written communication to this 
effect to the Depositary in accordance with the resolution referred to in paragraph 
1 of this Article. 
4. The commitment expressed pursuant to paragraph 3 of this Article shall be 
effective from the dates referred to in Article XXXIV, paragraph 3, and Article 
XXXV, paragraph 4, of this Convention, or on the date of the written 
communication referred to in paragraph 3 of this Article, whichever is later. 
    Along with the UNFSA, the Antigua Convention uses the term ‘mutatis mutandis’ to 
express that fishing entities are under the same obligations as parties. It is worth noting that, 
although Articles XVIII and XX are in Part IV on the Rights and Obligations of Members 
of the Commission, the subject they address is the party, rather than the member. Articles 
XIX and XXI clearly stipulate that the former two articles apply to fishing entities that are 
members of the IATTC. This implies that, although fishing entities cannot become 
contracting parties, they still have status equal to contracting parties.
48  Furthermore, 
although the Antigua Convention adopts the model of WCPFC distinguishing between 
parties and members of the commission, the related provisions concerning fishing entities 
are included in the main text of the Antigua Convention but in the annexes of the WCPFC 
Convention. 
    Pursuant to the Antigua Convention, Chinese Taipei, as a fishing entity, signed an 
Instrument for the Participation of Fishing Entities in Washington, D.C., on 14 November 
                                                      
48  In the WCPFC Convention, the articles concerning the obligations of Members, duties of flag states and 
compliance and enforcement all refer to the subject of members, rather than contracting parties. See 
articles 23, 24 and 25 of the WCPFC Convention.  
57 
 
2003 and became a member of the IATTC when the Antigua Convention entered into force 
on 27 August 2010.
49 
 
5. International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North 
Pacific Ocean 
In 1995, the United States and Japan announced their intention to establish an interim 
scientific committee (ISC) to study the tuna and tuna-like species of the North Pacific 
Ocean.
50  The main purpose of the committee would be to increase scientific research and 
cooperation for conservation and rational utilisation of the species of tuna and tuna-like 
fishes which inhabit the North Pacific Ocean. Attachment 4 of the Report of the First 
Meeting of the Interim Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North 
Pacific contains the Guidelines for the Committee, which was developed through a series 
of consultations between the United States and Japan.
51  In Part B of the guidelines, the 
membership is limited to members and observer participants. The former includes coastal 
states in the region and states with vessels fishing for tuna and tuna-like species in the 
region, while the latter consists of relevant intergovernmental fishery organisations, 
intergovernmental marine science organisations and other entities with vessels fishing for 
tuna and tuna-like species in the region.
52 
    According to the original guidelines, only states may be members, and fishing entities 
may only become observers of the ISC. In 2002, an amendment was proposed which 
would allow fishing entities to become members. The item concerning other entities with 
vessels fishing for tuna and tuna-like species in the region in the section addressing 
observer participants would be deleted, and the phrases ‘fishing entities’ and ‘fishing 
entities with vessels fishing for tuna and tuna-like species in the region’ added to the 
section on members (see Table 1).
53  According to this amendment to the ISC guidelines, 
fishing entities could be qualified as members rather than observer participants. This 
                                                      
49  See the IATTC website, http://www.iattc.org/IATTCdocumentationENG.htm (visited on 17/02/2011). 
50  In 2005, the committee name was changed to the ‘International Scientific Committee for Tuna and 
Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific Ocean’, as recorded in paragraph 12 of the Report of the Plenary 
Session of the Fifth Meeting of the Interim Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North 
Pacific. See ISC, http://isc.ac.affrc.go.jp/pdf/ISC5pdf/Report_ISC5_Plenary.pdf (visited on 07/10/2010). 
51  For further information, see ISC, http://isc.ac.affrc.go.jp/pdf/ISC1pdf/isc1P_rep.pdf (visited on 
07/10/2010). 
52  Ibid. 
53  Further information can be found on the ISC website, http://isc.ac.affrc.go.jp/pdf/ISC3pdf/isc3P_rep.pdf 
(visited on 07/10/2010).  
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proposal was adopted at the 3rd ISC Plenary Meeting on 29 January, 2002, and the revised 
guidelines become the present version.
54 
 
 
<Table 1> 
The Original Provision of Part B  The 2002 Amendment 
B. Membership 
1. Member 
a. Coastal states of the region 
b. States with vessels fishing for 
these species in the region 
 
2. Observer participants 
a. Relevant intergovernmental 
fishery organisations 
b. Relevant intergovernmental 
marine science organisations 
c. Other entities with vessels 
fishing for those species in the 
region 
B. Membership 
1. Member 
a. Coastal states/ fishing entities 
of the region 
b. States/ fishing entities with 
vessels fishing for these species 
in the region 
 
2. Observer participants: 
a. Relevant intergovernmental 
fishery organisations 
b. Relevant intergovernmental 
marine science organisations 
c. (Deleted) 
Source: ISC, http://isc.ac.affrc.go.jp/pdf/ISC3pdf/isc3P_rep.pdf (visited on 07/10/2010) 
 
As a result, the ISC recognises no difference between contracting parties and members; 
states and fishing entities which would like to participate in the ISC are categorised as the 
members. Thus, within the ISC, fishing entities have equal legal status with states; both 
state members and fishing entity members have the same rights and obligations. In the 
light of the revised guidelines, Chinese Taipei, as a fishing entity, announced on 29 January 
2002 that, as the soon-to-be-member of the ISC, Taiwan would regard itself as a 
constructive force in the ISC.
55 
                                                      
54  Ibid. 
55  The statement can be found in Attachment 3 of Report of the Plenary Session of the Third Meeting of the 
ISC, http://isc.ac.affrc.go.jp/pdf/ISC3pdf/isc3P_rep.pdf (visited on 10/09/2010).  
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6. Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
In May 1993, Australia, Japan and New Zealand signed the Convention for the 
Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna
56, which entered into force on 20 May 1994 and 
lead to the establishment of the CCSBT headquartered in Canberra, Australia.
57  The 
southern bluefin tuna (SBT) is the only stock the CCSBT manages and conserves, and the 
CCSBT’s purpose is to ensure, through appropriate management, the conservation and 
optimum utilisation of this stock.
58 
    Article 18 of the convention states that, ‘[a]fter the entry into force of this Convention, 
any other State, whose vessels engage in fishing for southern bluefin tuna, or any other 
coastal State through whose exclusive economic or fishery zone southern bluefin tuna 
migrates, may accede to it. This Convention shall become effective for any such other State 
on the date of deposit of that State’s instrument of accession’.
59  Article 18 stipulates the 
qualifications for states to accede but does not directly allow the possibility for fishing 
entities to participate. However, three articles in the convention mention ‘entity’. 
Article 5(4) states that ‘[t]he Parties shall cooperate in the exchange of information 
regarding any fishing for southern bluefin tuna by nationals, residents and vessels of any 
State or entity not party to this Convention’.
60  Article 14(1) allows the commission to 
invite states or entities which are not contracting parties but whose nationals, residents or 
fishing vessels harvest SBT to send observers to meetings of the commission and of the 
Scientific Committee.
61  Additionally, Article 15(1) reads that ‘[t]he Parties agree to invite 
the attention of any State or entity not party to this Convention to any matter relating to the 
fishing activities of its nationals, residents or vessels which could affect the attainment of 
the objective of this Convention’. Article 15(2) states that ‘[e]ach Party shall encourage its 
nationals not to associate with the southern bluefin tuna fishery of any State or entity not 
party to this Convention, where such association could affect adversely the attainment of 
the objective of this Convention’. Article 15(4) again mentions ‘entity: ‘The Parties shall 
                                                      
56  The full text of the convention can be found on the CCSBT website, 
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/about_the_commission/convention.pdf (visited on 15/12/2010). 
57  See the website of CCSBT, http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/about.html (visited on 15/12/2010). 
58  See Article 3 of the Convention, supra note 56. Pursuant to this article, South Korea and Indonesia joined 
the commission on 17 October 2001 and 8 April 2008, respectively. 
59  Ibid. 
60  Ibid. 
61  Ibid.  
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cooperate in taking appropriate action, consistent with international law and their 
respective domestic laws, to deter fishing activities for southern bluefin tuna by nationals, 
residents or vessels of any State or entity not party to this Convention where such activity 
could affect adversely the attainment of the objective of this Convention’.
62 
From these three articles and Article 18, it is obvious that the convention does not 
consider whether fishing entities could apply to be contracting parties. In addition, the 
convention does not give criteria for fishing entities to become members of the 
commission. Instead, pursuant to Article 14(1), the only route for fishing entities to 
participate the CCSBT is to become observers, provided they are invited by the 
commission. 
Nevertheless, at its seventh meeting in April 2001, the CCSBT adopted a Resolution 
to Establish an Extended Commission and an Extended Scientific Committee.
63  The 
objective of the resolution was to ensure, through the commission, all states and fishing 
entities fishing SBT could work together in sustaining this stock. Paragraph 1 states that 
part of the legal foundation of the resolution is Article 8(3)(b) of the convention, which 
provides that the commission can decide and adopt other measures for the purpose of 
conservation, management and optimum utilisation of SBT. The other legal basis is Article 
15(4) of the convention, which encourages all parties to take appropriate action to deter 
fishing activities for SBT by non-party states and fishing entities which might undermine 
the objectives of the convention. Hence, instead of the CCSBT proper, the CCSBT’s 
Extended Commission is open to all states and fishing entities whose vessels conduct 
fishing for SBT to become members by exchange of letters.
64  Paragraph 1 of the 
resolution indicates that the members of the Extended Commission ‘shall be comprised of 
                                                      
62  Ibid. 
63  See Attachment I of the Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the Commission, available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_7/report_of_ccsbt7.pdf (visited on 15/12/2010). 
The CCSBT adopted this resolution with the hope of bringing Taiwan, as a major catcher of SBT in the CCSBT 
Convention area, into the CCSBT regime. Taiwan regarded itself as a state and preferred to participate at 
least as a member rather than an observer. However, the conflict between Taiwan and China became the 
main obstacle for Taiwan’s participation as a state. Hence, the CCSBT adopted this resolution in order to 
provide another route for Taiwan to participate in the CCSBT as a fishing entity. The details of Taiwan’s 
participation in the CCSBT are discussed in Chapter 8, pp. 156–163, of this thesis. 
64  Paragraph 6 of the Resolution clearly states: ‘Any entity or fishing entity, vessels flagged to which have 
caught SBT at any time in the previous three calendar years, may express its willingness to the Executive 
Secretary of the Commission to become a member of the Extended Commission. The Executive Secretary of 
the Commission, on behalf of the Commission, will conduct an Exchange of Letters with the representative 
of such entity or fishing entity to this effect. In so doing, the applicant shall give the Commission its firm 
commitment to respect the terms of the Convention and comply with such decisions of the Extended 
Commission as become decisions of the Commission pursuant to paragraph 4’.  
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the Parties to the Convention and any entity or fishing entity, vessels flagged to which have 
caught SBT at any time in the previous three calendar years, that is admitted to 
membership by the Extended Commission pursuant to this Resolution’. 
The Extended Commission performs nearly the same function as the CCSBT, 
including deciding upon a total allowable catch and its allocation among the members. The 
CCSBT Secretariat also serves as the Secretariat of the Extended Commission. All 
members of the Extended Commission have equal voting rights. Theoretically, the 
Extended Commission meets before the Annual Commission Meeting, and its decisions are 
adopted in the CCSBT meeting.
65  To a certain degree, the Extended Commission, in 
principle, replaces the function of the CCSBT, although the latter can still adopt a 
resolution contrary to the former’s decision. However, paragraph 4 of the resolution 
indicates that any decision by the CCSBT which affects the operation of the Extended 
Commission or the rights, obligations or status of any individual member of the Extended 
Commission should not be undertaken without consideration by the Extended 
Commission. 
Although the CCSBT can adopt a resolution contrary to the decision of the Extended 
Commission, this circumstance should not occur because the two bodies have nearly the 
members; it would be contradictory for the same issue to lead to a different decision by the 
same members. Consequently, the CCSBT practically serves as a rubber stamp for the 
Extended Commission’s decisions. However, for this design to work, the Extended 
Commission needs to include all members of the CCSBT. In other words, all CCSBT 
members must agree to become members of the Extended Commission, or the Extended 
Commission’s decision might not be adopted by the commission so that the establishment 
of the Extended Commission lacks meaning. 
As a fishing entity, Taiwan applied to become a member of the Extended Commission 
and the Extended Scientific Committee for CCSBT and gained that status effective 30 
August 2002.
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65  The operation of the Extended Commission is explained in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 and 9 of the resolution. 
66  See the Report of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Commission, available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/docs/pdf/meeting_reports/ccsbt_9/report_of_ccsbt9.pdf (visited on 19/12/2010).  
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7. North Pacific Anadromous Fish Commission 
The NPAFC was set up on 16 February 1993 under Article VIII(1) of the Convention for 
the Conservation Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean
67, signed on 11 February 
1992.
68  The objective of the NPAFC is to promote the conservation of anadromous stocks 
in the waters of the North Pacific Ocean and its adjacent seas.
69 
The NPAFC convention does not create any route for fishing entities to accede; it is 
open to Canada, Japan, Russia and United States, which are major states of origin for 
anadromous stocks which migrate into the convention area. By a unanimous invitation 
from the original parties, other states may accede to the NPAFC.
70  The provisions 
concerning entities in the convention are in Articles IV, VI, and IX. 
Under Article IV(1), the contracting parties should require states or entities which are 
not party to the convention to note any matter relating to the fishing activities of their 
nationals, residents or vessels which could affect adversely the conservation of 
anadromous stocks within the convention area.
71  Article IV(2) further requires the 
contracting parties to encourage such states or entities to adopt regulations consistent with 
the convention’s provisions regarding fishing operations conducted by its nationals, 
residents or vessels.
72  The contracting parties, under Article IX(4), should ‘cooperate in 
taking action, consistent with international law and their respective domestic laws, for the 
prevention by any State or entity not party to this Convention of any directed fishing for, 
and the minimization by such State or entity of any incidental taking of, anadromous fish 
by nationals, residents or vessels of such State or entity in the Convention Area’.
73  Article 
IX instructs the contracting parties to cooperate with each other and other states or entities 
which could hinder the conservation measures of the convention and to encourage those 
states or entities to adopt related laws consistent with the convention. These articles 
passively regulate entities rather than bringing them directly into the convention regime. 
Article VI(3) continues along these lines: ‘The Parties shall cooperate to exchange 
                                                      
67  The full text of the convention can be found on the official NPAFC website, 
http://www.npafc.org/new/publications/HandBook/English%20(page1-44).pdf (visited on 07/01/2011). 
68  The contracting parties are Canada, Japan, Korea, Russia and the United States; further information can 
be found on the official NPAFC website, http://www.npafc.org/new/about_convention.html (visited on 
07/01/2011). 
69  Ibid. 
70  See Articles XVII and XVIII, supra note 67. 
71  Ibid. 
72  Ibid. 
73  Ibid.  
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information regarding any directed fishing for and any incidental taking of anadromous 
fish in the Convention Area by nationals, residents and vessels of any State or entity not 
party to this Convention’. Article IX provides for the authority of the NPAFC.
74  Article 
IX(2) states that the commission can ‘promote the exchange of information on any 
activities contrary to the provisions of this Convention, especially with respect to fishing 
for and trafficking in anadromous fish contrary to the provisions of Article III, as well as 
on responsive action taken by the Parties and, as appropriate, by any State or entity not 
party to this Convention’. Article IX(6) allows the commission to ‘promote the exchange 
of catch and effort information in respect of activities of Parties and any states or entities 
not party to this Convention for conducting scientific research and for coordinating the 
collection, exchange and analysis of scientific data regarding anadromous stocks and 
ecologically related species’.
75  Article IX(10) is the only provision dealing with how 
entities may participate in the commission; it provides that the commission can invite any 
states or entities not party to the convention to consult with the commission on matters 
relating to the conservation of anadromous stocks and ecologically related species in the 
convention area.
76 
    Although entities may consult on matters relating to the conservation and 
management of anadromous stocks with the commission, they may not accede to the 
convention or become members of the NPAFC. The regulations concerning entities in the 
NPAFC Convention passively request that the commission cooperate with entities in order 
to acquire fisheries information or prevent such entities from violating the conservation 
and management measures adopted by the NPAFC. However, those entities which are 
neither contracting parties nor members have no obligation to comply with the NPAFC’s 
regulations. Fishing entities which are invited to attend the meetings and discuss some 
particular issues and agree to comply with certain stipulations or resolutions of the NPAFC 
can revoke the agreement at any time. Hence, the NPAFC convention’s position 
concerning entities do not provide a good way either to establish or to stabilise relations 
with fishing entities. A better way for the NPAFC to prevent fishing entities from breaking 
its conservation and management measures would be to bring them into its legal regime, in 
other words, to create a route for fishing entities to become contracting parties or members 
                                                      
74  Ibid. 
75  Ibid. 
76  Ibid.  
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of the NPAFC required to comply with its resolutions. The NPAFC should consider 
amending its convention, perhaps using the CCSBT’s experience as a reference. 
Taiwan, as a fishing entity in other RFMOs, has been invited to be an observer and 
join in discussions at the commission’s annual meetings since 2005. However, it is not 
been identified as a fishing entity but has merely used the term ‘Taiwan’ to participate.
77 
 
8. Indian Ocean Tuna Commission 
The FAO established the IOTC on 27 March 1996 to manage tuna and tuna-like species in 
the Indian Ocean and adjacent seas and promote cooperation among members to ensure the 
conservation and optimum utilisation of stocks and encourage the sustainable development 
of fisheries based on such stocks.
78  The IOTC falls within the framework of FAO and, 
thus, also within the framework of the UN. This position limits the membership in the 
IOTC to only FAO members and associate members, UN members and specialized 
agencies and members of the International Atomic Energy Agency.
79  The Agreement for 
the Establishment of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
80  did not create any approach for 
fishing entities to accede to or join the IOTC. One provision in the agreement concerning 
fishing entities is Article X(4), which requires IOTC members to cooperate and exchange 
information on stocks covered by the convention with non-member fishing entities whose 
vessels fish in the convention area. As well, Article XI(1) provides that the IOTC should 
make effort to obtain fishing statistics from fishing states or entities which are not 
members. 
At the Fourth Meeting of the IOTC in 1999, Resolution 99/04 on the Status of 
Cooperating Non-Contracting Parties was adopted, defining ‘cooperating non-contracting 
parties’ as ‘[a]ny non-Contracting Party that voluntarily ensures that vessels flying its flag 
                                                      
77  The Annual Meeting Reports from 1993 are available at 
http://www.npafc.org/new/pub_annualreport.html (visited on 07/01/2011). 
78  Further information can be found on the IOTC website, http://www.iotc.org/English/index.php (visited 
on 30/12/2010). 
79  The IOTC members are Australia, Belize, China, Comoros, Eritrea, the European Union, France, Guinea, 
India, Indonesia, Iran, Japan, Kenya, Korea, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mauritius, the Sultanate of Oman, 
Pakistan, Philippines, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Tanzania, Thailand, the United Kingdom 
and Vanuatu. The cooperating non-contracting parties are the Maldives, Senegal, South Africa and Uruguay. 
Further information can be found at http://www.iotc.org/English/info/comstruct.php (visited on 
17/01/2011). 
80  The full text of the agreement can be found on the IOTC website, 
http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/misc/ComReportsTexts/IOTC%20Agreement.pdf (visited on 
18/02/2011).  
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fish in a manner which is in conformity with the conservation measures adopted by IOTC 
be defined as a Non-Contracting Cooperating Party’.
81  The resolution required the IOTC 
secretary to encourage non-contracting parties to become contracting parties or 
non-contracting cooperating parties.
82  In 2003, Resolution 99/04 was replaced by 
Resolution 03/02 on Criteria for Attaining the Status of Co-Operating Non-contracting 
Party. It stipulates that co-operating non-contracting parties’ status should be reviewed and 
renewed annually and that any non-contracting parties requesting the status of co-operating 
non-contracting party should provide: ‘a) where available, data on its historical fisheries in 
the IOTC Area, including nominal catches, number/type of vessels, name of fishing vessels, 
fishing effort and fishing areas; b) all the data that Contracting Parties have to submit to 
IOTC based on the resolutions adopted by IOTC; c) details on current fishing presence in 
the IOTC Area, number of vessels and vessel characteristics and; d) information on any 
research programmes it may have conducted in the IOTC Area and the information and the 
results of this research’.
83  Although Resolution 03/02 does not define the term 
‘cooperating non-contracting parties’, it in principle includes fishing entities. 
However, the critical problem that the IOTC faces concerning fishing entities is 
Taiwan, which is the major catcher of tuna in the Indian Ocean. The commission’s 
conservation and management efforts cannot be effective without Taiwan’s participation.
84 
However, the IOTC is the only regional fisheries organisation that excludes Taiwan from 
participating. As the IOTC falls within the framework of the FAO and UN, it is involved in 
the dispute over recognition between China and Taiwan.
85  To solve this problem, the 
seventh meeting of the commission in 2002 explored a legal route for Taiwan to be brought 
into the IOTC as a cooperative non-member entity.
86  So far, however, the commission has 
failed to create or find a way for Taiwan. Taiwan has participated as an invited expert, a 
                                                      
81  The full text of the resolution can be found at: 
http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/misc/ComReportsTexts/resolutions_E.pdf (visited on 11/01/2011). 
82  Ibid. 
83  Ibid. 
84  See W.R. Edeson, ‘An International Legal Extravaganza in the Indian Ocean: Placing the Indian Ocean 
Tuna Commission outside the Framework of FAO’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 
22, No.4(2007), p. 486; William Edeson, ‘Some Future Directions for Fishing Entities in Certain Regional 
Fisheries Management Bodies’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 252. 
85  Regarding the dispute between China and Taiwan, see Chapter 7, pp. 119-126, of this thesis. 
86  See the 8
th Meeting of the Commission, available at 
http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2003/s/IOTC-2003-S08-R[EN].pdf    
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status which recognises individuals rather than government and lacks the rights and 
obligations of members.
87 
 
9. South East Atlantic Fisheries Organisation 
In 1995, Namibia suggested establishing a regional fisheries management organisation to 
conserve and manage fishery resources in the South-east Atlantic Ocean.
88  Through nine 
preparatory meetings between 1997 and 2001, the Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Fisheries Resources in the South East Atlantic Ocean
89  was negotiated. It 
was signed in April 2001
90  and entered into force in April 2003, leading to the 
establishment of the SEAFO.
91  The convention was the first to create a regional 
management organisation after the adoption of the UNFSA. The convention’s objective is 
to ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of the fishery resources in the 
convention area. 
    Article 1(i) defines ‘fishing entity’ as ‘any fishing entity referred to in article 1 
paragraph 3 of the 1995 agreement’. However, the convention does not contain any 
provisions for a fishing entity allowing to accede. Article 26 states that the convention is 
open to accession by coastal states and all other states and regional economic integration 
organisations whose vessels fish in the convention area.
92  Like the NPAFC, the SEAFO 
regulations concerning fishing entities all require contracting parties to cooperate with 
fishing entities in order to prevent any diminishment of the effectiveness of the 
conservation and management measures. Article 6(10) requires the commission to ‘draw 
the attention of any State or fishing entity which is a non-party to this Convention to any 
activity which in the opinion of the Commission affects implementation of the objective of 
this Convention’.
93  Article 22(4) instructs contracting parties to cooperate with fishing 
entities that have fishing vessels in the convention area in implementing conservation and 
management measures.
94  This article further states that ‘such fishing entities shall enjoy 
                                                      
87  William Edeson, supra note 84, p. 261. 
88  See the website of SEAFO, http://www.seafo.org/welcome.htm (visited on 11/01/2011). 
89  The full text of the convention can be found on SEAFO website, http://www.seafo.org/welcome.htm 
(visited on 18/02/2011). 
90  Ibid. 
91  Ibid. The parties to the SEAFO are Angola, the European Union, Japan, Namibia, Norway and South 
Africa. 
92  Ibid. 
93  Ibid. 
94  Ibid.  
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benefits from participation in the fishery commensurate with their commitment to comply 
with conservation and management measures in respect of the stocks’
95—the same 
provision as in Article 17(3) of the UNFSA. However, the convention does not further 
explain what the commensurate benefits and obligations of fishing entities are. 
    At present, the Convention of the SEAFO excludes fishing entities from membership, 
nor has any fishing entity joined the SEAFO. 
 
10. Conclusion 
RFMOs are usually established because coastal states and states with vessels fishing in 
certain high seas areas see the necessity for regional organisations to conserve and manage 
fisheries resources. The strategy that the RFMOs adopt is to invite all related states, 
especially those whose vessels fish in the convention areas, to enter the RFMO’s regime. 
Those states either become contracting parties or members of the RFMOs, facilitating the 
effective implementation of the RFMO’s conservation and management measures. As the 
amount of regional fisheries resources is limited, some states catch more, decreasing the 
amount that other states can catch. Consequently, the most important RFMO conservation 
and management measure is to use scientific statistics provided by each member to 
calculate a TAC in order to avoid over-fishing. RFMOs allocate quotas to each member 
according to the TAC. RFMOs need all states whose vessels fish in their convention areas 
to cooperate so that the scientific statistics, TAC and allocated quotas can be calculated 
accurately. Therefore, brining all actors, even non-traditional actors, into the RFMOs’ 
conservation and management regimes is key to effectively carrying out the conservation 
and management measures. Thus, most of the RFMOs discussed bring fishing entities, 
non-traditional actors, into their legal system.   
    If fishing entities are excluded from RFMO regimes, they do not have the obligation 
to comply with the conservation and management measures adopted by the RFMOs. First, 
the statistical information that RFMOs gather might be inaccurate, which would influence 
calculation of the TAC. If the TAC has a huge discrepancy with reality, over-fishing might 
occur even if each member strictly complies with the allocated quotas. Furthermore, even 
if calculation of the TAC is not influenced by inaccurate statistics and each member 
catches only their allocated quota, fishing entities not bound by the RFMO regulations 
might conduct unlimited fishing within the RFMOs’ convention areas, exceeding the TAC 
                                                      
95  Ibid.  
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and making the efforts of the RFMO members in vain. Consequently, binding all actors 
within an RFMO’s convention area to its legal system is crucial to effectively implement 
the RFMO’s conservation and management measures. Therefore, the WCPFC, IATTC, and 
ISC endow fishing entities with rights equal to those of states which become members, and 
the ICCAT and CCSBT allow a route for fishing entities to participate and be bound by the 
organisations’ resolutions. In addition, members of the IOTC tried to amend its convention 
to allow fishing entities to participate. The NPAFC and SEAFO have not opened a door for 
fishing entities to join possibly because their conservation and management measures are 
not affected by fishing entities. Once those non-traditional actors become a factor in 
decreasing the effectiveness of conservation and management, these two RFMOs can be 
expected to create a route for fishing entities to participate and be bound by their legal 
regimes.   
  
69 
 
II. ENFORCEMENT IN HIGH SEAS FISHERIES BY FISHING ENTITIES 
 
 
CHAPTER 4 Fishing Entities as Equivalent to Flag States in High Seas Enforcement 
 
1. Introduction 
The high seas encompass all parts of the sea not under the jurisdiction of any state. 
However, the extent of the high seas is not constant but changes over time. Pursuant to 
Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas
1, the term ‘high seas’ is defined as ‘all 
parts of the sea that are not included in the territorial sea or in the internal waters of a State’. 
Due to the extension of states’ jurisdiction over the ocean, the concept of exclusive 
economic zones (EEZ) was built into the 1982 UNCLOS, reducing the scope of the high 
seas to ‘all parts of the sea that are not included in the EEZ, in the territorial sea or in the 
internal waters of a State, or in the archipelagic waters of an archipelagic State’.
2  In the 
seventeenth century, Hugo Grotius argued that, as the resources of the seas were limitless 
and inexhaustible, they could not be occupied by or subject to anyone.
3  The modern 
freedom of high seas stems from Grotius’ contention. 
    Pursuant to Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, the freedom of high 
seas includes the freedom of navigation and fishing and the freedom to lay submarine 
cables and pipelines and to fly over the high seas. In addition to these four freedoms of the 
high seas, the 1982 UNCLOS adds two more: the freedom to construct artificial islands 
and other installations permitted under international law and freedom of scientific research. 
These six freedoms of the high seas lead to a corollary: the principle of the exclusivity of 
flag state jurisdiction. As the existence of fishing entities relies on their specific function of 
fishing, this chapter does not discuss all of the six freedoms but focuses on the role of 
fishing entities in the freedom of fishing and their exercise of the exclusivity of flag state 
jurisdiction. This chapter shows that fishing entities enjoy the freedom of fishing and the 
attendant obligations, and on the basis of the freedom of fishing and its limitations, 
examines fishing entities’ exclusive jurisdiction and enforcement on the high seas. 
                                                      
1  United Nations, Treaty Series (Vol. 450), p. 11; the full text is also available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_high_seas.pdf (visited on 
03/05/2011). 
2  See Article 86 of the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
3  Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas (trs. Ralph Van Deman Magoffin, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 1916), pp. 27–28.  
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2. The Freedom of Fishing on the High Seas   
The freedom of fishing means that the fishery resources on the high seas are open for all 
states to fish and catch. This principle originated from the reasoning that, although the high 
seas are the common property of all (res communis omnium), the natural resources within 
the high seas are not subject to anyone specific (res nullius). Thus, the nationals of all 
states have the right to engage in fishing, and their vessels are free to catch and possess 
those resources on the high seas.
4 
However, it must be noted that the freedom of fishing is given not to individuals but 
to all states, both coastal and landlocked.
5  Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High 
Seas states that the freedom of high seas extends to both coastal and non-coastal states. 
Article 87 of the 1982 UNCLOS reasserts this rule and further indicates that freedom of 
high seas is for both coastal and ‘land-locked’ states, replacing the term ‘non-coastal’ states. 
The principle that states are the main subject of international law is not the only reason that 
the freedom of fishing is given to states rather than individuals. Practically, as a result of 
res communis omnium, the special status of high seas, Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on 
the High Seas and Article 89 of the 1982 UNCLOS stipulate that no state may subject any 
part of the high seas to its sovereignty. Consequently, no states can control or rule the high 
seas. Therefore, the effective procedure to maintain order in the activity of fishing on the 
high seas is for states to control their vessels which engage in fishing on the high seas. 
In the international law of the sea, fishing entities are defined by their specific 
function of fishing. They cannot be regarded as the same as normal states; however, they 
absolutely possess the capacity for fishing. Although fishing entities are different from 
normal states,
6  the operation of their vessels which engage in fishing on the sea is the 
same as those of states. As owners of vessels, their nationals register with the authorities of 
fishing entities, placing fishing entities in the position of de facto flag states. The vessels of 
fishing entities should comply with the rules and domestic laws stipulated by fishing 
entities. Like flag states, fishing entities as de facto flag states are under the obligation to 
                                                      
4  See Article 2 of 1958 Convention on the High Seas and articles 87 and 116 of UNCLOS. 
5  Rosemary Gail Rayfuse, Non-flag State Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2004), p. 30. 
6  In this chapter, we do not deal with how and why fishing entities become entities, instead of normal 
states because there are complicated reasons which vary case by case. Neither do we discuss the extent of 
how the concept of fishing entities differs from that of the state. At present, international law does not 
present an objective standard which can be judged.  
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restrict the fishing activities of their nationals on the high seas and to control their vessels 
so as not to violate the international law of the sea.
7 
Despite having the same duties as flag states, fishing entities, as de facto flag states, 
are not the subject of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and the 1982 UNCLOS. 
Neither convention mentions the term ‘fishing entities’. Article 31 of the 1958 Convention 
on the High Seas states that it may be signed by all UN member states and specialised 
agencies and by any other state invited by the UN General Assembly to become a party to 
the convention. Article 33 opens accession to the convention to states belonging to any of 
the categories mentioned in Article 31. The 1958 Convention on the High Seas does not 
create opportunities for fishing entities to sign or accede.
8  Articles 305 and 307 of the 
UNCLOS also do not provide a gateway for fishing entities to be the subject of the 
convention.
9  However, lacking the opportunity to be the subject of those two conventions 
does not prevent fishing entities from enjoying the freedom of fishing on the high seas. The 
1958 Convention on the High Seas and most related fishing rules in UNCLOS are not 
newly developed or created; rather, they codify customary international law which has long 
existed and is viewed by international society as ‘evidence of a general practice accepted 
as law’.
10  The freedom of fishing is regarded as customary international law.
11 
Theoretically, the actors of international society should comply with customary 
international law and could be endowed with some rights from customary law. Fishing 
entities are no exception. Therefore, although they are not the subject of the 1958 
Convention on the High Seas or UNCLOS, fishing entities are granted the right of freedom 
of fishing by international customary law. In other words, the practice of vessels of fishing 
entities exercising the freedom of fishing by engaging in fishing on high seas is not 
regarded as violating international law. 
                                                      
7  This assumes that fishing entities are subject to the law of the sea. The cross-references regarding fishing 
entities’ international legal personality are shown in Chapter 2, pp. 27–32, of this thesis. 
8  The concept of fishing entities had not developed at that time. The international document which first 
referenced fishing entities is a paper entitled ‘International Fishery Bodies: Considerations for High Seas 
Management’, from the FAO Technical Consultation on High Seas Fishing. This paper is discussed in Chapter 
1, pp. 21–22, of this thesis. 
9  The details of fishing entities’ status in UNCLOS are discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 32-34, of this thesis. 
10  See Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice. Also see Ian Brownlie, Principles of 
Public International Law, 7
th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 8; see also the Preamble of 
the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. 
11  R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3
rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999), p. 203.  
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    In contrast, the term ‘fishing entity’ was included in the UNFSA and the related 
regulations of RFMOs. Pursuant to Article 1(3) of the UNFSA, it applies to fishing entities 
whose vessels fish on high seas. This article implies that it is necessary to bring fishing 
entities into the legal system in order to achieve the conservation and sustainable use of 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. Meanwhile, it can be reasoned that vessels of 
these fishing entities have been engaging in fishing on high seas, so their fishing activities 
must be regulated. Similarly, the regulations of some RFMOs clearly allow fishing entities 
to become members. As members of or participants in RFMOs, fishing entities assume 
obligations imposed by the RFMOs’ conservation and management measures, including 
allocation of catch quota and detailed stipulations for vessels fishing on the high seas. The 
regulations of the UNFSA and RFMOs imply that fishing entities invited to become the 
members of or participants in RFMOs possess the right to fish on high seas. On one hand, 
this practice seems to contradict traditional international law of the sea which grants that 
the freedom of fishing only to states. On the other, it can be regarded as recognising fishing 
entities’ conduct of fishing on the high seas so as to imply that, in addition to states, fishing 
entities can also enjoy the freedom of fishing. However, the purpose of RFMOs’ 
conservation and management measures is to protect and sustain fisheries resources on the 
high seas by reducing the total catch amount per year. Arguably, given the aim to reduce 
the catch amount of certain fish stocks on the high seas, it is not in RFMOs’ interest to 
increase the vessels fishing those stocks on the high seas by endowing with rights new 
legal actors not originally permitted to fish on the high seas. The reasonable inference is 
that the fishing entities which can become members of or participants in RFMOs’ 
conservation and management measures are recognised as also originally enjoying the 
freedom of fishing. Otherwise, it would be unnecessary to bring this kind of fishing entity 
into the legal system of conservation and management measures, limit their catching 
amount and require their cooperation. Therefore, it can be deduced that fishing entities 
within RFMOs’ system already possess the freedom of fishing on the high seas, so the 
related rules of conservation and management measures adopted by RFMOs may 
reasonably be imposed on them. 
 
3. The Limitations of the Freedom of Fishing 
Although the freedom of fishing brings many benefits and convenience for humans, it is 
still accompanied by some limitations. Article 2 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas 
states that, when exercising freedoms of the high seas, states should have reasonable regard  
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for the interests of other states. Article 87(2) of UNCLOS reads that ‘[t]hese freedoms shall 
be exercised by all States with due regard for the interests of other States in their exercise 
of the freedom of the high seas, and also with due regard for the rights under this 
Convention with respect to activities in the Area’. These articles remind all states to 
consider other states’ rights and freedoms as they also exercise these rights. The purpose of 
this limitation is to prevent hinder the exercise of these freedom by each state and to 
balance the benefits of using the high seas for each state. 
    In addition, the freedom of fishing is largely subject to the measures for conservation 
and management on high seas fisheries resources. International society acknowledges that 
the high seas fisheries resources are not limitless and inexhaustible, as Grotius thought. 
Therefore, regulations concerning the conservation and management of these resources 
have been established. The 1958 Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living 
Resources of the High Seas
12  was adopted and entered into force on 20 March 1966. 
Article 1(2) of this convention states that all states have the duty to adopt or cooperate with 
other states in adopting necessary measures for the conservation of the living resources of 
the high seas. Article 4 further indicates that, if the nationals of two or more states engage 
in fishing the same stocks of fish or other living marine resources on the high seas, these 
states shall negotiate to adopt necessary measures for the conservation of the living 
resources affected. The 1982 UNCLOS has provisions similar to the 1958 convention.
13 
Article 117 of the UNCLOS reads: ‘All States have the duty to take, or to cooperate with 
                                                      
12  United Nations, Treaty Series (Vol. 559), p. 285; the full text is also available at 
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_fishing.pdf (visited on 
03/05/2011). 
13  However, some of provisions of UNCLOS are more specific. For example, Article 119 reads:   
‘1. In determining the allowable catch and establishing other conservation measures for the living resources 
in the high seas, States shall:   
(a) take measures which are designed, on the best scientific evidence available to the States concerned, 
to maintain or restore populations of harvested species at levels which can produce the maximum 
sustainable yield, as qualified by relevant environmental and economic factors, including the special 
requirements of developing States, and taking into account fishing patterns, the interdependence of 
stocks and any generally recommended international minimum standards, whether subregional, regional 
or global;   
(b) take into consideration the effects on species associated with or dependent upon harvested species 
with a view to maintaining or restoring populations of such associated or dependent species above levels 
at which their reproduction may become seriously threatened.   
2. Available scientific information, catch and fishing effort statistics, and other data relevant to the 
conservation of fish stocks shall be contributed and exchanged on a regular basis through competent 
international organizations, whether subregional, regional or global, where appropriate and with 
participation by all States concerned.   
3. States concerned shall ensure that conservation measures and their implementation do not discriminate 
in form or in fact against the fishermen of any State’.  
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other States in taking, such measures for their respective nationals as may be necessary for 
the conservation of the living resources of the high seas’. Article 118 stipulates that states 
whose nationals exploit either the same or different living resources in the same area 
should undertake the measures necessary for the conservation of these living resources and 
cooperate in establishing subregional or regional fisheries organisations. Article 116 further 
indicates that the freedom of fishing is limited by measures adopted by coastal states to 
conserve and manage straddling and highly migratory fish stocks in EEZs.   
    Moreover, in 1991 the UN adopted a Resolution on Large-scale Pelagic Drift-net 
Fishing and its Impact on the Living Marine Resources of the World’s Oceans and Seas
14, 
which requires all members of international community to cease large-scale pelagic 
drift-net fishing on the high seas from the end of 1992. The Agreement to Promote 
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing 
Vessels on the High Seas and the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, adopted by 
FAO in 1993 and 1995 respectively, require flag states to monitor their vessels which 
engage in fishing on the high seas to ensure that these vessels do not violate relevant 
conservation and management measures.
15  Additionally, the UNFSA plays a significant 
role in encouraging states to cooperate in adopting conservation and management measures 
for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks in the high seas through subregional or 
regional fisheries management organisations. 
                                                      
14  A/RES/46/215. The full text can be found at 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/583/03/IMG/NR058303.pdf?OpenElement 
(visited on 05/05/2011). 
15  Article 3(3) of the Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management 
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas states: ‘No Party shall authorize any fishing vessel entitled to 
fly its flag to be used for fishing on the high seas unless the Party is satisfied that it is able, taking into 
account the links that exist between it and the fishing vessel concerned, to exercise effectively its 
responsibilities under this Agreement in respect of that fishing vessel’. Article 3(6) reads: ‘Each Party shall 
ensure that all fishing vessels entitled to fly its flag … are marked in such a way that they can be readily 
identified in accordance with generally accepted standards’. Article 3(7) further states: ‘Each Party shall 
ensure that each fishing vessel entitled to fly its flag shall provide it with such information on its operations 
as may be necessary to enable the Party to fulfil its obligations under this Agreement, including in particular 
information pertaining to the area of its fishing operations and to its catches and landings’. Article 6.10 of 
the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries states: ‘States should ensure compliance with and 
enforcement of conservation and management measures and establish effective mechanisms, as 
appropriate, to monitor and control the activities of fishing vessels and fishing support vessels’. Article 7.1.7 
also reads: ‘States should establish…effective mechanisms for fisheries monitoring, surveillance, control and 
enforcement to ensure compliance with their conservation and management measures’. Article 7.7.3 
reiterates this, stipulating that ‘[s]tates … should implement effective fisheries monitoring, control, 
surveillance and law enforcement measures including, where appropriate, observer programmes, 
inspection schemes and vessel monitoring systems’.  
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    As the concept of fisheries resources conservation and management have gained 
international concern, related measures, including many treaties, have largely restricted the 
traditional freedom of fishing. While exercising the freedom of fishing like states, fishing 
entities, too, are bound by these limitations. In particular, the UNFSA and other treaties 
creating RFMOs seek to bring fishing entities under their conservation and management 
measures on high seas. Fishing entities thus cannot escape responsibility for high seas 
fisheries conservation and management while enjoying the freedom of fishing.   
 
4. The Exclusivity of Flag State Jurisdiction and Enforcement on High Seas 
4.1 Exclusive Jurisdiction 
The principle of the freedom of high seas allows every state to use the high seas. As no 
state can demand or exercise sovereignty over the high seas, vessels from all states are 
equal and cannot be controlled and subjected to the jurisdiction of other states, par in 
parem non habet imperium. As a corollary, each state thus has the obligation not to 
interfere with vessels of other flag states.
16  Consequently, the exclusivity of flag state 
jurisdiction can be applied when vessels fish on the high seas.
17   
This application is qualified by the 1927 Lotus case
18, in which the Permanent Court 
of International Justice decided that an officer responsible for a collision could be 
prosecuted by Turkey, as well as France, because the collision between French and Turkish 
ships which caused a loss of life on the Turkish ship had taken place on the Turkish ship as 
well as the French ship. This decision was much criticised and reversed by the 1952 
International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to Penal Jurisdiction 
in Matters of Collision or other Incidents of Navigation.
19  Under it, proceedings 
concerning criminal or disciplinary responsibility for the masters or any persons in ships 
involved in collisions or navigation incidents while sea-going may be performed only by 
                                                      
16  Robert C.F. Reuland, ‘Interference with Non-national Ships on the High Seas: Peacetime Exceptions to 
the Exclusivity of Flag State Jurisdiction’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 22(1989), pp. 
1164–1165. 
17  Ibid. 
18  See Publications of the Permanent Court of International Justice (Series A.-No 10). Also see the official 
website of the International Court of Justice: http://www.icj-cij.org/pcij/series-a.php?p1=9&p2=1 (visited 
on 04/11/2011). 
19  The convention was adopted and signed in Brussels on 10 May 1952 and entered into force on 20 
November 1955. See United Nations, Treaty Series (Vol. 439), p. 235; the full text is available at 
http://treaties.un.org/doc/publication/unts/volume%20439/volume-439-i-6332-english.pdf (visited on 
03/10/2011).  
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the judicial or administrative authorities of the flag states.
20  The rule of the 1952 Brussels 
Convention was adopted in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and the UNCLOS. 
Pursuant to Article 11 of the 1958 High Seas Convention and Article 97 of UNCLOS, 
penal and disciplinary proceedings in cases of collision or other navigational incidents are 
held by the authorities of that state in whose ship the defendants served or of the state of 
which they are nationals. A state retains jurisdiction over its nationals wherever they might 
be, but in the case of concurrent jurisdiction, the flag states have primacy.
21 
The jurisdiction of the flag state on the high seas is not only a right but also an 
obligation. Apart from the duties of the master, crew and passengers in a ship flying its flag 
to render assistance to ships in distress and to enforce legislation dealing with those 
matters,
22  each flag state has the obligation to create laws making it an offence for their 
ships fishing on the high seas to break or injure submarine cables or pipelines under the 
high seas and to offer compensation for such acts.
23  Furthermore, pursuant to Article 5
24 
of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and Article 91
25  of the UNCLOS, there must be 
a genuine link between ships fishing on the high seas and their flag states. Neither 
convention defines ‘genuine link’. Although the rule regarding a genuine link is included in 
customary international law and codified in 1958 convention, there is still no agreement on 
what constitutes the genuine link that customary international law requires.
26  Article 5 of 
                                                      
20  See Article 1 of the 1952 Convention. 
21  R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, supra note 11, p. 209. 
22  See articles 10 and 11 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and articles 94 and 98 of the 1982 
UNCLOS. 
23  For the details, see Articles 27–29 of the 1958 High Seas Convention and Articles 113–115 of the 1982 
UNCLOS. 
24  Article 5 reads: ‘Each State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the 
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State 
whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship; in 
particular, the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control in administrative, technical and 
social matters over ships flying its flag’. 
25  Article 91 states: ‘Every State shall fix the conditions for the grant of its nationality to ships, for the 
registration of ships in its territory, and for the right to fly its flag. Ships have the nationality of the State 
whose flag they are entitled to fly. There must exist a genuine link between the State and the ship’. 
26  D.J. Harris presents two opposite examples to show that it is unclear whether the ‘genuine link’ 
requirement is a part of customary international law. The travaux preparatoires of the 1986 UN Convention 
on Conditions for Registration of Ships shows widespread support for it; however, Liberia asserted that ‘any 
limitation on the rights of states to determine the conditions under which vessels should be accepted on 
national shipping registers would be contrary to customary international law’. See D.J. Harris, Cases and 
Materials on International Law, 7
th ed. (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2010), p. 368. The 1986 Registration 
Convention stipulated many conditions which could be considered to determine whether there is a genuine 
link; however, this convention has never come into force. The full text of the 1986 Registration Convention 
can be found on the website of Admiralty and Maritime Law Guide, 
http://www.admiraltylawguide.com/conven/registration1986.html (visited on 04/11/2011).  
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High Seas Convention indicates that ‘the State must effectively exercise its jurisdiction and 
control in administrative, technical and social matters over ships flying its flag’, as does 
Article 94 of the UNCLOS. Although it is unclear in Article 5 whether a state’s exercise of 
such jurisdiction is a condition or consequence of a genuine link,
27  the effective exercise 
of jurisdiction and control likely could serve as evidence of a genuine link between flag 
states and fishing vessels. In light of Article 94 of UNCLOS, states have the obligation to 
ensure that their vessels fishing on high seas are under their effective control by 
maintaining a register and assuming jurisdiction in internal law over all vessels fishing on 
the high seas and their masters, officers and crew in administrative, technical and social 
matters concerning the ship. States must also ensure the safety of their vessels fishing on 
high seas, inter alia, checking (a) the construction, equipment and seaworthiness of ships; 
(b) the manning of ships, labour conditions and the training of crews; and (c) the use of 
signals, the maintenance of communications and the prevention of collisions. 
    The UNFSA also lists flag states’ duties regarding their vessels fishing on the high 
seas which establish a genuine link between flag states and vessels, which include: 
ensuring that their vessels comply with subregional and regional conservation and 
management measures; authorising vessels to fish on the high seas only when they can 
effectively fulfil the responsibilities for such vessels under UNCLOS and the agreement; 
and making sure that the measures they impose on their vessels are compatible with the 
subregional, regional and global systems of monitoring, control and surveillance.
28 
                                                      
27  See Rayfuse, supra note 5, p. 26. 
28  See Article 18 of the UNFSA. It stipulates that flag states should take measures, including:   
‘(a) control of such vessels on the high seas by means of fishing licences, authorizations or permits, in 
accordance with any applicable procedures agreed at the subregional, regional or global level;   
  (b) establishment of regulations: 
  (i) to apply terms and conditions to the licence, authorization or permit sufficient to fulfil any subregional, 
regional or global obligations of the flag State; 
  (ii) to prohibit fishing on the high seas by vessels which are not duly licensed or authorized to fish, or 
fishing on the high seas by vessels otherwise than in accordance with the terms and conditions of a 
licence, authorization or permit; 
  (iii) to require vessels fishing on the high seas to carry the licence, authorization or permit on board at all 
times and to produce it on demand for inspection by a duly authorized person; and 
  (iv) to ensure that vessels flying its flag do not conduct unauthorized fishing within areas under the 
national jurisdiction of other States; 
  (c) establishment of a national record of fishing vessels authorized to fish on the high seas and provision of 
access to the information contained in that record on request by directly interested States, taking into 
account any national laws of the flag State regarding the release of such information; 
  (d) requirements for marking of fishing vessels and fishing gear for identification in accordance with 
uniform and internationally recognizable vessel and gear marking systems, such as the Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations Standard Specifications for the Marking and 
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    While stipulating related conservation and management measures concerning 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks, RFMOs bring fishing entities into their legal 
system by establishing certain relationships with fishing entities, such as membership, 
observer or invited expert. As a member of a RFMO, fishing entities’ have to comply with 
conservation and management measures, such as allocations of allowable catch or levels of 
fishing effort for their vessels fish on the high seas. This system implies that, as fishing 
entities are recognised as possessing the right to fish these stocks on the high seas, they 
need to obey the related measures. As fishing entities are admitted to legally fish on the 
high seas, there is no reason to think that they can escape the duties imposed on flag states. 
Therefore, the duties of flag states under the 1995 agreement also apply to fishing entities 
that are members of RFMOs or regarded as possessing the right to fish on the high seas.   
    The 1958 High Seas Convention and UNCLOS do not clarify whether the stipulations 
concerning the jurisdiction of the flag state can apply to fishing entities, i.e. whether 
fishing entities can exert jurisdiction over the vessels flying their flags. The basis of flag 
states’ jurisdiction on the high seas stems from flag states’ duties to effectively control their 
vessels and prevent their vessels from violating international conventions and customs. 
However, the duties of flag states on high seas are based on the freedom of fishing. As 
mentioned, fishing entities can fish on the high seas based on RFMOs regulations. 
Nevertheless, the conservation and management measures adopted by RFMOs further 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Identification of Fishing Vessels;   
  (e) requirements for recording and timely reporting of vessel position, catch of target and non-target 
species, fishing effort and other relevant fisheries data in accordance with subregional, regional and 
global standards for collection of such data; 
  (f) requirements for verifying the catch of target and non-target species through such means as observer 
programmes, inspection schemes, unloading reports, supervision of transshipment and monitoring of 
landed catches and market statistics; 
  (g) monitoring, control and surveillance of such vessels, their fishing operations and related activities by, 
inter alia: 
  (i) the implementation of national inspection schemes and subregional and regional schemes for 
cooperation in enforcement pursuant to articles 21 and 22, including requirements for such vessels to 
permit access by duly authorized inspectors from other States; 
  (ii) the implementation of national observer programmes and subregional and regional observer 
programmes in which the flag State is a participant, including requirements for such vessels to permit 
access by observers from other States to carry out the functions agreed under the programmes; and 
  (iii) the development and implementation of vessel monitoring systems, including, as appropriate, satellite 
transmitter systems, in accordance with any national programmes and those which have been 
subregionally, regionally or globally agreed among the States concerned; 
  (h) regulation of transshipment on the high seas to ensure that the effectiveness of conservation and 
management measures is not undermined; and 
  (i) regulation of fishing activities to ensure compliance with subregional, regional or global measures, 
including those aimed at minimizing catches of non-target species.  
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restrict the scope of the freedom of fishing on the high seas. As the purpose of RFMOs’ 
measures is to conserve and sustainably use fisheries resources by reducing the total 
amount of catch per year, fishing entities must be under the same obligations as flag states 
to control vessels flying their flags and fishing on the high seas. Thus, fishing entities must 
also possess jurisdiction over their vessels, as flag states do under the 1958 Convention on 
the High Seas and UNCLOS. In other words, without jurisdiction over vessels flying their 
flag, fishing entities’ right to engage in fishing on the high seas would not be meaningful, 
as fishing can only be done through the means of vessels. 
 
4.2 Enforcement on the High Seas 
To fulfil the obligations to ensure that vessels fishing on the high seas comply with 
international conventions, flag states generally possess exclusive jurisdiction over their 
vessels. Flag states, therefore, can conduct enforcement on these vessels in accordance 
with domestic regulations.
29  Due to the limitation of the environment at sea, enforcements 
on the high seas usually include stop, approach, boarding, search and arrest.
30 
    Under traditional international law of the sea, both the 1958 and 1982 conventions 
rule that, unless a ship on high seas is reasonably suspected of engaging in piracy, the slave 
trade or unauthorised broadcasting, or of lacking nationality, non-flag states’ warships, 
military aircraft or any other ship or aircraft clearly marked and identifiable as in 
government service cannot board and inspect a foreign ship.
31  A non-flag state may board 
and inspect a foreign ship which, though flying a foreign flag or refusing to show its flag, 
is suspected of having the same nationality as the enforcing ship.
32  It is not debated 
whether an authorised unit, including a warship or a ship in government service, may board, 
inspect and arrest ships which are fishing on the high seas and flying the same flag as the 
authorised unit following its own domestic law, although this practice is not explicitly 
mentioned in international conventions which usually only stipulate the conditions for 
non-flag state enforcement.   
    To control vessels on the high seas flying the flags of fishing entities and to ensure 
those vessels comply with international conventions, including RFMOs’ conservation and 
management measures, fishing entities can be presumed to be able to conduct 
                                                      
29  See Reuland, supra note 16, pp. 1163-1164; R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, supra note 11, p. 208. 
30  Reuland, supra note 16, pp. 1169–1176. 
31  See Article 22 of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and Article 110 of 1982 UNCLOS. 
32  Ibid.  
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enforcements on high seas according to their internal regulations. Their authorised ships 
can impose enforcements on the vessels flying their flags on the high seas, as flag states do 
under the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, UNCLOS and Fish Stock Agreement. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Under the traditional international law of the sea, only states may enjoy the freedom of 
fishing on the high seas. Before the 1990s, the concept of fishing entities did not exist. 
Since the UNFSA formally introduced the term fishing entity in its stipulations, fishing 
entities primarily have been recognised in agreements creating RFMOs and resolutions 
issued by RFMOs. The concept of the fishing entity thus has been established in 
international fishery law. Reviewing UNFSA regulations and agreements creating RFMOs, 
it can be seen that fishing entities, as well as states, are able to enjoy the freedom of fishing 
on the high seas. As a corollary to the freedom of fishing, fishing entities are bound by the 
accompanying limitations stipulated in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas, the 1958 
Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas and 
UNCLOS. Fishing entities also have exclusive jurisdiction like a flag state and can conduct 
enforcement against their vessels on the high seas. Thus, there is no obstacle to fishing 
entities acting as the equivalent of flag states in high seas enforcement. Fishing entities’ 
role in non-flag state enforcement in high seas fisheries is clarified in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 Fishing Entities in Non-Flag State Enforcement 
 
1. Introduction 
The high seas are not under the jurisdiction of any state; therefore, as Chapter 4 explains, 
the purpose of flag states’ enforcement on the high seas is to control their vessels in order 
to ensure the freedom of the high seas. The objective of non-flag state enforcement, though, 
exceeds flag state’s enforcement in order to ensure that each state can enjoy the benefits 
from the freedom of the high seas. Consequently, non-flag state enforcement amounts to 
interference with the exclusive jurisdiction of flag state; on the other, it can be regarded as 
a supplement to flag state’s jurisdiction.
1 
    In customary international law and Article 110 of UNCLOS, non-flag state 
enforcement on the high seas is usually limited to the circumstances of piracy, slave 
trading, unauthorised broadcasting, drug trafficking, ships of uncertain nationality and 
stateless ships.
2  With the rapid development of fishing technology, non-flag state 
enforcement on the high seas has extended to the field of fishing. As some flag states might 
be unwilling or unable to ensure compliance by their vessels with their international 
obligations concerning fisheries conservation and management on the high seas, non-flag 
state enforcement becomes an effective way to deal with this problem.
3  As the subject of 
non-flag state enforcement is regarded as a state to an extent, whether fishing entities can 
conduct enforcement on the high seas like a non-flag state is worth clarifying. The purpose 
of this chapter is to discuss the role of fishing entities in non-flag state enforcement on the 
high seas for fisheries conservation and management. This chapter first reviews the mode 
of enforcement on the high seas and the development of non-flag state enforcement in high 
seas fisheries. Next, this chapter determines the legal status of fishing entities in the regime 
of non-flag state enforcement under the UNCLOS, 1995 Fish Stock Agreement and IUU 
International Plan of Action. Finally, it discusses the position of fishing entities’ non-flag 
state enforcement under bilateral and regional treaties. 
 
                                                      
1  Rosemary Rayfuse even asserts that ‘non-flag state enforcement already forms a significant part of the 
jurisdiction balances in the UNCLOS’. See Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘Regulation and Enforcement in the Law of the 
Sea: Emerging Assertions of a Right to Non-flag State Enforcement in the High Seas Fisheries and 
Disarmament Contexts’, Australian Year Book of International Law, Vol. 24(August 2005), p. 183. 
2  R.R. Churchill and A.V. Lowe, The Law of the Sea, 3
rd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999), 
pp. 209-214. 
3  Rayfuse, supra note 1, p. 184.  
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2. The Mode of Enforcement on the High Seas 
2.1 The Right of Approach 
As a supplement to the exclusive jurisdiction of flag states, non-flag state enforcement is 
permitted in exceptions such as piracy and slave trading. Under the customary international 
law of the sea, the right of approach is usually the first step of non-flag enforcement. It 
allows warships to approach a vessel on the high seas to verify its identity and nationality 
in order to thwart illegal activities and maintain order on the high seas.
4  A warship usually 
requests that a vessel show its flag.
5  If the vessel refuses to hoist her flag, then the warship 
can fire a blank shot.
6  Then the warship can shoot across her bow if the vessel ignores the 
warning.
7  If the vessel still refuses to show her flag, the warship may resort to force in 
order to verify her nationality.
8 
    Although in 1859 correspondence the British and American governments agreed upon 
the propriety of every merchant vessel showing its flag on the ocean whenever requested 
by the warship of any nation
9, no related regulation indicates that vessels have the 
obligation to show their flags to warships. However, if a vessel refuses to exhibit its flag, it 
creates reasonable grounds for suspecting that the vessel is engaged in illegal activities, so 
the warship may request to board and inspect the suspected vessel. 
 
2.2 The Right of Boarding and Inspection 
Boarding and inspection, which also falls under customary law, is the main method of high 
seas enforcement. It contains two elements. First, in boarding, a warship sends a boat to the 
suspected vessel and checks her documents to verify the legitimacy of the vessel and her 
flag. Second, in inspection, if a warship after boarding has reasonable grounds to suspect 
that the suspected vessel is not entitled to the protection of the flag which she has hoisted 
                                                      
4  Robert C.F. Reuland, ‘Interference with Non-National Ships on the High Seas: Peacetime Exceptions to the 
Exclusivity of Flag State Jurisdiction’, Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law, Vol. 22(1989), pp. 1169–1170; 
also see Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law, 7
th ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 
2008), p. 232. At first, this right under customary international law was used to prevent and deter piracy; 
with the development of international law of the sea, it has gradually been expanded to other illegal 
activities on the high seas. See L. Oppenheim, Oppenheim’s International Law, 9
th ed. (eds. Robert Jennings 
and Arthur Watts London: Longman, 1992, Vol. I), pp. 736–739. 
5  Reuland, supra note 4, p. 1170. 
6  Oppenheim, supra note 4, p, 738; also see C. J. Colombos, The International Law of the Sea, 6
th ed. 
(London: Longmans Green & Co. Ltd., 1967), p. 312. 
7  Ibid. 
8  Ibid. 
9  Ibid.  
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or that the suspected vessel might have engaged in proscribed activities, then the warship 
may proceed to a further examination of the vessel. The purpose of inspection is to find the 
evidence that supports the suspicion of the warship.
10  The master and crew of the 
inspected vessel do not have obligation to render any assistance, except for example to 
open locked cupboards.
11 
    This customary right is codified in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas. Article 
22(2) of the Convention on the High Seas states that, ‘[i]n the cases [in which a vessel is 
reasonably suspected of being engaged in some proscribed activities], the warship may 
proceed to verify the ship’s right to fly its flag. To this end, it may send a boat under the 
command of an officer to the suspected ship. If suspicion remains after the documents have 
been checked, it may proceed to a further examination on board the ship’. This right is also 
codified in the UNCLOS under the exact same clause as Article 110(2). According to 
customary law, if the suspected vessel is proven innocent, the inspectors must replace 
anything removed and make a memorandum in the log-book, then, the inspected vessel 
may continue on the high seas as planned.
12  In addition, the flag state of the warship 
should compensate any loss or damage sustained by the vessel as a result of the boarding 
and inspection.
13 
 
2.3 Arrest 
Following boarding and inspection, if the suspected vessel has committed or is found to 
have engaged in proscribed activities based on sufficient evidence, then the warship may 
arrest the vessel.
14  During the arrest, the warship should keep the vessel and its cargo safe 
and intact.
15  There is no clear regulation of jurisdiction over the arrested vessel. 
Oppenheim writes:   
The arrested vessel, either accompanied by the arresting vessel or not, must be 
brought to such harbour as is determined by the cause of the arrest.
16 
    The provisions in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and UNCLOS concerning 
enforcement on high seas go no further than boarding and inspection. Neither has 
                                                      
10  Reuland, supra note 4, pp. 1175–1176. 
11  Oppenheim, supra note 4, p. 738. 
12  Ibid. 
13  See Article 22(3) of the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and Article 110(3) of UNCLOS. 
14  Reuland, supra note 4, pp. 1176. 
15  Oppenheim, supra note 4, p, 739. 
16  Ibid.  
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regulations regarding the right of arrest or provides the next step for warships and 
inspected vessel when the vessel is found to have engaged in proscribed activities. 
 
3. The Expansion of Enforcement on the High Seas 
The contents of enforcement on the high seas have become broader than in the past. 
However, the 1958 Convention on the High Seas and UNCLOS do not have provisions 
concerning the right of approach; they only regulate the rights of boarding and inspection. 
The concept of boarding and inspection stems from a convention prohibiting the slave 
trade between Britain and France in 1845.
17  The provisions concerning transportation of 
liquor in the North Sea in the 1887 Hague Convention
18  endowed the warships of 
contracting parties with the right to stop a vessel hoisting the flag of contracting parties and 
the right to board and inspect the documents of that vessel.
19  The system of boarding and 
inspection on the high seas by non-flag states breaches the exclusive jurisdiction of flag 
states in customary international law; therefore, it was initially limited under specific 
agreements between states.   
At turn of the nineteenth century, Britain tried to board and inspect an American 
vessel in order to recruit navy crewmembers, but United States objected, leading to a 
conflict
20  which has spurred many discussions. Pitman B. Potter thought that a state had 
no right to command another state’s vessel to stop or to board and inspect this vessel 
during peace-time unless that vessel was engaged in piracy or slave trade.
21  Professor H.A. 
Smith considered that under customary law, except the right of approach, a state could not 
interfere with another state’s vessel on the high seas during peace-time.
22  He believed that, 
unless the vessel was engaged in piracy or other improper activities, any interference by a 
non-flag state must be permitted by a treaty.
23  Charles Cheney Hyde took a somewhat 
                                                      
17  René-Jean Dupuy and Daniel Vignes, eds., A Handbook on the New Law of the Sea (Boston: Martinus 
Nijhoff, 1991), p. 420. 
18  The full name of the convention is the Convention Respecting the Liquor Traffic in the North Sea’. The full 
text is available at http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/Vict/56-57/17/schedule (visited on 5/27/2013). 
19  Dupuy and Vignes, supra note 17. 
20  John Bassett Moore, A Digest of International Law (Ann Arbor: UMI, A Bell & Howell Company, 1993, Vol. 
2), pp. 987–1001. 
21  See Myres S. McDougal and William T. Burke, The Public Order of the Oceans: A Contemporary 
International Law of the Sea (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1962), p. 887; Pitman B. Potter, The 
Freedom of the Seas, in History, Law and Politics (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1924), p. 101. 
22  H.A. Smith, The Law and Custom of the Sea, 3rd ed. (London: Stevens and Sons Limited, 1959), pp. 64-65. 
23  Ibid. Smith states: ‘This ‘right of approach’ (verification du pavillon or reconnaissance) is the only 
qualification under customary law of the general principle which forbids any interference in time of peace 
with ships of another nationality upon the high seas. Any other act of interference (apart from the 
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different point of view. He contended that the right of boarding and inspection on the high 
seas by non-flag states could be used only during war-time; no state possessed this right 
during peace-time.
24  Gilbert Gidel had a similar position as Hyde; he thought that, during 
peace-time, a state could not interfere with another state’s vessel on the high seas 
according to the principles of freedom of the high seas.
25  Furthermore, in an International 
Law Commission Report, J.P.A. François asserted that international law holds that, during 
peace-time, the only control measure that non-flag states may practice is the right of 
approach, which means the right to ascertain the identity and nationality of the vessels but 
not the right to inspect the documents of the vessels or the right of search.
26  At the seventh 
meeting of the International Law Commission in 1955, the final provisions concerning 
boarding and inspection in the 1958 Convention on the High Seas were drafted.
27 
However, from the customary international law and the 1958 Convention on the High 
Seas to UNCLOS, the contents of enforcement on high seas has become broader. The 
subject of enforcement in customary law and the 1958 Convention is the ‘warship’; but in 
UNCLOS, it is expanded to ‘any other duly authorized ships clearly marked and 
identifiable as being on government service’. Additionally, the object of enforcement was 
also enlarged from ‘a foreign merchant ship’ in the 1958 Convention to ‘a foreign ship’ in 
UNCLOS.
28  In addition, according to the 1958 Convention, the ships may become the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
repression of piracy) must be justified under powers conferred by treaty. Provided that the merchant vessel 
responds by showering her flag the captain of the warship is not justified in boarding her or taking any 
further action, unless there is reasonable ground for suspecting that she is engaged in piracy or some other 
improper activity’. 
24  Charles Cheney Hyde, International Law: Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the United States 2
nd rev. 
ed. (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1951, Vol. 1), p. 764. 
25  McDougal and Burke, supra note 21, p. 888. For the full text, see: Gilbert Gidel, ‘Memorandum’, in 
United Nations Secretariat, Memorandum on the Regime of the High Seas (U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/32) (1950), 
available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_32.pdf (visited on 10/11/2011). 
26  Ibid., p. 889. For the full text, see: J.P.A. François, Report on the Regime of the High Seas (U.N. Doc. No. 
A/CN.4/17, 1950), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_17.pdf (visited on 
13/12/2011). François reiterated his position in the Second Report on the Regime of the High Seas (U.N. 
Doc. No. A/CN.4/42, 1951), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/documentation/english/a_cn4_42.pdf 
(visited on 11/11/2011). Serving on the International Law Commission in 1951, Judge Manley O. Hudson 
suggested that the rights of boarding and inspecting vessels suspected of engaging in piracy and vessels 
suspected of engaging in slave trade should not be distinguished but combined. See International Law 
Commission, Yearbook of the International Law Commission (New York: United Nations, 1951, Vol. 1), p. 
354. 
27  McDougal and Burke, supra note 21, p. 890. 
28  Under the 1958 convention, any ships which are not the merchant ships are excluded from enforcement. 
According to this stipulation, ships which belong to a government with commercial purpose can also be the 
object of enforcement; see McDougal and Burke, supra note 21, p. 892. During the drafting of the 1958 
Convention, applying enforcement by warships to ships suspected of engaging in hostile acts causing 
imminent danger to the warship state was considered. This provision was not adopted was not primarily 
  
86 
 
object of enforcement on the high seas because they are suspected of engaging in piracy, 
slave trade, flying a foreign flag or refusing to show their flag but are actually of the same 
nationality as the warship; however, in UNCLOS, the warships may also conduct 
enforcement against ships which are without nationality or engaged in unauthorised 
broadcasting. 
In addition to these above activities which may justify non-flag state enforcement, 
enforcement on the high seas is expanded to fishing activities.
29  Due to the necessity for 
conservation and management of high seas fisheries, many international agreements and 
RFMOs contain related measures. One method to ensure the implementation of these 
conservation measures is enforcement on the high seas. In traditional international law of 
the sea, flag state enforcement, even on the high seas, is the norm. However, due to the 
urgency of declining fishery resources, non-flag state enforcement on the high seas to 
ensure compliance with the conservation and management measures is developing. 
However, it is as of yet only a treaty right. It is regulated in the UNCLOS and specified in 
the UNFSA, as well as by some RFMOs. A discussion of non-flag state enforcement on the 
high seas for fisheries follows. 
 
4. The Legal Status of Non-Flag State Enforcement in High Seas Fisheries 
4.1 Global Instruments 
A. United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea 
Although the UNCLOS does not directly permit enforcement to be applied to ships 
engaged in proscribed fishing activities, Article 116 preserves the possibility that the right 
of non-flag state enforcement concerning fishing may be endowed by treaties. Article 117 
further indicates that states should take necessary measures to conserve and manage the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
because the warship had no right to conduct this enforcement but, rather, to prevent states from abusing 
this provision as the concepts of ‘imminent danger’ and ‘hostile acts’ are too ambiguous to clarify and 
interpret. See E.D. Brown, The International Law of the Sea (Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company, 
1994, Vol. 1), p. 314. 
29  In addition to fisheries, another activity which necessitates enforcement by non-flag states on the high 
seas is anti-proliferation of the weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). After the 9/11 attacks, the United 
States proposed the concept of proliferation security initiative (PSI) in 2002. This concept permits states to 
take collective cooperative action to prevent the proliferation of WMDs. One method they may use is to 
board, inspect and even seize vessels suspected of transporting WMDs on the high seas. Regarding PSI, 
please see Michael Byers, ‘Policing the High Sea: The Proliferation Security Initiative’, American Journal of 
International Law, Vol. 98, No. 3(July, 2004), pp. 526-545; ‘Asia: Practising to provoke: 
Counter-proliferation’, The Economist, Vol. 368(Sept. 20, 2003), p. 79; Rayfuse, supra note 1, pp. 181–200.  
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living resources of the high seas. It does not provide any concrete measures for states but 
can be regarded as implying that such measures could include enforcement measures. 
    The UNCLOS does not directly address non-flag state’s enforcement for fishing on 
the high seas but maintains the possibility. Therefore, non-flag state’s boarding and 
inspection procedure for fishery conservation and management on the high seas requires 
separate treaties. In this position, the role of non-flag state’s enforcement on the high seas 
for fishing entities is not be influenced by its legal status in the UNCLOS. In other words, 
as UNCLOS does not inhibit the possibility of non-flag state enforcement on the high seas 
for fisheries by treaty, fishing entities may, like states, possess the right to participate in 
this enforcement regime through treaties or RFMOs. 
 
B. The United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement 
The UNFSA regulates the conservation and management of straddling and highly 
migratory fish stocks on the high seas. To achieve these aims, it emphasises the obligation 
of contracting parties to cooperate and help each other in enforcement measures. Articles 
20, 21 and 22 of the UNFSA are the core provisions regarding high seas enforcement. 
Article 20 indicates that states should cooperate in enforcement at the international level. 
Article 20(6) allows coastal states which are authorised by flag states to conduct 
enforcement against suspected unauthorised fishing vessels: ‘Where there are reasonable 
grounds for believing that a vessel on the high seas has been engaged in unauthorized 
fishing within an area under the jurisdiction of a coastal State, the flag State of that vessel, 
at the request of the coastal State concerned, shall immediately and fully investigate the 
matter. The flag State shall cooperate with the coastal State in taking appropriate 
enforcement action in such cases and may authorize the relevant authorities of the coastal 
State to board and inspect the vessel on the high seas’. 
    Article 21 regulates states’ cooperation in enforcement at the subregional and regional 
levels. Articles 21(1) and (2) allows states in RFMOs to board and inspect each other’s 
vessels according to the enforcement procedures adopted by RFMOs to ensure compliance 
with the conservation and management measures for straddling and highly migratory fish 
stocks.
30  Under Article 21(4), inspecting states should inform all states whose vessels fish 
                                                      
30  Article 21(1) states: ‘In any high seas area covered by a subregional or regional fisheries management 
organization or arrangement, a State Party which is a member of such organization or a participant in such 
arrangement may, through its duly authorized inspectors, board and inspect, in accordance with paragraph 
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on the high seas of the form of identification issued to their duly authorised inspectors, and 
the vessels used for boarding and inspection should be clearly marked and identifiable as in 
government service. 
    The mode of enforcement described in the UNFSA is boarding and inspection. Any 
further actions, such as arrest, after finding evidence of violations by non-flag states are 
still taken over by flag states. Pursuant to Article 21(5) of the UNFSA, if there are clear 
grounds for believing that a vessel has engaged in any activity contrary to conservation and 
management measures, the inspecting state should promptly notify and deliver evidence of 
the violation to the flag state. The flag state should respond to the notification within three 
working days by either conducting an investigation and sending the findings to the 
inspecting state or by authorising the inspecting state to investigate.
31  If the flag state 
chooses to authorise the inspecting state to investigate the alleged violation, the authorised 
state should return the results of investigation to the flag state without delay; the flag state 
is obliged to undertake further enforcement involving the vessel. Otherwise, the flag state 
may authorise the inspecting state to take such enforcement action as the flag state may 
specify with respect to the vessel.
32  However, if after boarding and inspecting there are 
clear grounds for believing that a vessel has committed a ‘serious violation’
33  and the flag 
                                                                                                                                                                 
2, fishing vessels flying the flag of another State Party to this Agreement, whether or not such State Party is 
also a member of the organization or a participant in the arrangement, for the purpose of ensuring 
compliance with conservation and management measures for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory 
fish stocks established by that organization or arrangement’. Article 21(2) reads: ‘States shall establish, 
through subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or arrangements, procedures for 
boarding and inspection pursuant to paragraph 1, as well as procedures to implement other provisions of 
this article. Such procedures shall be consistent with this article and the basic procedures set out in article 
22 and shall not discriminate against non-members of the organization or non-participants in the 
arrangement. Boarding and inspection as well as any subsequent enforcement action shall be conducted in 
accordance with such procedures. States shall give due publicity to procedures established pursuant to this 
paragraph’. 
31  See Article 21(6) of the UNFSA. 
32  See Article 21(7) of the UNFSA. 
33  Article 21(11) further defines a serious violation as:   
‘(a) fishing without a valid licence, authorization or permit issued by the flag State in accordance with 
article 18, paragraph 3 (a); 
(b) failing to maintain accurate records of catch and catch-related data, as required by the relevant 
subregional or regional fisheries management organization or arrangement, or serious misreporting of 
catch, contrary to the catch reporting requirements of such organization or arrangement;   
(c) fishing in a closed area, fishing during a closed season or fishing without, or after attainment of, a 
quota established by the relevant subregional or regional fisheries management organization or 
arrangement; 
(d) directed fishing for a stock which is subject to a moratorium or for which fishing is prohibited; 
(e) using prohibited fishing gear; 
(f) falsifying or concealing the markings, identity or registration of a fishing vessel; 
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state does not respond or take further action, then Article 21(8) permits inspectors to 
‘remain on board and secure evidence’ and ‘require the master to assist in further 
investigation including, where appropriate, by bringing the vessel without delay to the 
nearest appropriate port’. Although the flag state could choose to authorise the inspecting 
state to investigate, it can also withdraw this authorisation at any time. Article 21(12) states 
that, ‘[n]otwithstanding the other provisions of this article, the flag State may, at any time, 
take action to fulfil its obligations … with respect to an alleged violation. Where the vessel 
is under the direction of the inspecting State, the inspecting State shall, at the request of the 
flag State, release the vessel to the flag State along with full information on the progress 
and outcome of its investigation’. However, Article 21(17) allows any states not only to 
board and inspect a stateless vessel but also to conduct follow-up enforcement if they find 
evidence of violations.
34 
    The UNFSA encourages RFMOs to establish their own boarding and inspection 
procedures. If they have not yet, Article 22 of the UNFSA details basic boarding and 
inspection procedures which can be adopted directly by RFMOs or as transitional rules. It 
specifies that authorised inspectors should ‘present credentials to the master of the vessel 
and produce a copy of the text of the relevant conservation and management measures; … 
initiate notice to the flag State at the time of the boarding and inspection; not interfere with 
the master’s ability to communicate with the authorities of the flag State during the 
boarding and inspection; provide a copy of a report on the boarding and inspection to the 
master and to the authorities of the flag State, noting therein any objection or statement 
which the master wishes to have included in the report; promptly leave the vessel 
following completion of the inspection if they find no evidence of a serious violation; and 
avoid the use of force. …. [If necessary,] the degree of force used shall not exceed that 
reasonably required in the circumstances’. Pursuant to Article 22(2), the inspectors have 
the authority to inspect the vessel and its licence, gear, equipment, records, facilities, fish 
and fish products and any relevant documents necessary to verify compliance with the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
(g) concealing, tampering with or disposing of evidence relating to an investigation; 
(h) multiple violations which together constitute a serious disregard of conservation and management 
measures; or 
(i) such other violations as may be specified in procedures established by the relevant subregional or 
regional fisheries management organization or arrangement’. 
34  Article 21(17) reads: ‘ Where there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that a fishing vessel on the 
high seas is without nationality, a State may board and inspect the vessel. Where evidence so warrants, the 
State may take such action as may be appropriate in accordance with international law. ‘  
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relevant conservation and management measures. The master of the vessel which is 
requested to be inspected should fully cooperate with the inspectors.
35  If the master of the 
vessel refuses to be inspected, then the flag state should direct the master to immediately 
accept the boarding and inspection request. If the master of the vessel still refuses, the flag 
state should suspend the vessel’s authorisation to fish and order the vessel to return 
immediately to port.
36 
    Although the state is the subject of Articles 20-22 in the UNFSA regarding non-flag 
state enforcement in high seas fisheries, fishing entities are not excluded from its 
provisions. Article 1(3) states that it applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing entities 
whose vessels fish on the high seas, and pursuant to Article 17(3), these fishing entities 
should be requested to cooperate with RFMOs in implementing conservation and 
management measures. Although the UNFSA allows no door for fishing entities to sign or 
accede to it, it encourages fishing entities to be brought into RFMOs so as to apply 
conservation and management measures as extensively as possible to fishing activities in 
the relevant area.
37  The UNFSA stipulates that each RFMO should establish boarding and 
inspection procedures which can be applied to members in the relevant high seas areas. It 
also encourages the fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas to join or become 
members of RFMOs. From this position, the UNFSA does not exclude the possibility of 
fishing entities’ participating in non-flag state enforcement on the high seas. In other words, 
the UNFSA is not violated if a RFMO adopts boarding and inspection procedures allowing 
all of its members, including fishing entities, to implement its high seas enforcement 
provisions.   
 
 
                                                      
35  Article 22(3) states: ‘The flag State shall ensure that vessel masters: 
(a) accept and facilitate prompt and safe boarding by the inspectors; 
(b) cooperate with and assist in the inspection of the vessel conducted pursuant to these procedures; 
(c) do not obstruct, intimidate or interfere with the inspectors in the performance of their duties; 
(d) allow the inspectors to communicate with the authorities of the flag State and the inspecting State 
during the boarding and inspection; 
(e) provide reasonable facilities, including, where appropriate, food and accommodation, to the inspectors; 
and 
(f) facilitate safe disembarkation by the inspectors’. 
36  The flag state shall advise the inspecting state of the action it has taken when the circumstances arise. 
See Article 22(4) of the UNFSA. 
37  Fishing entities’ legal status under the UNFSA is discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 34–43, of this thesis.  
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C. Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing International Plan of Action
38 
The provisions concerning non-flag state enforcement on the high seas in the IUU 
International Plan of Action are not as specific as those in the UNFSA but only respond to 
the UNFSA’s appeal to carry out the related boarding and inspection regimes. According to 
Paragraph 24.10 of the IUU International Action Plan, states ‘should undertake 
comprehensive and effective monitoring, control and surveillance (MCS) of fishing from 
its commencement … by ensuring effective implementation of national and … 
internationally agreed boarding and inspection regimes consistent with international law, 
recognizing the rights and obligations of masters and of inspection officers, and noting that 
such regimes are provided for in certain international agreements, such as the 1995 
[UNFSA]’. In addition to the UNFSA, paragraph 80.8 reiterates the need to establish 
boarding and inspection procedures within RFMOs: ‘States, acting through relevant 
regional fisheries management organizations, should take action to strengthen and develop 
innovative ways … to prevent, deter, and eliminate IUU fishing. Consideration should be 
given to … development within a regional fisheries management organization … of 
boarding and inspection regimes consistent with international law, recognizing the rights 
and obligations of masters and inspection officers’. 
    As the IUU International Action Plan is a voluntary instrument that applies to all 
states and entities and to all fishers, it poses not obvious challenge to the legal status of 
fishing entities. Furthermore, the regulations concerning enforcement on the high seas in 
the IUU International Action Plan mainly reiterates and consents to the boarding and 
inspection regimes in the UNFSA and the establishment of similar regimes by RFMOs. 
This plan does not affect fishing entities’ status in RFMOs or apply to them the UNFSA’s 
provisions for non-flag state enforcement in high seas fisheries. 
 
4.2 Regional and Bilateral Treaties 
A. Regional Treaties 
In 1882, the International Convention for Regulating the Police of the North Sea 
Fisheries
39  (the 1882 North Sea Fisheries Convention) was signed to regulate the policing 
                                                      
38  Also see Chapter 1, p. 25, of this thesis. 
39  The parties were: Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Great Britain and Netherlands. The full text is 
available at 
http://iea.uoregon.edu/pages/view_treaty.php?t=1882-PoliceNorthSeasFishery.EN.txt&par=view_treaty_ht
ml (visited on 13/12/2011).  
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of the fisheries in the North Sea outside territorial waters.
40  At that time, enforcement on 
the high seas was still largely limited to flag states. Pursuant to Article XXIX, the 
commanders of cruisers could only require a vessel suspected of violating the provisions of 
the convention to show her official document establishing her nationality.
41  The 
commanders of cruisers could board and inspect a vessel which was not of their own 
nationality only provided that it was ‘necessary for the purpose of obtaining proof of an 
offence or of a contravention of regulations respecting the police of the fisheries’.   
In the twentieth century, non-flag state enforcement on the high seas is not as limited 
as in the nineteenth century. In 1952, the United States, Canada and Japan concluded the 
International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean
42, in 
which Article X allows the contracting parties to board each other’s vessels to inspect 
equipment, books and documents and question those on board.
43  If there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the inspected vessel was engaged in operation in violation of this 
convention, then the inspecting official may arrest or seize such person or vessel.
44 
                                                      
40  At that time, the concept of the exclusive economic zone did not exist. The high seas meant all waters 
outside the 3-mile limit from low-water mark along the entire coast of a country. 
41  Article XXIX of the 1882 North Sea Fisheries Convention reads: ‘When the commanders of cruizers have 
reason to believe that an infraction of the provisions of the present Convention has been committed, they 
may require the master of the boat inculpated to exhibit the official document establishing her nationality. 
The fact of such document having been exhibited shall then be endorsed upon it immediately’. 
42  The Convention entered into force on 12 June 1953. The full text of the convention can be found on the 
website of the Center for International Earth Science Information Network (CIESIN): 
http://sedac.ciesin.columbia.edu/entri/texts/fisheries.north.pacific.1952.html (visited on 19/12/2012). In 
accordance with this convention, the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC) was 
established in 1952 with Canada, Japan and the United States of America as members, to contribute to 
understanding of the life history and distribution of anadromous species, groundfish, crab and marine 
mammals in the North Pacific Ocean and Bering Sea. The INPFC was dissolved when the Convention for the 
Conservation of Anadromous Stocks in the North Pacific Ocean entered into force on 16 February 1993. 
Regarding the INPFC, please see http://www.npafc.org/new/ipnfc.html (visited on 19/12/2012). 
43  Article 10(1)(a) of the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean 
reads: ‘When a fishing vessel of a Contracting Party has been found in waters in which that Party has agreed 
to abstain from exploitation in accordance with the provisions of this Convention, the duly authorized 
officials of any Contracting Party may board such vessel to inspect its equipment, books, documents, and 
other articles and question the persons on board. Such officials shall present credentials issued by their 
respective Governments if requested by the master of the vessel’. 
44  Article 10(1)(b) of the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean 
further states: ‘When any such person or fishing vessel is actually engaged in operation in violation of the 
provisions of this Convention, or there is reasonable ground to believe was obviously so engaged 
immediately prior to boarding of such vessel by any such official, the latter may arrest or seize such person 
or vessel. In that case, the Contracting Party to which the official belongs shall notify the Contracting Party 
to which such person or vessel belongs of such arrest or seizure and shall deliver such vessel or persons as 
promptly as practicable to the authorized officials of the Contracting Party to which such vessel or person 
belongs at a place to be agreed upon by both Parties. Provided, however, that when the Contracting Party 
which receives such notifications cannot immediately accept delivery and makes request, the Contracting 
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However, the arrested or seized person or vessel should be handed over to the flag state; i.e. 
only the flag state had the right of jurisdiction.
45  On 25 April 1978, the Protocol Amending 
the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean
46  (the 
1978 Amended Protocol) was signed in Tokyo. The provisions concerning non-flag state 
enforcement on the high seas in the 1978 Amended Protocol were similar to the 1952 
Convention but specified that the inspected vessels were ‘vessels fishing for anadromous 
species’. As well, the Amended Protocol permits the inspecting official to not only arrest 
and seize the suspected person or vessel but also to investigate further, the circumstances 
warrant it.
47  The Amended Annex of the 1978 Amended Protocol contained a 
memorandum of understanding on Enforcement, which recorded details of enforcement 
between Japan and United States in the Japanese land-based fishery area, including the 
numbers of patrol vessels, precise area of enforcement, and other acts of cooperation.
48  In 
this memorandum, Japan and the United States agree to accommodate an observer of the 
other government aboard its patrol vessels assigned to enforce along the eastern limit of the 
Japanese land-based fishery area for up to four weeks.
49  Such observers would be paid by 
their government and could communicate with their parent agency with the consent of the 
captain of the patrol vessel.
50  Furthermore, the observer should comply with instructions 
of the host enforcement officials under all circumstances.
51  Most importantly, the observer 
would not exercise any enforcement authority but only observe the activities of the 
enforcement officials of the patrol vessel.
52 
    As well, in 1967, the Convention on Conduct of Fishing Operations in the North 
Atlantic
53  was adopted to ensure order in the fishing grounds of the North Atlantic area. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Party which gives such notification may keep such person or vessel under surveillance within its own 
territory under the conditions agreed upon by both of the Contracting Parties’.   
45  Article 10(1)(c) of the International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North Pacific Ocean 
reads: ‘Only the authorities of the Party to which the above-mentioned person or fishing vessel belongs 
may try the offence and impose penalties therefor. The witnesses and evidence necessary for establishing 
the offence, so far as they are under the control of any of the Parties to this Convention, shall be furnished 
as promptly as possible to the Contracting Party having jurisdiction to try the offence’. 
46  The amended protocol entered into force on 15 February 1979. The full text of the protocol can be found 
at http://www.npafc.org/new/inpfc/INPFC%20_convention.pdf (visited on 03/01/2012). 
47  See Article XI of the 1978 amended protocol. 
48  See the amended protocol, supra note 46. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid. 
51  Ibid. 
52  Ibid. 
53  The parties to the convention are the governments of Belgium, Canada, Denmark, the French Republic, 
the Federal Republic of Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, the Polish 
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Article 9 stipulates that, if an authorised officer has reason to believe that a vessel of any 
contracting party is not complying with the provisions of the convention, he may order the 
vessel to stop and board it for enquiry and report. However, this non-flag state enforcement 
is permitted only if no authorised official of the flag state available can do so.
54 
    The International Commission for the Northwest Atlantic (ICNAF)
55  in 1970 adopted 
a Scheme of Joint International Enforcement of the fishery regulations in the Convention 
Area
56, which allows the contracting parties to appoint inspectors to conduct boarding and 
inspection of members’ vessels in the convention area. Subsequently, Article XVIII of the 
Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries
57, 
which was adopted on 24 October 1978 in Ottawa, also announces plans to establish a 
scheme including ‘provision for reciprocal rights of boarding and inspection by the 
Contracting Parties and for flag State prosecution and sanctions on the basis of evidence 
resulting from such boardings and inspections’. Next, a Proposal for Amendment of the 
Scheme of Joint International Enforcement of the Fishery Regulations in Regulatory 
Area
58  was adopted on 7 June 1979 to succeed the ICNAF International Enforcement 
Scheme. 
    The NPAFC replaced the International North Pacific Fisheries Commission (INPFC), 
established by the 1952 International Convention for the High Seas Fisheries of the North 
Pacific Ocean. The NPAFC’s provisions concerning non-flag state enforcement followed 
                                                                                                                                                                 
People’s Republic, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America. The convention entered into force on 
26 September 1976. The full text can be seen at 
http://www.fco.gov.uk/resources/en/pdf/3706546/3892723/21060066/Tr-FishNorthAtlan-Ts40.1977 
(visited on 03/01/2012). Regarding this convention, also see D. W. Van Lynden, ‘The Convention on Conduct 
of Fishing Operations in the North Atlantic’, Netherlands International Law Review, Vol. 14(1967), pp. 
245-258. 
54  Ibid. Article 9(12) reads: ‘An authorised officer shall not exercise his powers to board a vessel of another 
Contracting Party if an authorised officer of that Contracting Party is available and in a position to do so 
himself’. 
55  The ICNAF was formed in 1949 to conserve and manage fishery resources in Northwest Atlantic. It was 
ended and replaced by the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organization (NAFO) in 1979. See 
http://www.nafo.int/icnaf/frames/icnaf.html (visited on 04/12/2012). 
56  The scheme came into effect on 7 January 1971, and its operation by all contracting parties commenced 
on 1 July 1971. The full text of the scheme can be found in the ICNAF Annual Proceedings, Vol. 
20(1969-1970), pp. 20–22. Also see Rosemary Gail Rayfuse, Non-Flag State Enforcement in High Seas 
Fisheries (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2004), pp. 234–236. 
57  The Convention came into force on 1 January 1979, establishing the NAFO to replace the ICNAF. The 
prime objective of NAFO is to contribute through consultation and cooperation to the optimum utilisation, 
rational management and conservation of the fishery resources of the convention area. The full text of the 
convention can be found on the official NAFO website, http://www.nafo.int/about/frames/about.html 
(visited on 05/01/2012). 
58  The full text of the proposal can be found in the NAFO Annual Report, Vol. 1(1979), pp. 70–71.  
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those in the 1978 Amended Protocol, including policies for boarding, inspection, arrest, 
seizure, investigation and judicial jurisdiction over the inspected vessel.
59 
    In 1975, the ICCAT adopted a Scheme of Joint International Inspection
60  under 
which non-flag state boarding and inspection could be conducted by the contracting 
governments. In 2006, this scheme was reiterated through the Recommendation by ICCAT 
to Establish a Multi-Annual Recovery Plan for Bluefin Tuna in the Eastern Atlantic and 
Mediterranean.
61  This recommendation states that, in the framework of the multi-annual 
management plan for bluefin tuna, the contracting parties, cooperating non-contracting 
parties, entities or fishing entities agreed to apply this scheme.
62  However, no practice 
under the scheme has been reported.
63 
    In the Convention on the Conservation and Management of the Pollock Resources in 
the Central Bering Sea
64  signed on 16 June 1994 in Washington and entering into force on 
                                                      
59  Article IX of the Convention of NPAFC states: 
‘ ….(i) The duly authorized officials of any Contracting Party may board vessels fishing for anadromous 
species of the other Contracting Parties to inspect equipment, logs, documents, catch and other 
articles and question the persons on board for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this 
Convention. Such inspections and questioning shall be made so that the vessels suffer the minimum 
interference and inconvenience. Such officials shall present credentials issued by their respective 
Governments if requested by the master of the vessel. 
(ii) When any such person or fishing vessel is actually engaged in operations in violation of the 
provisions of this Convention, or there is reasonable ground to believe was obviously so engaged 
prior to boarding of such vessel by any such official, the latter may arrest or seize such person or 
vessel and further investigate the circumstances if necessary. The Contracting Party to which the 
official belongs shall notify promptly the Contracting Party to which such person or vessel belongs of 
such arrest or seizure, and shall deliver such person or vessel as promptly as practicable to the 
authorized officials of the Contracting Party to which such person or vessel belongs at a place to be 
agreed upon by both Parties. Provided, however, that when the Contracting Party which receives 
such notification cannot immediately accept delivery, the Contracting Party which gives such 
notification may keep such person or vessel under surveillance within the waters of the Convention 
area or within its own territory under the conditions agreed upon by both the Contracting Parties. 
(iii) Only the authorities of the Contracting Party to which the above-mentioned person or fishing vessel 
belongs may try the offense and impose penalties therefor. The witnesses and evidence necessary 
for establishing the offense, so far as they are under the control of any of the Contracting Parties to 
this Convention, shall be furnished as promptly as possible to the Contracting Party having 
jurisdiction to try the offense and shall be taken into account, and utilized as appropriate, by the 
executive authority of that Contracting Party having jurisdiction to try the offense’. 
60  The full text of the scheme can be found in the Report of the Fourth Regular Meeting of the ICCAT, 
available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_74-75_II.pdf (visited on 17/12/2012), at 
Annexe 7, Appendix II, pp. 76-79. 
61  The full text of the recommendation can be found in the 15
th Special Meeting of the ICCAT, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_06-07_I_1.pdf (visited on 17/12/2012), pp. 130-139.   
62  Ibid., p. 131. 
63  Also see Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 2009), pp. 112-115. 
64  The full text can be seen at 
http://www.afsc.noaa.gov/REFM/CBS/Docs/Convention%20on%20Conservation%20of%20Pollock%20in%20
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8 December 1995, Article XI(6) has provisions concerning non-flag state enforcement: ‘(a) 
Each Party consents to the boarding and inspection of fishing vessels flying its flag and 
located in the Convention Area by duly authorized officials of any other Party for 
compliance with this Convention or measures. … (b) Such officials may inspect the 
vessel, … catch, fishing gear, and relevant documents and logbooks, and question the 
master, the fishing master, and other officers on board’.
65 
    At present, the WCPFC offers the most complete and detailed regulations concerning 
non-flag state enforcement on the high seas. Article 25(6) of the WCPFC Convention states 
that, if there are reasonable grounds for believing that a fishing vessel on the high seas has 
engaged in unauthorised fishing in an area under the national jurisdiction of a WCPFC 
member, the flag state of the vessel should either immediately investigate the matter and 
cooperate with the member concerned in taking appropriate enforcement action or 
authorise the relevant authorities to board and inspect the vessel on the high seas. In this 
provision, non-flag state enforcement is based on the consent and request of the flag state. 
Article 26 further requires the WCPFC to adopt a boarding and inspection procedure so 
that non-flag states can conduct enforcement without needing to obtain the consent of the 
flag state in advance; in other words, the procedure amounts to consent in advance. 
    As Article 26 of the Convention, the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries 
Commission Boarding and Inspection Procedures
66  (the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection 
Procedure) was adopted at the Third Regular Session of the WCPFC in Apia, Samoa, 
11–15 December 2006. Article 17 of the procedure requires information on authorised 
inspectors and inspecting vessels to be open and continuingly updated.
67  Additionally, 
Article 13 requires that the inspecting authority provide the following documents to the 
WCPFC: the details of the inspecting vessel and name of the inspection authority, 
notification that the inspection vessel is clearly marked and identifiable as in government 
service and notification that the crew has received and completed training in carrying out 
the boarding and inspection procedures and are familiar with the fishing activities to be 
inspected and the provisions of the conservation and management measures.
68  Article 13 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Central%20Bering%20Sea.pdf (visited on 05/01/2012). 
65  Ibid. 
66  The full text of the procedure can be found on the official WCPFC website, 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2006-08/western-and-central-pacific-fisheries-commission-boarding-and-in
spection-procedures (visited on 05/01/2012). 
67  Ibid. 
68  Ibid.  
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implies that the inspectors and vessels will perform enforcement only under strict 
conditions in order to protect the traditional right of enforcement of the flag state and 
prevent the abuse of non-flag state enforcement. 
    Pursuant to Article 20, before proceeding with boarding and inspection, the inspecting 
vessel should: 
a. make best efforts to establish contact with the fishing vessel by radio, by the 
appropriate International Code of Signals or by other accepted means of alerting the 
vessel; 
b. provide the information to identify itself as an authorised inspection vessel - name, 
registration number, international radio call sign and contact frequency; 
c. communicate to the master of the vessel its intention to board and inspect the 
vessel under the authority of the Commission and pursuant to these procedures; and 
d. initiate notice through the authorities of the inspection vessel of the boarding and 
inspection to the authorities of the fishing vessel.
69 
    Article 24 describes the obligations of inspectors while undertaking boarding and 
inspection: 
a. present their identity card to the master of the vessel and a copy of the text of the 
relevant measures in force pursuant to the Convention in the relevant area of the high 
seas; 
b. not interfere with the master’s ability to communicate with the authorities of the 
fishing vessel; 
c. complete the inspection of the vessel within 4 (four) hours unless evidence of a 
serious violation is found; 
d. collect and clearly document any evidence they believe indicates a violation of 
measures in force pursuant to the Convention;   
e. provide to the master prior to leaving the vessel a copy of an interim report on the 
boarding and inspection including any objection or statement which the master 
wishes to include in the report;   
f. promptly leave the vessel following completion of the inspection; and 
g. provide a full report on the boarding and inspection to the authorities of the fishing 
vessel, pursuant to paragraph 30, which shall also include any master’s statement.
70 
                                                      
69  Ibid. 
70  Ibid.  
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Furthermore, Articles 23 stipulates that, in order not to constitute harassment of a fishing 
vessel, its officers or crew, the boarding and inspection procedure should be carried out in 
accordance with the internationally accepted principles of good seamanship and not 
interfere unduly with the lawful operation of the fishing vessel or adversely affect the 
quality of the catch.
71 
    Article 25 further lists the obligations of the master of the inspected vessel during 
boarding and inspection: 
a. follow internationally accepted principles of good seamanship so as to avoid 
risks to the safety of authorised inspection vessels and inspectors; 
b. accept and facilitate prompt and safe boarding by the authorised inspectors; 
c. cooperate with and assist in the inspection of the vessel pursuant to these 
procedures; 
d. not assault, resist, intimidate, interfere with, or unduly obstruct or delay the 
inspectors in the performance of their duties; 
e. allow the inspectors to communicate with the crew of the inspection vessel, the 
authorities of the inspection vessel, as well as with the authorities of the fishing 
vessel being inspected;   
f. provide them with reasonable facilities, including, where appropriate, food and 
accommodation; and 
g. facilitate safe disembarkation by the inspectors. 
If the master of the fishing vessel refused to be boarded and inspected, he should offer a 
reasonable explanation, and the inspection authority should immediately notify the 
authority of the fishing vessel, as well as the commission.
72  Then, the flag state should 
direct the master to accept the boarding and inspection; if the master still refuses, the flag 
state should suspend the vessel’s authorisation to fish, order the vessel to return 
immediately to port and immediately notify the authorities of the inspection vessel and the 
commission of the action it has taken in these circumstances.
73 
    Articles 20–27 constitute the core of the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure 
and regulate the main procedures for boarding and inspection and the obligations of the 
                                                      
71  Ibid. 
72  See Article 26 of the procedure. 
73  See Article 27 of the procedure.  
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See a suspected vessel 
Notify the authority of the fishing vessel 
Notify the vessel of the intention to board 
and inspect the vessel 
1. Establish contact with the 
fishing vessel by radio. 
2. Provide the information to 
identify itself as an 
authorized inspection 
vessel. 
3. Communicate to the master 
of the vessel the intention to 
board and inspect the 
vessel. 
Conduct a boarding and inspection 
1. Communicate with the 
master of the fishing vessel 
in a language that the 
master can understand. 
2. Present the identity card to 
the master of the vessel. 
3. Inspect the vessel’s license, 
gear, equipment, records, 
facilities, fish and fish 
products. 
4. Collect any evidence of 
violations. 
Provide to the master a copy of an interim 
report on the boarding and inspection 
Leave the vessel 
Provide a full report on the boarding and 
inspection to the authorities of the fishing 
vessel 
inspectors, authorities of the inspection vessel, inspected vessels and the fishing vessels 
(see Chart 5.1).   
 
Chart 5.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure §20-24 
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    In addition, Article 16 allows inspectors from different authorities to conduct the 
enforcement work on other contracting parties’ inspection vessels.
74  This permission 
seems to break the wall separating enforcement units established by each party and to 
gather all inspectors and inspection vessels as a specialised department under the WCPFC. 
 
B. Fishing Entities’ Equivalent to Non-flag State Enforcement in RFMOs 
    Fishing entities would be regarded as possessing legal personality in the international 
legal system if the existing contracting parties or members considered the fishing entities 
to have capability to bear rights and obligations of their legal system and agreed to them 
becoming members.
75  Therefore, it is possible for fishing entities to participate in 
enforcement under a regional treaty. However, as the concept of fishing entities mainly 
stems from the UNFSA, the WCPFC is the only RFMO to allow fishing entities as 
members and undertake boarding and inspection procedures.
76  However, provisions 
concerning fishing entities’ rights and obligations in the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection 
Procedure are ambiguous. Article 6 clearly indicates that the procedure applies to fishing 
entities: ‘Unless otherwise decided by the Commission, these procedures shall also apply 
in their entirety as between a Contracting Party and a Fishing Entity, subject to a 
notification to that effect to the Commission from the Contracting Party concerned’. Article 
6 does not clearly indicate whether the fishing entity to which it refers is a fishing entity 
which has already acceded to the WCPFC Convention and become a member of the 
WCPFC according to the Arrangement for the Participation of Fishing Entities or a fishing 
entity which is outside the WCPFC regime. If the latter, this Article seems unnecessary 
because the same regulation can also apply to states outside the regime of WCPFC 
conservation and management measures; in this circumstance, there is no need to 
specifically regulate the contracting party and a fishing entity. The reasonable presumption 
is that it refers to a fishing entity which has acceded to the WCPFC Convention and 
become a member. 
                                                      
74  Article 16 of the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure reads: ‘To enhance the effectiveness of the 
Commission’s boarding and inspection procedures, and to maximize the use of trained inspectors, 
Contracting Parties may identify opportunities to place authorized inspectors on inspection vessels of 
another Contracting Party.…Contracting Parties should seek to conclude bilateral arrangements to this end 
or otherwise facilitate communication and coordination between them for the purpose of implementing 
these procedures’. 
75  Fishing entities’ legal status under international law is discussed in Chapter 2, pp. 27–32, of this thesis. 
76  The Convention of NPAFC contains provisions concerning non-flag state enforcement but still does not 
allow fishing entities to become parties or members.  
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However, the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure automatically applies to 
members who accede to the convention; in other words, it is unnecessary to deliver another 
notification to the commission expressing agreement that the procedures apply to each 
other. Therefore, Article 6 can be regarded as implying that even as WCPFC members, 
fishing entities can fall outside the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure. A possible 
reason for this stipulation is that boarding and inspection procedures are concerned with 
infringing a state’s sovereignty, and states might not be willing to see their vessels boarded 
and inspected by a fishing entity. Nevertheless, the purpose of non-flag state enforcement 
in fisheries within RFMOs is to ensure that the conservation and management measures 
can be carried out completely. All WCPFC members, except fishing entities, have the 
obligation to comply with Procedure, leading to a problematic consequence that whether 
the WCPFC boarding and inspection regime can be carried out effectively and achieve its 
aim depends on the willing cooperation of fishing entities. In other words, if a fishing 
entity delivers a notification of its willingness to comply with the procedure and all other 
members express willingness to apply the procedure between them and that fishing entity, 
then the rights and obligations in the Procedure can be established between the state 
members and the fishing entity. However, if a fishing entity is not willing to comply with 
the procedure or it delivers such notification but all or some state members are not willing 
to apply the procedure between them and that fishing entity, then the fishing entity can be 
legally outside WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Regime. Hence, it is possible that the 
stipulations concerning notification from fishing entities become a loophole in the WCPFC 
boarding and inspection regime for either a fishing entity or a state member. 
    In addition, it implies that Article 6 of the Procedure returns the relation between the 
fishing entities and contracting parties in the WCPFC boarding and inspection regime to 
the level of bilateral treaties. This would deviate from the main purpose in establishing 
RFMOs to bring all actors under conservation and management measures. 
 
C. Bilateral Treaties 
States making the non-flag state enforcement measures on the high seas to conserve fishery 
resources through bilateral treaties was not a new notion, even before the regulations of the 
UNCLOS, UNFSA and RFMOs. In 1956, Japan and the Soviet Union signed the  
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Japan-Soviet Convention for the Northwest Pacific Fisheries,
77  which allowed Japan and 
the Soviet Union to board and inspect each other’s vessels if there were reasonable grounds 
to believe the vessels were engaged in activities in violation of the agreement. In 1976, the 
United States and Soviet Union concluded the Agreement between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
on Mutual Fisheries Relations.
78  Article VIII permitted their vessels to be boarded and 
inspected by each other’s duly authorised officers, who could even seize or arrest the 
vessels and the individuals on board.
79 
After the agreement with the Soviet Union, the United States reached a series of 
bilateral boarding and inspection agreements with many states beginning in 1976 to ensure 
fisheries conservation of the high seas of the Atlantic the Agreement between the 
Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Polish People’s 
Republic Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States (1976)
80, the Agreement 
between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the 
Republic of China Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States (1976)
81, the 
Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government 
of the People’s Republic of Bulgaria Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United 
                                                      
77  See Syma A. Ebbin, A Sea Change: The Exclusive Economic Zone and Governance Institutions for Living 
Marine Resources (Dordrecht: Springer, 2005), p. 83; Douglas M. Johnston, Marine Policy and the Coastal 
Community: The Impact of the Law of the Sea (London: Croom Helm Ltd., 1976), pp. 223-224. 
78  The full text can be found at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/138873.pdf (visited on 
04/01/2012). 
79  Article VIII of the Agreement states:   
‘1. Each Party consents to and, to the extent allowable under its own law, will assist and facilitate boardings 
and inspections of its vessels by duly authorized officers of the other Party for compliance with laws and 
regulations referred to in Article III. If, upon boarding and inspection of a vessel by a Party’s duly 
authorized officer, such law or regulation is found to have been violated, each Party agrees that it will 
not object to appropriate enforcement action undertaken pursuant to the laws of that other Party, 
including seizure and arrest of the vessel and the individuals on board. 
  2. Each Party shall impose appropriate penalties, in accordance with its laws, for violations of the laws or 
regulations referred to in Article III. In the case of arrest and seizure of a vessel of a Party by the 
authorities of the other Party, notification shall be given promptly through diplomatic channels 
informing the flag state party of the facts and actions taken. 
  3. Each Party shall release vessels of the other Party and their crews promptly, subject to the posting of 
reasonable bond or other security. 
  4. The penalty for violation of a limitation or restriction on the fishing operations of a Party shall be limited 
to appropriate fines, forfeitures or revocation or suspension of fishing privileges’. 
80  The full text is available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/3/5/11639.pdf (visited on 
11/12/2011). 
81  The full text is available at http://www.intfish.net/treaties/bilaterals/texts/chi-usa/chi-usa-1976.pdf 
(visited on 28/11/2007).  
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States (1976)
82, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Socialist Republic of Romania Concerning Fisheries off the 
Coasts of the United States (1976)
83, the Agreement between the Government of Spain and 
the Government of the United States of America Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the 
United States (1977)
84, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of the Republic of Cuba Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts 
of the United States (1977)
85, the Agreement between the Government of the United States 
of America and the Government of Mexico Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the 
United States (1977)
86, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Portugal Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the 
United States (1980)
87, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of 
America and the Government of Norway Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United 
States (1981)
88, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America 
and the Government of the Republic of Korea Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the 
United States (1982)
89, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of 
America of the one part and the Government of Denmark and the Home Government of 
the Faroe Islands of the other part Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United States 
(1984)
90, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the 
Government of the Republic of Iceland Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the United 
States (1984)
91, and the Agreement between the Government of the United States of 
                                                      
82  United Nations, Treaty Series (vol. 1134), p. 127. 
83  The full text is available at http://www.intfish.net/treaties/bilaterals/texts/rom-usa/rom-usa-1976.pdf 
(visited on 28/11/2007). 
84  The full text is available at http://www.intfish.net/treaties/bilaterals/texts/spa-usa/spa-usa-1977.pdf 
(visited on 28/11/2007). 
85  The full text can be seen in ‘Cuba—United States: Agreement Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of the 
United States’, International Legal Materials, Vol. 16, No. 3(May 1977), pp. 596–605. 
86  The full text is available at http://www.intfish.net/treaties/bilaterals/texts/mex-usa/mex-usa-1977.pdf 
(visited on 28/11/2007). 
87  The full text is available at http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/por22901.doc (visited on 12/12/2011). 
88  The full text can be found in: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/9/21/00017008.pdf (visited on 
12/12/2012). 
89  The full text is available at http://www.intfish.net/treaties/bilaterals/texts/rok-usa/rok-usa-1982a.pdf 
(visited on 28/11/2007). 
90  The full text can be found in: http://untreaty.un.org/unts/144078_158780/1/1/100.pdf (visited on 
12/12/2011). 
91  The full text is available at http://www.intfish.net/treaties/bilaterals/texts/ice-usa/ice-usa-1984.pdf 
(visited on 28/11/2007).  
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America and the European Economic Community Concerning Fisheries off the Coasts of 
the United States (1984)
92. 
    Making a bilateral treaty with other entities or states is not impossible for fishing 
entities if they or the states regard the fishing entities as possessing the capacity, or the 
international legal personality, to bear rights and obligations under the international legal 
system. In fact, non-flag state enforcement on the high seas through bilateral treaties is still 
based on the consent and authorisation of the flag state. Within bilateral treaties, a fishing 
vessel of the contracting party could only be boarded and inspected by the other party. It, to 
a certain degree, preserves more rights for flag states and is much simpler because it 
involves enforcement only between two parties. However, RFMOs, which have gradually 
covered almost every high seas area around the world, have provided a forum for states to 
discuss and decide all existing matters or problems within different areas, so non-flag state 
enforcement on the high seas is increasingly being developing and carried out within 
RFMOs. In addition, the concept of fishing entities formally stems from the UNFSA which 
encourages fishing entities to be brought into RFMOs. Therefore, in addition to having the 
ability to conclude bilateral treaties concerning enforcement, fishing entities, as the 
members of RFMOs, are likely to comply with the regulations of non-flag state 
enforcement under RFMOs. 
 
5. Conclusion 
At the bilateral treaty level, there is no impediment for a fishing entity to participate in 
non-flag state high seas enforcement because international treaties are always concluded 
based on the parties’ willingness. Theoretically, through the UNFSA, the fishing entity can 
become a member or a cooperative party in RFMOs and further participate in their high 
seas enforcement schemes. Nevertheless, the WCPFC’s Boarding and Inspection Procedure 
excludes fishing entity from holding a position equivalent to that of a normal non-flag state 
obliged to conform to the procedure. In contrast, by the delivery of notification, a fishing 
entity can decide whether it is inside or outside the procedure, and the state members can 
decide whether to apply the Procedure between themselves and the fishing entity. 
Consequently, the fishing entity’s role in non-flag enforcement is still based on the nature 
of bilateral treaties; the only difference is that there is an intermediary, the RFMO. The 
                                                      
92  The full text is available at http://faolex.fao.org/docs/texts/bi-11049.doc (visited on 12/12/2011).  
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following chapter further discusses the problematic consequences of enforcement by 
fishing entities on the high seas.  
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CHAPTER 6 The Problematic Consequences of Enforcement by Fishing Entities on 
the High Seas 
 
1. Introduction 
A fishing entity, as an equivalent to a flag state, should not to encounter many problems in 
high seas enforcement, but due to the nature of non-flag state enforcement on the high seas 
as a supplement to traditional flag state enforcement, fishing entities might face some 
uncertainties in this area. At present, the legal basis for non-flag state enforcement on the 
high seas comes either from bilateral or multilateral treaties. Under bilateral treaties, both 
parties can board and inspect each other’s vessels. The advantage of bilateral treaties is that 
they are simpler and can be concluded more easily. On the other hand, through multilateral 
treaties, more states are involved in the boarding and inspection procedure, increasing the 
effectiveness of the fisheries sustainable development. Under a multilateral treaty, all states 
can board and inspect other parties’ vessels and must allow their own vessels to be boarded 
and inspected by others. However, due to the larger number of states which might have 
different interests in their fisheries policy, it becomes complicated to negotiate, concluded 
and implement multilateral treaties. Being a party to bilateral treaties concerning high seas 
enforcement establishes a clear legal status for fishing entities as a non-flag state. Thus, at 
the bilateral level, fishing entities can participate in non-flag state enforcement on the high 
seas to conserve and manage fisheries resources. However, at the multilateral level, such as 
multilateral conventions or RFMOs, states are usually the subject of regulations; therefore, 
enforcement by fishing entities poses an issue in the international law of the sea which is 
difficult to resolve. 
    In addition, neither the UNCLOS nor the UNFSA allow fishing entities to accede; 
only some RFMOs allow fishing entities to become members. However, UNCLOS and the 
UNFSA play significant roles in fisheries conservation and management on the high seas. 
In particular, the UNFSA establishes a high seas boarding and inspection procedure as a 
temporary measure for RFMOs which had not developed such a procedure within two 
years of its adoption. Fishing entities, as members of the RFMOs, face not only the 
problem of compliance with the UNFSA but also the uncertainty of their rights and 
obligations in RFMOs regarding non-flag state high seas enforcement. These uncertainties 
and problems that fishing entities, as equivalent to a non-flag state, might encounter are 
discussed in this chapter. Furthermore, the WCPFC is the only RFMO which both allows 
fishing entities to be members and has adopted boarding and inspection procedure  
107 
 
according to the UNFSA. Therefore, this chapter also discusses the uncertainty that fishing 
entities might face in the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure. 
 
2. Weakening the Effectiveness of Multi-protection in Conservation and Management 
Systems 
Articles 63 and 64 in UNCLOS stipulate that relevant states should cooperate directly or 
indirectly through RFMOs in establishing conservation and management measures for 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. Articles 116–119 reiterate the importance of 
cooperation among states and provide the principles for conservation and management 
measures for living resources in the high seas. Based on those principles, the 1995 UNFSA 
was adopted to establish more detailed provisions for the implementation of UNCLOS.
1 
Article 4 of the UNFSA states that ‘[n]othing in this Agreement shall prejudice the rights, 
jurisdiction and duties of States under the Convention. This Agreement shall be interpreted 
and applied in the context of and in a manner consistent with the Convention’. Therefore, 
although the UNFSA is a separate treaty from UNCLOS, the role of the UNFSA is to 
supplement the UNCLOS. The conservation and management measures adopted under the 
UNFSA should not prejudice the related provisions in the UNCLOS.
2 
    As the implementation of UNCLOS, UNFSA uses RFMOs as a major method to 
strengthen and carry out its conservation and management measures. Articles 8(1) and (3) 
state that the related states should cooperate through RFMOs and have an obligation to 
follow the conservation and management measures set by RFMOs. Article 8(5) further 
states that, if there is no RFMO to regulate conservation and management, ‘relevant coastal 
States and States fishing on the high seas for such stock in the subregion or region shall 
cooperate to establish such an organisation or enter into other appropriate arrangements to 
ensure conservation and management of such stock and shall participate in the work of the 
organisation or arrangement’. Articles 9–14 of the UNFSA lay out the functions and issues 
that RFMOs should observe in their conservation and management measures. 
    As parties to the UNCLOS, UNFSA or any treaties that create RFMOs, states create a 
situation in high seas fisheries conservation and management which can be called 
uni-protection. On the other hand, UNFSA regulations concerning UNCLOS and RFMOs 
                                                      
1  Article 2 of the UNFSA states that the purpose of the agreement is to ‘ensure the long-term conservation 
and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks through effective 
implementation of the relevant provisions of the Convention’. 
2  See Article 7 of the UNFSA.  
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create a triangle system among these entities. Compared with uni-protection, states bound 
by these three regulations create the situation of multi-protection, increase the strength of 
fisheries conservation and management on the high seas. Within the multi-protection 
system, the UNCLOS provides a framework for high seas fisheries resources conservation 
and management. Based on UNCLOS, the UNFSA further focuses on the sustainable 
development of straddling and highly migratory fish stocks. RFMOs carry out the 
principles of the conservation and management measures in the UNCLOS and UNFSA and 
establish concrete procedures or measures to implement this convention and agreement. 
Consequently, the UNCLOS, UNFSA and RFMOs are interdependent and mutually 
reinforce the conservation and management measures, building a tight network for the 
sustainable utilisation of high seas fisheries resources.
3  Within this network, the UNFSA 
stands as the centre connecting the UNCLOS and RFMOs. Although the UNFSA has 
provisions concerning fishing entities, it does not allow them to join.
4  On the other hand, 
the agreement does not exclude but even encourages fishing entities to participate in 
RFMOs
5  in order to bring fishing entities into conservation and management networks.   
    Any state would be bound by the agreement if it became a state party to the UNFSA, 
regardless of whether it also participates in a RFMO. If fishing entities become members 
of a RFMO, it is absolutely clear that they are directly bound by the RFMO’s conservation 
and management measures and so indirectly follow the related UNFSA regulations. 
However, if a fishing entity does not or refuses to participate in RFMOs, then it is not be 
bound by the regulations of either RFMOs or the UNFSA. Consequently, establishing the 
relations between RFMOs and fishing entities becomes significant to bring fishing entities 
into the conservation and management system.   
The UNCLOS, UNFSA and RFMO regulations can be regarded as the filters through 
which the more states pass, the more stable the conservation and management regime 
becomes. In other words, if more states are parties to all three sets of regulations, more 
states are bound by the multi-protection system. In this context, the best situation is for all 
                                                      
3  See Peter G.G. Davies and Catherine Redgwell, ‘The International Legal Regulation of Straddling Fish 
Stocks’, The British Yearbook of International Law, Vol. 67(1996), pp. 270; 272. 
4  Article 1(3) states: ‘This Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to other fishing entities whose vessels fish 
on the high seas’. However, Article 39 concerning accession does not allow fishing entities to join. 
Regarding fishing entities’ status in the UNFSA, please see Chapter 2, pp. 34–43, of this thesis. 
5  Article 17(3) reads: ‘States which are members of RFMOs should individually or jointly request fishing 
entities to cooperate with RFMOs and such fishing entities shall enjoy benefits from participation in the 
fishery commensurate with their commitment to comply with conservation and management measures in 
respect of the stocks’.    
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the actors who have vessels conducting fishing on the high seas to be brought into the 
entire triangle system, rather than just one or two of the regulatory systems. However, the 
lack of opportunity for fishing entities to join the UNFSA and UNCLOS places stress on 
RFMOs to play the crucial role of deciding whether fishing entities are inside or outside 
conservation and management regimes. The lack of opportunity also raises the key 
question of whether the UNFSA and RFMOs’ measures can be fully enforced on the high 
seas. Accordingly, RFMOs become the only international conservation and management 
regimes which may have binding effect on fishing entities. The effectiveness of the 
conservation and management measures, therefore, is reduced from multi-protection to 
uni-protection.
6 
 
3. Uncertainty of the Relations among UNFSA, RFMOs and Fishing Entities 
The relation between the UNFSA and RFMOs can be seen in Article 8 of the UNFSA. 
Article 8(1) states that coastal states and states fishing on the high seas should cooperate on 
straddling and highly migratory fish stocks directly or indirectly through RFMOs.
7  Article 
8(5) further stipulates that those states should establish a RFMO if no such organisation 
exists.
8  Therefore, the UNFSA provides that, if a RFMO existed before the adoption of the 
UNFSA, state parties may cooperate through that RFMO; if there was no RFMO, states 
parties should establish one. 
Article 21(2) of the UNFSA stipulates that states should through RFMOs establish a 
boarding and inspection procedure. Article 21(3) of the UNFSA states that, if a RFMO 
does not establish its own boarding and inspection procedures within two years of the 
adoption of the UNFSA, the UNFSA Boarding and Inspection Procedure in Article 22 
                                                      
6  See also Rosemary Rayfuse, ‘The Interrelationship between the Global Instruments of International 
Fisheries Law’, in Ellen Hey, ed., Developments in International Fisheries Law (Hague: Kluwer Law 
International, 1999), pp. 153–155. 
7  The full text of Article 8(1) reads: ‘Coastal States and States fishing on the high seas shall, in accordance 
with the Convention, pursue cooperation in relation to straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish 
stocks either directly or through appropriate subregional or regional fisheries management organizations or 
arrangements, taking into account the specific characteristics of the subregion or region, to ensure effective 
conservation and management of such stocks’. 
8  Article 8(5) states: ‘Where there is no subregional or regional fisheries management organization or 
arrangement to establish conservation and management measures for a particular straddling fish stock or 
highly migratory fish stock, relevant coastal States and States fishing on the high seas for such stock in the 
subregion or region shall cooperate to establish such an organization or enter into other appropriate 
arrangements to ensure conservation and management of such stock and shall participate in the work of 
the organization or arrangement’.  
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should apply automatically as between UNFSA parties.
9  Pursuant to Article 21 of the 
UNFSA, the RFMOs are encouraged and expected to establish their own boarding and 
inspection procedures. Nevertheless, the UNFSA does not explicitly indicate if the RFMOs 
which correspond with those in Article 21(3) adopting the UNFSA boarding and inspection 
procedures are the new organisations established after the adoption of the UNFSA or the 
ones that existed before 1995. It can be understood that RFMOs established on the basis of 
the UNFSA may apply Article 21(3) of the UNFSA and adopt its boarding and inspection 
procedures.
10  However, RFMOs set up separately before the UNFSA do not have the 
obligation to cooperate with Article 21(3), so the UNFSA needs to establish another special 
link with RFMOs.
11  Even if an RFMO was formed after the UNFSA, it could be possible 
to refuse to implement Article 21(3) of the UNFSA. The WCPFC reached a gentleman’s 
agreement to not implement the UNFSA boarding and inspection rules before concluding 
its own procedures.
12  This uncertainty in relations between RFMOs and the UNFSA can 
cause confusion in the application of Article 21(3) of the UNFSA. 
In addition, under Article 21(3), a member of a RFMO, whether formed before or 
after, which is also a state party of the UNFSA may conduct boarding and inspection 
between it and other state parties. Fishing entities which cannot become state parties of the 
UNFSA face two possible situations. If a fishing entity is a member of a RFMO, it raises 
doubt whether Article 22 of the UNFSA can apply to the fishing entity. Pursuant to Article 
21(2) of the UNFSA, the RFMO should adopt its own boarding and inspection procedures, 
which should be consistent with Article 22 of the UNFSA. As a member of the RFMO, the 
                                                      
9  Article 21(3) reads: ‘If, within two years of the adoption of this Agreement, any organization or 
arrangement has not established such procedures, boarding and inspection pursuant to paragraph 1, as 
well as any subsequent enforcement action, shall, pending the establishment of such procedures, be 
conducted in accordance with this article and the basic procedures set out in article 22’. 
10  At present, the WCPFC is the only RFMO which complies with Article 21(3) of the UNFSA, through 
wording in Article 26(2) of the WCPFC Convention that reads: ‘If, within two years of the entry into force of 
this Convention, the Commission is not able to agree on such procedures, or on an alternative mechanism 
which effectively discharges the obligations of the members of the Commission under the Agreement and 
this Convention to ensure compliance with the conservation and management measures established by the 
Commission, articles 21 and 22 of the Agreement shall be applied, subject to paragraph 3, as if they were 
part of this Convention and boarding and inspection of fishing vessels in the Convention Area, as well as any 
subsequent enforcement action, shall be conducted in accordance with the procedures set out therein and 
such additional practical procedures as the Commission may decide are necessary for the implementation 
of articles 21 and 22 of the Agreement.’. 
11  Although RFMOs members that are also parties of the UNFSA are bound by the agreement, the RFMOs 
themselves, as the subjects of international law, still need a special link to the UNFSA. 
12  Douglas Guilfoyle, Shipping Interdiction and the Law of the Sea (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2009), p. 110.  
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fishing entity should follow the regulations adopted by the RFMO; therefore, the boarding 
and inspection procedures provided in Article 22 of the UNFSA might automatically apply 
to the fishing entity, which thus is indirectly bound to the UNFSA. 
In the other situation, if a fishing entity does not participate in a RFMO, it is not be 
bound by the boarding and inspection procedures of the UNFSA. In this circumstance, the 
RFMO complies with the UNFSA boarding and inspection procedures, but the fishing 
entity is excluded from the procedures, as well as the conservation and management 
regime on the high seas. Hence, while implementing boarding and inspection procedures 
among members of a RFMO, the fishing entity has no warrant to board and inspect the 
vessels of other RFMO members; on the other hand, the vessels of the fishing entity could 
also escape being boarded and inspected on the high seas, increasing the possibilities for 
the vessels of the fishing entity to violate the conservation and management measures of 
the RFMO. This would further weaken the effectiveness of the boarding and inspection 
procedures of the UNFSA. 
 
4. Confusing Legal Status in the WCPFC Enforcement Procedures 
Pursuant to Article 26
13  of the WCPFC Convention, the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection 
Procedure
14  was adopted in 2006 and applies on the high seas within the convention area. 
Theoretically, members discussed the boarding and inspection procedure during the 
WCPFC regular meeting, so each member should equally cooperate and participate in this 
procedure. It means that a member of the WCPFC possesses equal right to board and 
inspect the vessels of all other members but also has the obligation to ensure that its vessels 
may be boarded and inspected on the high seas within the convention area. However, it 
seems that this procedure does not distribute rights and obligations equally but 
distinguishes between the rights and obligations by contracting parties and the members. 
    Articles 2(c) and 2(d) of the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure separately 
define ‘Authorities of the Inspection Vessel’ and ‘Authorities of the Fishing Vessel’. The 
                                                      
13  Article 26(1) states: ‘For the purposes of ensuring compliance with conservation and management 
measures, the Commission shall establish procedures for boarding and inspection of fishing vessels on the 
high seas in the Convention Area. All vessels used for boarding and inspection of fishing vessels on the high 
seas in the Convention Area shall be clearly marked and identifiable as being on government service and 
authorized to undertake high seas boarding and inspection in accordance with this Convention’. 
14  The full text of the procedure can be found on the official WCPFC website, 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/cmm-2006-08/western-and-central-pacific-fisheries-commission-boarding-and-in
spection-procedures (visited on 21/05/2012). The details of this procedure are discussed in Chapter 5, pp. 
96–101, of this thesis.  
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former means the authorities of the contracting party of the commission under whose 
jurisdiction the inspection vessel is operating. The latter means the authorities of the 
member of the commission under whose jurisdiction the fishing vessel is operating. In the 
WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure, the subjects which can be inferred to have the 
right to board and inspect other members’ vessels are defined by the term ‘contracting 
party,’ and the subjects which can be inferred to have obligations to allow being boarded 
and inspected are described by the term ‘member of the commission’. The result is that the 
contracting parties of the WCPFC Convention and the members of the commission might 
have different legal statuses under the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure. 
    With respect to the subjects that can be inferred to have the rights of boarding and 
inspection, Article 5 of the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure states that ‘[e]ach 
Contracting Party may, subject to the provisions of these procedures, carry out boarding 
and inspection on the high seas of fishing vessels engaged in or reported to have engaged 
in a fishery regulated pursuant to the Convention’. Article 13 regulates the documents and 
notifications that the inspectors and inspection vessels should provide: ‘Each Contracting 
Party that intends to carry out boarding and inspection activities pursuant to these 
procedures shall so notify the Commission, through the Executive Director, and shall 
provide the following …’. Article 15 further stipulates that authorised inspection vessels 
and inspectors notified by contracting parties pursuant to paragraph 13 shall be included in 
the commission register once the executive director confirms that they meet the 
requirements of that paragraph. Article 16 instructs that, in order to increase the 
effectiveness of the procedure, ‘[c]ontracting Parties may identify opportunities to place 
authorised inspectors on inspection vessels of another Contracting Party. … Contracting 
Parties should seek to conclude bilateral arrangements … or otherwise facilitate 
communication and coordination between them for the purpose of implementing these 
procedures’. Article 40 requires contracting parties whose vessels conduct boarding and 
inspection under the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure to report annually to the 
commission about the enforcement activities they carried out. In addition, the contracting 
parties should take responsibility for any damage or loss caused by their actions while 
implementing the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure.
15  Finally, Article 47 
                                                      
15  Article 45 of the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure reads: ‘Contracting Parties shall be liable for 
damage or loss attributable to their action in implementing these procedures when such action is unlawful 
or exceeds that reasonably required in the light of available information’.  
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provides a way that the contracting parties may seek to promote optimum use of the 
authorised inspection vessels and authorised inspectors when applying these procedures.
16 
With regard to the subjects that can be inferred to have obligations under the WCPFC 
Boarding and Inspection Procedure, Article 7 states that ‘[e]ach Member of the 
Commission shall ensure that vessels flying its flag accept boarding and inspection by 
authorized inspectors in accordance with these procedures’. Article 27 reads: ‘The 
authorities of the fishing vessel, unless generally accepted international regulations, 
procedures and practices relating to safety at sea make it necessary to delay the boarding 
and inspection, shall direct the master to accept the boarding and inspection. If the master 
does not comply with such direction, the Member shall suspend the vessel’s authorization 
to fish and order the vessel to return immediately to port. The Member shall immediately 
notify the authorities of the inspection vessel and the Commission of the action it has taken 
in these circumstances’.
17 
    As a result, although the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure does not 
explicitly state that only contracting parties have the right to board and inspect other 
members’ vessels, its language seems to imply so. Interestingly, the procedure was initially 
provided by the chairman under the title of the Draft Procedures for Boarding and 
Inspection Pursuant to the WCPFC Convention
18  in Working Group III of the fourth 
session of the WCPFC Preparatory Conference (PrepCon IV).
19  Then, in light of 
                                                      
16  The full text of Article 47 of the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure reads: ‘The Commission shall 
keep under continuous review the implementation and operation of these procedures, including review of 
annual reports relating to these procedures provided by Members. In applying these procedures, 
Contracting Parties may seek to promote optimum use of the authorized inspection vessels and authorized 
inspectors by: 
a. identifying priorities by area and/or by fishery for boarding and inspections pursuant to these 
procedures; 
b. ensuring that boarding and inspection on the high seas is fully integrated with the other monitoring, 
compliance and surveillance tools available pursuant to the Convention; 
c. ensuring non-discriminatory distribution of boarding and inspections on the high seas among fishing 
vessels of Members of the Commission without compromising the opportunity of Contracting Parties 
to investigate possible serious violations; and 
d. taking into account high seas enforcement resources assigned by Members of the Commission to 
monitor and ensure compliance by their own fishing vessels, particularly for small boat fisheries 
whose operations extend onto the high seas in areas adjacent to waters under their jurisdiction’. 
17  The articles above mentioned concerning the rights and obligations in the WCPFC Boarding and 
Inspection Procedure are some examples. The distinction between contracting parties and members can be 
seen throughout the procedure. 
18  The full text can be found at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfcprepconwp14/draft-procedures-boarding-and-inspection-pursuant-convent
ion (visited on 10/08/2012). 
19  Further information about PrepCon VI can be found in the Summary Report by the Chairman of Working 
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discussions during PrepCon IV, the chairman prepared the Revised Draft Procedures for 
Boarding and Inspection Pursuant to the WCPFC Convention
20  in the fifth session of the 
WCPFC Preparatory Conference (PrepCon V) on 10 September 2003.
21  In these two 
documents, the subject of the Procedures was drafted as ‘[Contracting Party] [Member of 
the Commission]’. It is obvious that the participants had not decided on the exact subject. 
In addition, in the first session of the Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC1)
22  in 
2005, the issue of the Boarding and Inspection Procedure was discussed, and the report of 
the TCC1 mentions that one of the key outstanding issues which requires resolution is 
whether the authority to board and inspect on the High Seas should be available to all 
members of the commission or limited only to contracting parties.
23  Under this question, a 
footnote states: 
The significance of this issue lies in the fact that, in a few cases, the Convention 
draws a subtle distinction between ‘Contracting Parties’ and ‘Members of the 
Commission’. ‘Contracting Parties’ are States or entities entitled to ratify or 
accede to the Convention. ‘Members of the Commission’ include all ‘Contracting 
Parties’ and others entitled to membership of the Commission. Members may 
therefore include States, Regional Integration Organizations and Fishing 
Entities. … Significantly, Article 26 of the Convention dealing with boarding and 
inspection powers comes under Part VI of the Convention entitled ‘Compliance 
and Enforcement’. It is worth noting that all the substantive provisions under Part 
VI apply to ‘Members of the Commission’. Thus, it can be concluded that the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Group III to the Fourth Session of the Conference, available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfcprepcon26/summary-report-chairman-working-group-iii-fourth-session-co
nference (visited on 10/08/2012). 
20  The full text can be found at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfcprepconwp14-rev-1/draft-procedures-boarding-and-inspection-pursuant-c
onvention (visited on 10/08/2012). 
21  Further information about PrepCon V can be found in the Summary Report by the Chair of Working 
Group III to the Fifth Session of the Preparatory Conference, available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfcprepcon33/summary-report-chair-working-group-iii-fifth-session-preparato
ry-conference (visited on 10/08/2012). 
22  See the 1st Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee on 5–9 December 2005, 
available at http://www.wcpfc.int/meetings/2005/1st-regular-session-technical-and-compliance-committee 
(visited on 12/08/2012). 
23  See WCPFC-TCC1-15, Boarding and Inspection Procedures, para 8, available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc-tcc1-2005-15/boarding-and-inspection-procedures-53k (visited on 
12/08/2012).  
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boarding and inspection powers envisaged under Article 26 of the Convention are 
applicable to all Members of the Commission.
24 
It seemed as if the subject of the procedure likely would be members of the 
commission; if so, a fishing entity could unambiguously be the subject of the procedure. 
On 10 March 2006, the TCC2
25  concluded the WCPFC Commission Boarding and 
Inspection Procedures’, which defines the subject of the Procedure as ‘members of the 
commission’ in a footnote stating: 
The use of the term ‘Member’ throughout the text is without prejudice to the 
position of any delegation with respect to the final disposition of the provisions of 
these procedures regarding the participation of Fishing Entities.
26 
The report of the TCC2 also states that the use of the term ‘member’ throughout the 
text should be considered provisional, pending final resolution of this matter.
27  However, 
in the third annual meeting of the WCPFC in December 2006, the final version of the 
Boarding and Inspection Procedure was adopted, making the subject of the Procedure 
‘contracting parties’, not ‘members of the commission’. 
Fishing entities cannot join the WCPFC Convention through accession
28  but can 
express their consent to be bound by the convention and become WCPFC members. 
Paragraph 1 of Annex I of the WCPFC Convention provides a method for fishing entities 
to join: ‘After the entry into force of this Convention, any fishing entity whose vessels fish 
                                                      
24  Ibid., fn 3. 
25  See the Second Regular Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee on 28 September-3 October 
2006, available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/meetings/2006/2nd-regular-session-technical-and-compliance-committee (visited on 
13/08/2012). 
26  See WCPFC-TCC2-12, High Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures and Attachments, fn 1 available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc-tcc2-2006-12/high-seas-boarding-and-inspection-procedures-attachments 
(visited on 13/08/2012). 
27  See WCPFC-TCC2-2006- Summary, Summary Record with Attachments, para 71, p. 14, available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc-tcc2-2006-summary/summary-record-with-attachments (visited on 
13/08/2012). 
28  Article 35 of the WCPFC Convention stipulates the ways for other states or entities may accede to it. 
Article 35(1) stipulates that the states referred to in Article 34(1) and any entity referred to in Article 
305(1)(c),(d) and (e) of UNCLOS which are in the convention area may join. The states mentioned in Article 
34(1) are Australia, Canada, China, the Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Fiji Islands, France, 
Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Kiribati, Republic of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Nauru, New Zealand, 
Niue, Republic of Palau, Independent State of Papua New Guinea, Republic of the Philippines, Republic of 
Korea, Independent State of Samoa, Solomon Islands, Kingdom of Tonga, Tuvalu, the United Kingdom of 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland in respect of Pitcairn, Henderson, Ducie and Oeno Islands, the United 
States of America and Republic of Vanuatu. In addition, Article 35(2) of the WCPFC Convention states: ‘After 
the entry into force of this Convention, the Contracting Parties may, by consensus, invite other States and 
regional economic integration organizations, whose nationals and fishing vessels wish to conduct fishing for 
highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area to accede to this Convention’.  
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for highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area, may, by a written instrument 
delivered to the depositary, agree to be bound by the regime established by this Convention. 
Such agreement shall become effective thirty days following the delivery of the instrument. 
Any such fishing entity may withdraw such agreement by written notification addressed to 
the depositary. The withdrawal shall take effect one year after the date of receipt of the 
notification, unless the notification specifies a later date’. In addition, Paragraph 2 of 
Annex I states that fishing entities who join the WCPFC Convention through Paragraph 1 
of the Annex should participate in the work of the commission, including decision-making, 
and should comply with the obligations under this convention; in other words, these fishing 
entities should also become members of the WCPFC.   
    Moreover, Paragraph 2 of Annex I further stipulates that references to the commission 
or members of the commission include ‘such fishing entity as well as Contracting Parties’. 
Accordingly, fishing entities can be members of the WCPFC but are still not the same as 
contracting parties. Then, fishing entities, as members of the WCPFC, certainly must 
ensure that their vessels may be boarded and inspected by other contracting parties of the 
WCPFC Convention. However, it remains a question of whether fishing entities can be 
regarded as equivalent to contracting parties or merely members in the WCPFC Boarding 
and Inspection Procedure. Thus, it is unclear whether fishing entities can conduct boarding 
and inspection of other members’ vessels according to the WCPFC Boarding and 
Inspection Procedure. Although Article 6 of the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection 
Procedure states that it also applies to fishing entities, it does not clarify the rights and 
obligations of fishing entities.   
    The Technical and Compliance Committee in its third regular session in 2007 (TCC 3) 
adopted the High Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedure (Revised)
29(the revised 
procedure). Paragraph 8 further indicates that the contracting parties in Article 13 of the 
WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure should provide details about the vessel and 
the names of the authorities responsible for boarding and inspection. Paragraph 8 includes 
a footnote on the term ‘contracting parties’ which reiterates Article 6 of the WCPFC 
Boarding and Inspection Procedure. This footnote further explains that ‘it follows that 
when a Contracting Party notifies the Commission that the High Seas Boarding and 
                                                      
29  WCPFC-TCC3-2007-11, in the Third Regular Session of WCPFC Technical and Compliance Committee is 
available on the official WCPFC website, 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc-tcc3-2007-11/high-seas-boarding-and-inspection-procedures-rev-1 (visited 
on 05/04/2012).  
117 
 
Inspection Procedures apply in their entirety as between that Contracting Party and a 
Fishing Entity, the operational guidelines for implementing the Procedures will also apply 
to the Fishing Entity concerned’. This suggests that fishing entities might have equality 
status if a contracting party has made such a notification. 
    Neither the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure nor the revised procedure 
clarifies fishing entities’ legal status. Neither clearly indicates whether the fishing entity to 
which it refers is a fishing entity which has already acceded to the WCPFC Convention and 
become a member of WCPFC according to the Arrangement for the Participation of 
Fishing Entities or a fishing entity which remains outside the WCPFC regime. However, as 
it is unnecessary for fishing entities to deliver another notification to the commission 
expressing their agreement to apply the procedure to one another, the possible inference is 
that fishing entities can go beyond their status as members of WCPFC and outside the 
WCPFC boarding and inspection regime, which implies that contracting parties and fishing 
entities can board and inspect each other’s vessels only through bilateral treaties.
30 
This ambiguity causes uncertainty in fishing entities’ status in the WCPFC Boarding 
and Inspection Procedure. Furthermore, states cooperate with each other to enforce fishery 
resources conservation and management measures through boarding and inspection at the 
multilateral level, i.e. through RFMOs, which is more far-reaching than the bilateral level. 
The effectiveness of the multilateral cooperation might be decreased if the relation between 
fishing entities and states is returned to the level of bilateral treaties, rather than bringing 
them all into a common regime. Doing so might make whether conservation and 
management measures can be carried out dependent upon the willingness of fishing entities. 
This practice would deviate from the main purpose of establishing RFMOs: to bring all 
actors under conservation and management measures if a fishing entity would like to 
escape from monitoring.
31 
    The other possible interpretation is that fishing entities have no choice but to allow 
their vessels to be boarded and inspected but themselves may not board and inspect others’ 
vessels. However, this interpretation might push fishing entities away from compliance 
with the boarding and inspection procedure, even those adopted by RFMOs, if they have 
obligations but no rights in the procedure. It might also influence their willingness to 
                                                      
30  The related inference is discussed in Chapter 5, pp. 100–101, of this thesis. 
31  Also see Chapter 5, p. 101, of this thesis.  
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participate in the RFMOs, leading again to deviations from the main objective of RFMOs 
to bring all actors into the conservation and management regimes. 
 
5. Conclusion 
International fisheries law and RFMOs’ regulations encourage and expect that fishing 
entities will be bound by them like states in order to effectively carry out conservation and 
management measures. However, under present regulations, RFMOs’ agreements and 
documents are the only regulations by which a fishing entity might be bound. In addition, 
with respect to high seas enforcement, the UNFSA expects that, through the UNFSA’s or 
RFMOs’ boarding and inspection procedures, states can board and inspect each other’s 
vessels at the multilateral level. Fishing entities, though, cannot become state parties to the 
UNFSA and thus are excluded from such high seas enforcement, whereas according to the 
UNFSA, state parties may conduct boarding and inspections on each other’s vessels. 
Although the WCPFC has adopted its own boarding and inspection procedure, a fishing 
entity and other states may board and inspect each other’s vessels only through notification 
from both sides. Therefore, fishing entities still may not conduct high seas boarding and 
inspections on the multilateral level but only on the bilateral. These problems facing 
fishing entities in regulations regarding high seas enforcement might affect the 
effectiveness of conservation and management measures on the high seas. In the following 
chapters, we consider the example of Taiwan, as the only fishing entity so far to participate 
in RFMOs, and its status in high seas enforcement under various related regimes. 
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III. PRACTICE WITHIN REGIONAL FISHERIES ORGANISATIONS—THE 
EXAMPLE OF TAIWAN 
 
 
CHAPTER 7 Membership 
 
1. Introduction 
Taiwan is a major distant-water fishing nation with respect to straddling and highly 
migratory stocks. Hence, it is significant that Taiwan can make a great contribution to the 
whole conservation and management system. Bringing this strong fishing actor into a 
controlled regime is necessary. The UNFSA created the term ‘fishing entity’ for Taiwan, 
giving Taiwan a legal basis in the regime of RFMOs so that their conservation and 
management measures could be implemented effectively. At present, only Taiwan 
participates in RFMOs under the identity of fishing entity. This unusual situation stems 
from the long-running dispute between Taiwan and China, which tries to prevent Taiwan 
from being directly or indirectly recognised as a state in the international community. The 
purpose of this chapter is to discuss Taiwan’s participation as a fishing entity in RFMOs. 
This chapter first reviews the background of Taiwan’s participation in RFMOs as a fishing 
entity, functioning as but not possessing the status of a state. This chapter then considers 
the linkage between Taiwan and the 1995 agreement and finally the process of Taiwan’s 
participation as a member in the RFMOs which comprise the WCPFC, IATTC and ISC. 
 
2. Taiwan’s Special Status in International Law—The Reason to be a Fishing Entity 
2.1 Background 
During the Ching Dynasty
1, Taiwan was part of China until the conclusion of Treaty of 
Shimonoseki
2  in 1895 which ended a war between China and Japan. China lost the war 
and, in the Treaty of Shimonoseki, agreed to cede territories, including Taiwan, Penghu 
Islands and the surrounding small islands, to Japan. Under the treaty, Taiwan became a 
                                                      
1  The Ching Dynasty was the last monarchy in China and lasted from 1644 to 1912. 
2  The full text of the treaty can be found at 
http://china.usc.edu/(S(u0o4uo4552nc4b45rm1khibm)A(4BUbwWp7zQEkAAAAZDlkMDBjYTctYjM1NC00OD
g1LWE5YjgtYTg4NGE0ZDc0ODU4BJSk2ve3v12T5hSKPbdqc1b-n8A1))/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=405&Aspx
AutoDetectCookieSupport=1 (visited on 01/06/2012).  
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Japanese colony until 1945 when Japanese rule was ended by politics and war, not the 
Treaty of Shimonoseki itself.
3 
    Meanwhile, the Ching Dynasty was overthrown on 10 October 1911 by the Kuo Min 
Tang Party (the Nationalist Party, the KMT) in a revolution.
4  The Republic of China 
(ROC), which was the successor to the Ching Dynasty and ended more than two thousand 
years monarchy in China, was established on 1
t January 1912. After the Ching Dynasty 
was overturned, various warlords caused civil wars. To control effectively the whole 
territory of China, the ROC became involved in those wars. Furthermore, the Communist 
Party was established in July 1921.
5  Against this background, war between China and 
Japan broke out in 1937 and became the Far East battlefield of the Second World War after 
Japan joined the Axis in 1940 and China joined the Allies in 1941.
6  The war was ended in 
1945 with the surrender of Japan; afterwards, the ROC was delegated by the Allies to take 
over Taiwan. At that time, the ROC was an original member state and permanent member 
of UN Security Council in the UN.
7  However, although China’s external war was ended, 
its civil war with the Communist Party did not cease. The Communist Party established the 
People’s Republic of China (PRC)
8  on 1 October 1949, and on 7 December, the ROC 
military withdrew from mainland China to Taiwan.
9 
 
2.2 Loss of Membership in the United Nations 
Since the establishment of the PRC, it has followed its One China Policy which claims that 
there is only one China, the PRC is the only legitimate representative of China and Taiwan 
is a part of China.
10  At the request of 17 members
11  during the 26
th Session of the UN 
                                                      
3  See Denny Roy, Taiwan: A Political History (New York: Cornell University Press, 2003), pp. 32–54. 
4  At that time, it was still a revolutionary group; it was formed with the name of KMT in August 1912. See 
Jonathan Fenby, Generalissimo: Chiang Kai-Shek and the China He Lost (London: Free Press, 2005), p. 30; p. 
35. 
5  Information about the Communist Party of China can be seen at http://www.chinatoday.com/org/cpc/ 
(visited on 01/06/2012). 
6  Japan invaded China in 1931 and declared the Great East Asia Coprosperity Sphere in 1940. 
7  See the official UN website, http://www.un.org/en/aboutun/history/index.shtml (visited on 01/06/2012); 
and http://www.un.org/sc/members.asp (visited on 01/06/2012). 
8  The PRC divides China into 23 provinces (including Taiwan although it has never been actually controlled 
by the PRC), 5 autonomous regions, 4 municipalities directly under the jurisdiction of the Central 
Government and 2 special administrative divisions (Hong Kong and Macao). 
9  See Roy, supra note 3, pp. 55-75. 
10  See the official website of the PRC government, http://www.gov.cn/test/2005-07/29/content_18293.htm 
(visited on 01/06/2012). The One China Policy is the PRC’s core discourse in international forum touching 
upon the Taiwan issue. On 14 March 2005, the PRC adopted the Anti-Secession Law which codified the ‘One 
China Policy’. The full text of the Anti-Secession Law is available at 
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General Assembly on 15 July 1971, the question of the restoration of the lawful rights of 
the People’s Republic of China in the United Nations was placed on the provisional agenda. 
These 17 members stated that China was a founding member of the UN and a permanent 
member of the Security Council and that the PRC was the only representative of China.
12 
On 25 September 1971, draft resolution A/L.630
13  was submitted to the General 
Assembly by 23 members (including the previous 17 members). The draft resolution 
A/L.630 requested that the General Assembly restore to the PRC all its rights and expel the 
representatives of Chiang Kai-shek, who was the leader of the ROC.
14  Another draft 
resolution A/L.632 opposing resolution A/L.630 was submitted by 22 member states
15  on 
29 September 1971. Resolution A/L.632 declared that any proposal in the General 
Assembly which would result in depriving the ROC of representation in the UN was an 
important question under Article 18 of the UN Charter, which would require it to be 
decided by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting.
16  On 25 October 1971, 
resolution A/L.632 was rejected.
17   
The United States was aware that the situation was favourable to the PRC, so through 
another section motion
18, it tried to retain the ROC’s membership in the UN, resulting in 
two China representatives (implying two states) if resolution A/L.630 were adopted.
19 
However, this motion failed, and the General Assembly adopted draft resolution A/L.630 
by a roll-call vote of 76–35, with 17 abstentions, as resolution 2758 (XXVI)
20. Before the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200503/14/eng20050314_176746.html (visited on 01/06/2012). 
11  These members are Albania, Algeria, Cuba, Democratic Republic of Yemen, Guinea, Iraq, Mali, 
Mauritania, the People’s Republic of the Congo, Romania, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, Tanzania, Yemen, 
Yugoslavia and Zambia. 
12  See the UN website, http://untreaty.un.org/cod/repertory/art3/english/rep_supp5_vol1-art3_e.pdf 
(visited on 01/06/2012). 
13  Further information about the A/L.630 is available at 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2758(XXVI)&Lang=E&Area=RESOLUTION 
(visited on 25/02/2014). 
14  See the UN website, supra note 12. 
15  These states are Australia, Bolivia, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Fiji, Gambia, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Japan, Lesotho, Liberia, Mauritius, New Zealand, Nicaragua, the Philippines, 
Swaziland, Thailand, the United States and Uruguay. 
16  See the UN website, supra note 12. 
17  Ibid.   
18  The representative of the United States subsequently proposed another motion that suggested that a 
separate vote be taken on including the words ‘and to expel forthwith the representatives of Chiang 
Kai-shek from the place which they unlawfully occupied at the United Nations and in all the organizations 
related to it’ in the operative paragraph of draft resolution A/L.630. 
19  See Denny Roy, supra note 3, pp. 130–135. 
20  The full text of the A/RES/2758(XXVI) is available on the UN website, 
http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/327/74/IMG/NR032774.pdf?OpenElement 
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adoption of the 2758 resolution, the ROC was aware that the resolution would be adopted 
so it decided to withdraw from UN membership in advance.
21  Since then, the ROC usually 
has been called ‘Taiwan’ because the territories under its control are Taiwan and 
surrounding islands. 
 
2.3 The Present—The Reality of International Relations 
Although the ROC was compelled to withdraw from the UN, the competition between 
ROC and PRC to represent China in international forums has never stopped. The ROC’s 
main strategy was to establish formal diplomatic relations with other states which 
recognise it as the legal representative of China.
22  However, since the PRC took the 
ROC’s seat in the UN, the ROC’s seat in other international organisations has also replaced 
by the PRC, and most states chose to transfer their formal diplomatic relations from the 
ROC to the PRC.
23  Therefore, the ROC gradually adopted another strategy of positively 
participating in international organisations, which it is easier and less costly to achieve than 
establishing diplomatic relations with states. The purpose of this strategy is to remind the 
international community that the ROC is an independent state not controlled by the PRC, 
to increase its visibility in international forum and to prevent being marginalised. 
In contrast, to carry out the One China Policy, the PRC’s strategy is to prevent the 
ROC from being recognised as a state. Accordingly, the PRC seeks to establish formal 
foreign relations with states that had foreign relations with ROC. The PRC also attempts to 
limit the ROC’s international space, including rejecting any possibility for the ROC to 
                                                                                                                                                                 
(visited on 07/06/2012). 
21  See Peter S.C. Ho, ‘The Impact of the Fish Stocks Agreement on Taiwan’s Participation in International 
Fisheries Fora’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 145, note 11. 
22  One method the ROC uses to establish or maintain diplomatic relations with states is foreign aid. 
Sometimes, a state might exploit this weakness to request money from both the ROC and the PRC and then 
pick sides; this is called dollar diplomacy. The states which have established formal diplomatic relations with 
the ROC are Belize, Burkina Faso, the Dominican Republic, Republic of El Salvador, Republic of the Gambia, 
Republic of Guatemala, Republic of Haiti, The Holy See, Republic of Honduras, Republic of Kiribati, Republic 
of the Marshall Islands, Republic of Nauru, Republic of Nicaragua, Republic of Palau, Republic of Panama, 
Republic of Paraguay, Saint Christopher and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, the 
Democratic Republic of Sao Tome and Principe, Solomon Islands, Kingdom of Swaziland and Tuvalu. 
23  States that terminated diplomatic relations with the ROC usually changed their embassies to ‘offices’ or 
‘agencies’ in order to still dealing with foreign affairs involving Taiwan. For example, the embassy of the 
ROC in the United States became the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United 
States, and the embassy of the United States in the ROC the American Institute in Taiwan, Taipei Office; the 
embassy of the ROC in Canada the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Canada, and the embassy of 
Canada in the ROC the Canadian Trade Office in Taipei; the embassy of the ROC in the UK the Taipei 
Representative Office in the UK, and the embassy of the UK in the ROC the British Trade and Cultural Office.  
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participate in international organisations, especially those which might indirectly recognise 
the ROC as a state. 
    Facing opposition from the PRC, the ROC uses many different identities and names to 
join international organisations. For example, in 1991, the ROC used the name Chinese 
Taipei to join the APEC.
24  Then, it became a member of World Trade Organization (WTO) 
with the identity and name of the Separate Customs Territory of Taiwan, Penghu, Kinmen 
and Matsu on 1 January 2002.
25  It participated in the International Competition Network 
(ICN)
26  under the identity and the name of the Taiwan Fair Trade Commission in 2001. In 
2010, the ROC joined the International Council for Information Technology in 
Government Administration (ICA)
27  under the identity of state named Taiwan. 
    In the maritime field, according to the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous 
Zone of the Republic of China
28, Taiwan claims that its territorial sea and contiguous zone 
extend 12 and 24 nautical miles from the baseline and outer limits, which is determined by 
a combination of straight baseline in principle and normal baseline as exception.
29  Under 
this law, the official maritime chart of the baseline and outer limits of territorial sea and 
contiguous zone of Taiwan was promulgated by the administrative department. In addition, 
pursuant to Article 2 of the Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental 
                                                      
24  The first occasion for the ROC to use the name ‘Chinese Taipei’ to participate in an international 
organisation and avoid the political sensitivity of the One China Policy happened in 1981 when the ROC 
joined the International Olympic Committee (IOC), which had intended to block the ROC from continuing as 
a member. See Ho, supra note 21, pp. 145–146, note 17. All APEC members are called ‘economies’, which 
identifies them as economic entities; hence, this organization does not raise the issue of the ROC’s status as 
a state. See APEC, http://www.apec.org/About-Us/About-APEC/Member-Economies.aspx (visited on 
08/06/2012). 
25  See WTO, http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/countries_e/chinese_taipei_e.htm (visited on 
08/06/2012). 
26  See the ICN website, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/members/member-directory.aspx 
(visited on 11/06/2012). 
27  See the ICA website, 
http://www.ica-it.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=53&Itemid=85 (visited on 
11/06/2012). Those are examples of international organisations that the ROC has joined. There are still 
many organisations in which Taiwan is a member, including the IATTC, Advisory Centre on WTO Law, 
Standards and Trade Development Facility, WCPFC, Extended Commission for CCSBT, ISC, Association of 
Asian Election Authorities, Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering, Central American Bank for Economic 
Integration, South East Asian Central Banks, Asian Development Bank, International Cotton Advisory 
Committee, International Seed Testing Association, Asian Productivity Organization, World Organization for 
Animal Health and International Organization of Securities Commissions. 
28  The Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic of China was adopted and 
entered into force on 21 January 1998. The full text is available at 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0000009 (visited on 02/04/2014). 
29  See articles 3, 4 and 14 of the Law on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone of the Republic of 
China.  
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Shelf of the Republic of China
30, Taiwan’s EEZ is the sea area contiguous to the outer 
limits of the territorial sea and to a distance measuring outwardly 200 nautical miles from 
the baseline of the territorial sea. However, because Taiwan’s EEZ overlaps with that of the 
PRC, the Philippines and Japan and there is no consensus on the borders of their EEZs, 
Taiwan has not promulgated a formal maritime chart of the outer limit of EEZ but in 2003 
declared a temporary EEZ enforcement area in order to protect its fisheries within the 
EEZ.
31  The PRC, the Philippines and Japan did not publicly disagree with Taiwan’s 
declaration concerning its territorial sea and temporary EEZ enforcement area. However, 
without consensus on delimitation of the overlapping EEZs, there remain many disputes 
among these states caused by fishing in these overlapping areas. According to official 
Taiwanese statistics, 2371 fishing vessels illegally trespassed in the temporary EEZ 
enforcement area in 2013; 97% of these vessels were Chinese nationals, and only 3% of 
other nationalities.
32  The enactment and declaration of a territorial sea, EEZ or even a 
temporary EEZ enforcement area reflect the reality of Taiwan’s practice as a maritime actor. 
Although many Chinese vessels conducting illegal fishing within the Taiwanese temporary 
EEZ enforcement area are expelled, arrested and penalised, the PRC government does not 
respond to these events or attempt to oppose the enforcement by the Taiwanese 
government. 
In 2013, Taiwan and Japan concluded a fishery agreement which does not delimit the 
EEZs but outlines an overlapping EEZ area between Taiwan and Japan and allows vessels 
of both nations to fish there.
33  The agreement was signed by the Association of East Asian 
                                                      
30  The Law on the Exclusive Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the Republic of China was adopted 
and entered into force on 21 January 1998. The full text is available at 
http://law.moj.gov.tw/Eng/LawClass/LawAll.aspx?PCode=A0000010 (visited on 02/04/2014). 
31  See the official website of the Coast Guard Administration, Executive Yuan, available at 
http://www.cga.gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/ct?xItem=5138&ctNode=891&mp=999 (visited on 02/04/2014). 
The temporary EEZ enforcement area was delimited pursuant to Article 4 of the Law on the Exclusive 
Economic Zone and the Continental Shelf of the Republic of China, which reads: ‘In the event that the 
exclusive economic zone or the continental shelf of the Republic of China overlaps with the adjacent or 
opposite countries, the Republic of China may negotiate, on the principle of equality, a delimitation line 
with those of the adjacent or opposite countries. 
Prior to agreements mentioned in the preceding paragraph, the Republic of China and the adjacent or 
opposite countries, in a spirit of understanding and co-operation, may reach a modus vivendi. 
Such a modus vivendi as prescribed in the preceding paragraph shall be without prejudice to the final 
delimitation’. 
32  In addition, 58% of these fishing vessels illegally trespassing were expelled by Taiwanese Coast Guard; 
the remaining 42% were arrested and penalised. Statistics concerning illegal trespass fishing can be found 
on the official website of the Coast Guard Administration, Executive Yuan, available at 
http://www.cga.gov.tw/GipOpen/wSite/public/Attachment/f1394179647548.pdf (visited on 04/04/2014). 
33  The title of this agreement is translated as The Fishery Agreement between the Association of East Asian 
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Relations
34  and the Interchange Association,
35  quasi-official diplomatic units in Taiwan 
and Japan. This agreement not only illustrates again Taiwan’s practice as a maritime actor 
but also reflects the reality that Japan de jure does not recognise Taiwan as a state but de 
facto recognises its position concerning the EEZ and the temporary EEZ enforcement area; 
Japan thus can be regarded as treating Taiwan as a de facto state. 
    The methods employed to conduct Taiwan’s relations with Japan can be observed in 
Taiwan’s relations with many other states. The majority of states agree to follow the One 
China Policy and so de jure do not establish official diplomatic relation with Taiwan or 
recognise it as an independent state. However, they do not completely cut off ties with 
Taiwan but establish quasi-official diplomatic channels to deal with affairs with Taiwan. 
For example, states change the name of embassies to ‘offices’ or ‘agencies’. Such practices 
treat Taiwan as a de facto state.
36  Many international governmental organisations, 
including RFMOs, approach Taiwan similarly. Following the One China Policy, Taiwan is 
de jure refused participation in RFMOs but allowed to participate de facto under the 
identity of a fishing entity. This trend implies that although the international community 
follows the One China Policy, it acknowledges that Taiwan is not controlled by the PRC. 
No matter what identity and name the ROC uses, it clearly participates in international 
organisations by emphasising its functions in different domains. Since the 1995 UNFSA 
introduced the term ‘fishing entities’ into its provisions, Taiwan has seen that this term 
emphasises its function of fishing and may offer an opportunity to participate in RFMOs 
by using the identity of fishing entity. To understand Taiwan’s practices in participating in 
RFMOs, including the process by which Taiwan accepts using the identity of fishing entity, 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Relations and the Interchange Association. The full text can be found on the official website of Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Taiwan, available at 
http://no06.mofa.gov.tw/mofatreatys/ShowPicOut.aspx?FileFolder=00&FileName=002013/04/10_C.pdf 
(visited on 04/04/2014). 
34  The Association of East Asian Relations, which was established in 1972, is an agency under the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan. It deals with the foreign affairs between Taiwan and Japan. Further 
information can be found on the website of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Taiwan, available at 
http://www.mofa.gov.tw/EnOfficial/Organization/DepartmentDetail/f510b84f-5e22-4fd5-b911-9d3414145
6b4 (visited on 08/04/2014). 
35  The Interchange Association was founded in 1972 when Japan established diplomatic relations with the 
PRC, which required terminating diplomatic relations with the ROC. The Interchange Association serves as 
the representative office of Japan in Taiwan, dealing with foreign affairs between Taiwan and Japan. The 
Interchange Association and the Association of East Asian Relations have functioned as the channel for 
negotiation and coordination between the two countries. Further information can be found on the 
Interchange Association’s website, http://www.koryu.or.jp/taipei-tw/ez3_contents.nsf/Top (visited on 
08/04/2014). 
36  For the examples, see supra note 23.  
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the following section discusses relations between Taiwan and the 1995 agreement and 
Taiwan’s participation in RFMOs with the identity of fishing entities with different names. 
 
3. Relation between Taiwan and the United Nations Fishing Stocks Agreement 
Although Article 1(3) of the UNFSA stipulates that it can apply to fishing entities whose 
vessels fish on the high seas, the agreement never defines the term ‘fishing entity’. Neither 
is there any public record explaining to what the term ‘fishing entity’ refers in the 
agreement.
37  However, the authors of some related literature either believe that the 
regulations concerning fishing entities in the agreement were created especially for Taiwan 
or consider that they can be applied to Taiwan. Hasjim Djalal writes: 
It is clear that the provisions in UNFSA on fishing entities were intended primarily to 
deal with the fishing vessels flying the flag of Taiwan.
38 
David Anderson, leader of the UK delegation to the UNFSA conference, writes: 
The Agreement is seemingly intended to be applicable in principle to a ‘fishing 
entity’ whose vessels fish on the high seas; Taiwan may have been in mind.
39 
Furthermore, while analysing the 1995 agreement, David A. Balton, legal adviser in the 
U.S. State Department, considers that   
Taiwan is not a member of the United Nations and did not participate in the 
conference except as an observer, despite the fact that many high seas fishing 
vessels are registered in its territory. Article 1(3) and 17(3) of the agreement 
provide a means to encourage compliance by vessels of Taiwan with rules of the 
agreement and with those of regional fishery organizations. Following adoption of 
the agreement, Taiwanese officials expressed willingness to abide by its 
parameters.
40 
Scholar Francisco Orrego Vicuña writes in his book: 
Another novel provision on participation is that applying the 1995 Agreement 
mutatis mutandis to ‘other fishing entities whose vessels fish on the high seas’. 
                                                      
37  See Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, ‘Fishing Entities: Their Emergence, Evolution, and Practice from Taiwan’s 
Perspective’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 153. 
38  Hasjim Djalal, ‘The Emergence of the Concept of Fishing Entities: A Note’, Ocean Development and 
International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 119. 
39  David H. Anderson, ‘The Straddling Stocks Agreement of 1995—An Initial Assessment’, International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 45(1996), p. 468. 
40  David A. Balton, ‘Strengthening the Law of the Sea: The New Agreement on Straddling Fish Stocks and 
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 27(1996), p. 149, footnote 
73.  
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While intended to cover the situation of Taiwan as a major fishing operator in the 
world ….
41 
He further comments: 
The third step envisaged by the 1995 Agreement is to make its provisions applicable 
to other fishing entities. The 1995 Agreement applies mutatis mutandis to other 
fishing entities, a provision intended to take care of the particular legal situation of 
Taiwan.
42 
In the Letter of Submittal from the U.S. State Department to President W.J. Clinton on 24 
January 1996, Warren Christopher, the secretary of state, points out that Articles 1(3) and 
17(3) open a door for Taiwan to participate in RFMOs. 
Article 17(3), along with Article 1(3), also provides a mechanism through which 
Taiwan, and the many fishing vessels flying the Taiwanese flag, may be brought 
within the ambit of such organizations.
43 
These views indicate the link between the term ‘fishing entities’ in the agreement and 
Taiwan. However, there is no public record further explaining fishing entities or the term’s 
possible relation to Taiwan in the UNFSA Conference. The reason why cannot be stated 
with certainty but still needs to be traced to the political circumstances of Taiwan’s status 
in international society. Nien-Tsu Alfred Hu, a member of the Presidential Advisory 
Council for Science and Technology in Taiwan, speculated that there is no public record 
and the term ‘fishing entities’ is plural because ‘no one wanted to single out Taiwan at an 
international conference officially sponsored by and held at U.N. Headquarters’. Although 
it is hard to prove whether this guess is correct, one thing which is certain is that the strong 
opposition of China to Taiwan creates its tough situation in the international community.   
    Nevertheless, although the UNFSA introduces the term ‘fishing entities’ which can be 
applied by Taiwan, the Taiwan government initially worried whether the term would also 
cover private fishing firms or other nongovernmental organisations because Taiwan’s core 
interest in participating in international organisations is to increase its visibility in 
international fora and present its case for independence from China.
44  These concerns 
                                                      
41  Francisco Orrego Vicuña, The Changing International Law of High Seas Fisheries (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1999), p. 139. 
42  Ibid., pp. 212-213. 
43  See the Second Session of the 104
th Congress in United States, Senate Treaty Document 104-24. The full 
text can be found at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CDOC-104tdoc24/pdf/CDOC-104tdoc24.pdf (visited on 
11/06/2012), p. X. 
44  See Hu, supra note 37, p. 155.  
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were soon relieved because Article 1(3) shows that the agreement applies to only fishing 
entities and states. The provisions in Part V on the Duties of the Flag State and Part VI on 
Compliance and Enforcement cannot be applied to private firms or nongovernmental 
organisations which lack the capacity to perform the responsibilities of a flag state or to 
cooperate with other states to conduct high seas fisheries enforcement.
45 
Furthermore, Article 17(3) indicates that fishing entities shall enjoy benefits from 
participation in the fishery commensurate with their commitment to comply with 
conservation and management measures adopted by RFMOs. From Taiwan’s point of view, 
this article creates a fair condition because, if it is willing to fulfil obligations just like state 
parties, then it can also possess the same rights as they. This implies the possibility that 
fishing entities can have equal status as contracting parties in RFMOs, although Taiwan 
would soon realise that its status could never be equal because RFMOs do not regard 
fishing entities as states. They do, however, make the obligations and rights of a 
contracting party and a fishing entity as similar as possible.
46 
Before the adoption of the UNFSA, Taiwan was not a member of any RFMO. The 
1995 agreement created an approach for Taiwan to participate in international fisheries 
organisations. Under the identity of fishing entity, Taiwan has become a member of the 
WCPFC, IATTC and ISC and has influenced other RFMOs of which it is not a member, 
such as the CCSBT and ICCAT. 
 
4. Taiwan’s Participation as a Member in Regional Fisheries Management 
Organisations 
4.1 Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission 
A. Taiwan’s Participation 
As the western and central Pacific lacked a RFMO to manage fishery resources, the Pacific 
Islands Forum Fisheries Agency
47  called for a conference on south Pacific tuna fisheries to 
adopt a convention and establish a RFMO. This call led to the seven sessions of the 
Multilateral High-Level Conference in the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific (MHLC) from 1994 to 2000. The 
process of drafting the WCPFC Convention concerning Taiwan’s participation in the 
                                                      
45  Ibid. 
46  Ibid. Hu suggests that Article 17(3) provides a balanced approach to solving the problem for Taiwan as a 
non-contracting party. 
47  See Chapter 3, p. 44, fn 2, of this thesis.  
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MHLCs reflected the intense competition between the ROC and the PRC. The first MHLC 
was held in December 1994 in the Solomon Islands, a state which had formal diplomatic 
relations with the ROC and recognised it as a state. Taiwan saw it as a good opportunity to 
participate under its official name, the ROC.
48  However, this was not allowed because it 
conflicted with the One China Policy adopted by the PRC and the states with diplomatic 
relations with it. As a result, Taiwan refused to participate in this meeting.
49 
    Taiwan started participating in the MHLC2, held in 1997 in the Marshall Islands 
which also had official relations with the ROC. During the process of negotiating Taiwan’s 
participation, the PRC suggested the names of Taiwan, China or China-Taiwan, but Taiwan 
refused both and eventually agreed to use the name Chinese Taipei which was also 
accepted by most participants.
50  Interestingly, the delegation of Chinese Taipei was seated 
at the table under the letter ‘T’, between Solomon Islands and Tonga, in order to not only 
avoid the embarrassment of being seated next to the PRC delegation but also to implicitly 
reflect Taiwan’s actual status as not subordinate to China but equal to other participating 
states.
51  As another compromise, national flags were not displayed inside or outside the 
meeting room, nor were official designations listing participants in the meeting 
recording.
52 
In its opening statement at MHLC2, Taiwan stated that it would participate under the 
identity of a fishing entity:   
As a fishing entity defined in the [UNFSA] and as an active fishing nation
53  in the 
region, we see ourselves as a constructive force in the formulation of any possible 
regional arrangement which satisfies the mutual interests of both coastal and 
fishing nations. We intend to collaborate with all parties concerned on a basis of 
equality, full participation and full membership to work out a regional 
arrangement which reflects and embodies the spirit and letter of [UNCLOS] and 
the [UNFSA].
54 
                                                      
48  Michael W. Lodge, ‘The Practice of Fishing Entities in Regional Fisheries Management Organizations: The 
Case of the Commission for the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific Ocean’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 187. 
49  Ibid. 
50  Ibid. Also see Hu, supra note 37, p. 158. 
51  Lodge, supra note 48, p. 188. 
52  Ibid. 
53  Here, ‘fishing nation’ means a fishing state. This designation reflects Taiwan’s position that it regards 
itself as a state, although it uses the identity of fishing entity to participate in the meeting. 
54  Hu, supra note 37, p. 158.  
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Since Taiwan was the only participant with the identity of fishing entity, it is clear that, at 
least in the following MHLCs, the discussion or articles concerning fishing entities 
specifically referred to Taiwan. The other significant matter regarding Taiwan in the 
MHLC2 was its adoption of the Majuro Declaration, which put fishing entities in the same 
position as states
55  and implied that fishing entities possess rights and obligations equal to 
coastal and other states under the UNFSA. 
    In an opening statement, the chairman expressed the necessity of Taiwan’s 
participation to increase the effectiveness of fisheries conservation and management of the 
WCPFC and further called on all participants to restrain from raising political issues. 
If we are going to have an effective regime for fisheries conservation and 
management in the region then it is obvious that all those who belong to the region 
or fish in the region must be involved. The participation of Chinese Taipei in this 
regard is on that basis. The present arrangement for participation, however, does 
not determine its final relationship to any agreement that this Conference might 
adopt. In arriving at such a relationship I shall certainly consult with all parties 
concerned in order to find a solution which is not only practical and realistic but 
also appropriate. 
In the meantime I urge all participants not to raise political issues which detract 
us from the basic purpose of our meeting here which is to agree on a regime for 
the conservation and management of the highly migratory species in the central 
and western Pacific. I therefore ask for restraint on all sides in this matter.
56 
However, when the chairman’s proposed Draft Convention on the Conservation and 
Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean 
began to be discussed during MHLC4 in February 1999, the PRC exercised its political 
influence to limit Taiwan to participating as an observer under the designation of Taipei, 
China instead of Chinese Taipei.
57 
    At the end of the MHLC4, the chairman proposed a ‘Draft Preamble and Final 
Clauses for a Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish 
Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific’. It would allow fishing entities, after the 
convention has entered into force, to accept the regime of the convention and open the 
                                                      
55  Regarding the Majuro Declaration, see Chapter 3, p. 45, of this thesis. 
56  Hu, supra note 37, p. 159. 
57  Ibid.  
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commission to full participation by those fishing entities. Article 43(2) reads: ‘After the 
entry into force of this Convention, the Commission shall also be open to full participation 
by fishing entities referred to in Article 35, paragraph 3, which have affirmed their 
acceptance of the regime established by this Convention, in the same manner as members 
of the Commission’.
58  This draft of the final clause was discussed at MHLC5 in 
September 1999 but was rejection by both Taiwan and the PRC. 
    In the draft final clause at MHLC4, the PRC could not accept the provision allowing 
fishing entities to affirm their acceptance of the convention under the title of ‘Signature, 
ratification, formal confirmation, acceptance, approval, accession’ because such formal 
treaty language might imply that Taiwan, as a possible fishing entity, could be regarded as 
possessing equal status with states.
59  On the other hand, Taiwan was not satisfied with the 
notion of ‘full participation’, which was also used in territories’ participation, in Article 
43(2). Taiwan insisted on becoming a full member of the commission with the same rights 
and obligations as contracting parties.
60  Taiwan could not be confident whether it could 
obtain full membership status in the commission through ‘full participation’.
61 
Contradictorily, the PRC could not accept the notion of ‘full participation’ because it was 
too far from the status of an observer on which it insisted for Taiwan.
62  In addition, the 
draft granted Taiwan participation through expressing its consent to the ‘regime established 
by the Convention’ rather than the convention itself; thus, Taiwan doubted whether it had 
liberty to withdraw from the regime once it had accepted it.
63 
    To solve this problem, the chairman at MHLC5 issued a Revised Draft Convention on 
the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and 
                                                      
58  Ibid., p. 160. 
59  Lodge, supra note 48, p. 191. 
60  Ibid. 
61  Hu, supra note 37, p. 160. 
62  Lodge, supra note 48, p. 191. 
63  Therefore, Taiwan expressed its strong negative reaction to the draft in the opening statement: 
The texts of the draft Convention….with respect to the participation status of any fishing entity to the 
Convention are conceivably not workable for any democratic government. The rights and obligations of a 
fishing entity under the present framework are not parallel, and the requirements for obligations and 
compliance ensued from the present draft Convention will definitely have relevance to the assignment of 
sovereignty and sovereign rights to an international fisheries management body. On these two grounds, 
the executive and legislative bodies of a democratic government will not be able to endorse the draft 
Convention as the way it is. This situation will unfortunately force out a fishing entity with a democratic 
institution from the present Convention—a situation that no one likes to embrace. 
Mr. Chairman, we believe that the design and the languages of the present draft Convention with respect 
to the participation of a fishing entity to the Convention is not workable for us, which, in turn, may 
damage the future work and operation of the Convention itself. See Hu, supra note 37, p. 160.  
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Central Pacific Ocean, which retained the provisions of Article 35(3) but moved it to 
Article 42 under the title ‘Fishing Entities’, instead of ‘Signature, ratification, formal 
confirmation, acceptance, approval, accession’. Furthermore, this revised draft convention 
distinguished between contracting parties and member of the commission in Article 1(1)(d): 
“‘Contracting Parties” means States and regional economic integration organizations 
which have consented to be bound by this Convention and for which the Convention is in 
force’.
64  Article 1(2)(b) reads: ‘‘Member of the Commission’ means a Contracting Party 
and, as appropriate, any fishing entity referred to in article 42, which has affirmed its 
acceptance of the regime established by this Convention. Membership of the Commission 
does not in any way determine the legal or political status of any such fishing entity’.
65 
However, sensitive issues concerning Taiwan’s participation were still not resolved. With 
respect to Taiwan’s concern about withdrawal of its consent to the regime established by 
the convention, Article 41 of the Revised Draft Convention stipulated that a ‘member of 
the Commission may, by written notification addressed to the Depositary, withdraw from 
this Convention and may indicate its reasons’.
66 
    Before MHLC6, the chairman issued an Information Note on Matters before the Sixth 
Session of the MHLC describing how a fishing entity could become a member of the 
commission and possess the same rights and obligations as a contracting party: 
A significant amount of time during the fifth session was devoted to the issue of 
participation in the work of the Commission by fishing entities. The draft 
Convention text would allow a ‘fishing entity, being a separate customs territory 
possessing full autonomy in the conduct of its external commercial relations, and 
whose vessels fish for highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area’ to 
become a full member of the Commission with the same rights and obligations as a 
Contracting Party after affirming in writing its acceptance of the Convention 
regime. Such affirmation may be made only after entry into force of the Convention. 
The draft Convention text further provides that ‘[M]embership of the Commission 
does not in any way determine the legal or political status of any such fishing 
                                                      
64  MHLC/WP.1/Rev.4, available at 
http://www.spc.int/coastfish/Asides/conventions/MHLC/mhlc_sep99.htm (visited on 01/11/2010). 
65  Ibid. 
66  Hu, supra note 37, p. 161.  
133 
 
entity’. While the exchange of views on this issue was constructive, this sensitive 
issue remains to be concluded.
67 
The conflict between the ROC and the PRC reached a climax at MHLC6 in April 
2000. In an opening statement, Taiwan stated: 
[W]e have long actively and constructively participated in the activities of various 
regional and/or subregional fisheries organizations since we, as a major global 
fishing power, recognize the importance of conservation of fisheries resources of 
the high seas to all the fishing nations, and take into account the cooperative needs 
required by the international community as a whole. We believe that our equal 
participation and substantive cooperation could have at a very large extent 
contributed to the effectiveness of conservation and management of fisheries 
resources concerned. … We would like to highlight the value of conservation and 
management of this particular ‘common property’, the fisheries resources in the 
seas and oceans, and to contribute more to the realization of this value. … 
Mr. Chairman and my colleagues, I understand that you all are watching with 
great interest the recent development in Taiwan, especially after the presidential 
election. The result of the election once again proves to the world that a genuine 
democratic institution is functioning in Taiwan. At the same time, we anticipate 
that both sides of the Taiwan Straits will enter the World Trade Organization as 
two full members in this year. Against the backdrop of this new development, we 
believe that a Contracting Party status to the Convention for us is needed in order 
to secure congressional approval in our democratic institution. 
 
In considering the issue of our participation status, we have to recognize the fact 
that we are the one fully capable of exercising control over our own fishing vessels 
and are competent of exercising jurisdiction over fisheries matters provided for in 
this draft Convention. Thus, under the framework of this Convention, we are 
competent to bear the obligations and are entitled to enjoy the rights as other 
parties to this Convention. Mr. Chairman and dear colleagues, these are the 
crucial matters in considering our position vis-à-vis this regional regime or 
                                                      
67  See paragraph 18 of the ‘Information Note on Matters before the Sixth Session of the Multilateral 
High-Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific’, in the Report of MHLC6, p. 37.  
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organization. The needs for a comprehensive and inclusive fisheries conservation 
and management mechanism has been over and over again underscored by our 
Chairman Ambassador Nandan during the development of the 1995 [UNFSA]. 
Indeed, to constitute a comprehensive and inclusive instrument with regard to and 
with intention for an effective conservation and management of highly migratory 
fish stocks in this region, it would be a major defect were Taiwan not to be 
rendered a Contracting Party status, should this Conference so agree. It would 
certainly undermine the purpose and the effectiveness of this regional scheme that 
we are endeavoring to formulate.
68 
The PRC responded: 
Mr. Chairman, this morning, my colleague from Chinese Taipei mentioned the 
election in the island. We hold that the local election in Taiwan and the element of 
democracy and other irrelevant matters have nothing to do with fish stock 
conservation and management; and cannot be served as a reason for Chinese 
Taipei to participate in the future Commission, the composition of which should be 
based on UNCLOS and [UNFSA]. As a matter of fact, our colleague from Chinese 
Taipei has politicized the fishing issues in his opening statement on purpose. We 
are surprised and feel uncomfortable about it. We hold that our colleague from 
Chinese Taipei should honour the rule of the game that has been agreed upon by 
all participants, including Chinese Taipei, from the first session of the MHLC. 
Such attitude is by no means constructive to us. In order to spare more time to 
discuss other significant pending issues, we hope the Conference shall not allow 
this phenomenon to reoccur. 
 
The Chinese Government is of the opinion that fishing entities should be made to 
comply with the conservation regulations in the Convention area. But this should 
not impair the sovereignty of the State concerned, or it may lead to numerous 
political troubles in the future implementation of the Convention. We hold that the 
status of fishing entities has no inevitable and direct link with the conservation and 
management measures. We wish the Convention be worked out in the guidance of 
                                                      
68  See the Opening Statement of Chinese Taipei, in the Report of MHLC6, pp. 27-28. Also see Andrew Serdy, 
‘Bringing Taiwan into the International Fisheries Fold: the Legal Personality of a Fishing Entity’, in James 
Crawford and Vaughan Lowe, eds., The British Year Book of International Law 2004 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 2005, Vol. 75), pp. 210–213.  
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the principles of UNCLOS and [UNFSA], and the spirit of consensus as well to 
ensure a smooth adoption.
69 
The conflict and contradiction between Taiwan and the PRC was reflected not only in 
their statements but also in those by other states’ opening statements. Nine states with 
diplomatic relationships with or friendly to Taiwan either supported Taiwan in obtaining 
contracting party status or in participating fully. The other twelve delegations took no 
position.
70  During MHLC6, Taiwan expressed its anticipation of holding the same position, 
including the rights and obligations in the commission, as a contracting party, as expressed 
in two documents entitled Chinese Taipei’s Views on Our Participation as a Contracting 
Party to the MHLC Convention and Legal Arguments for the Participation of a Fishing 
Entity in Regional Fisheries Management Organisations in the Capacity of Contracting 
Party.
71  In contrast, the PRC proposed Our Position on the Position of Fishing Entity and a 
specific article concerning fishing entities. Both suggested that Taiwan become an observer 
of the commission and tried to prevent Taiwan from gaining the same status as other 
independent states. The documents would require the following text to be inserted in the 
draft convention: 
1.  After the entry into force of this Convention, any fishing entity, whose vessels fish 
for highly migratory fish stocks in the Convention Area, may confirm in writing to 
cooperate fully in the implementation of conservation and management measures 
adopted by the Commission. Such fishing entities shall enjoy benefits from the 
fishery commensurate with their commitment to comply with conservation and 
management measures in respect of the relevant stocks. 
2.  Fishing entities referred to in paragraph 1, may upon request and subject to the 
concurrence of the members of the Commission and to the rules of procedure 
                                                      
69  See the Opening Statement of China, in the Report of MHLC6, pp. 11–12. Also see Serdy, supra note 68, 
pp. 211–212. According to the record of Hu, a member of the Taiwanese delegation, the PRC requested the 
floor again using emotional language that did not appear in the official record, including the statements: 
‘Adolf Hitler was also elected by popular votes’, ‘Do not squeeze your Central Government’ and ‘Barrels of 
gun powder are ready for a small handful of separatists, if they dare to try it’. See Hu, supra note 37, p. 162. 
70  Five states Nauru, Palau, Solomon Islands, Tuvalu and the United States, supporting Taiwan in becoming 
a contracting party, and four states, Fiji, Marshall Islands, Papua New Guinea and Vanuatu, supported 
Taiwan’s full participation. The other 12 delegations were from Canada, the Federated States of Micronesia, 
Indonesia, Japan, Kiribati, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, the Philippines, Mexico, French Polynesia, New 
Caledonia and the European Community. 
71  Lodge, supra note 48, p. 192.  
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relating to the granting of observer status, be invited to attend meetings of the 
Commission as observers.
72 
    The views of Taiwan and the PRC could not be reconciled, making for difficult 
concerning the position of fishing entities difficult. The chairman consulted separately with 
both sides but still failed to find a compromise.
73  The difficult situation is exhibited in the 
chairman’s information note before MHLC7. 
The question of the relationship of fishing entities to the draft Convention has 
always been a particularly difficult issue. Unfortunately, it was not possible to 
make progress on this issue during the sixth session. The issue is a sensitive 
political matter for the two parties concerned, but it is equally important for all 
other participants in the Conference because they want to ensure that in any 
conservation and management regime all major actors are involved and comply 
with the regime that is being established. Most participants in the Conference 
would like to see an outcome which creates legal obligations on fishing entities 
and enables substantive participation. The difficulty is how to find a formula which 
creates a legally binding relationship without prejudging the legal and political 
status of such entities. At the end of the sixth session the Chairman had requested 
all concerned to give further thought to this matter and to show some flexibility.
74 
Another note from the chairman again states that the matter could go further; at a meeting 
with Japan, the United States, the PRC and Taiwan, the Chairman indicated that: 
Neither Japan nor the US had any new suggestions on this issue. Both feel that the 
chairman’s current proposal provides a basis for compromise between China and 
Chinese Taipei. I wish also to inform you that I have discussed the matter with 
both China and Chinese Taipei in recent weeks with the intention of clarifying 
their respective positions. While I have no further solutions to offer at this time, I 
will continue to work on the issue prior to MHLC7 and have urged both China and 
Chinese Taipei to do likewise.
75 
    In the opening statement of MHLC7 in August 2000, the PRC reiterated its position 
that a fishing entity could become only an observer. 
                                                      
72  Ibid. 
73  Ibid., p. 193. 
74  See paragraph 17 of the ‘Information Note on Matters before the Seventh Session of the Multilateral 
High-Level Conference on the Conservation and Management of Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the 
Western and Central Pacific’, in Annex 4 of the Report of MHLC7. 
75  Hu, supra note 37, p. 164.  
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[M]y delegation cannot accept the formulation on the issue of fishing entities in 
the current text of the draft Convention. The issue of fishing entities has been 
originated from the 1995 [UNFSA]. In accordance with [UNFSA], the issue of 
fishing entities should be deferred until the Commission is established for its 
consideration. In view that my delegation has agreed to invite the fishing entity to 
participate in the MHLC, my delegation is prepared to join the effort in making 
appropriate arrangement for fishing entities to participate in the future regime of 
the Convention for the purpose of both ensuring fishing entities bound by the 
conservation and management measures of the Convention and safeguarding the 
interests of fishing entities. However, my delegation cannot accept the view that the 
issue of fishing entities is a bilateral political issue; my delegation cannot accept 
the attempt to raise the political status of fishing entities; and my delegation 
cannot accept the move of some people to use the issue of fishing entities for other 
interests. Fishing is a commercial business. No matter how large the fishing fleet is, 
fishing is an industry. Fishing entities’ interests is fishing. … My delegation firmly 
believes that, as the Convention is intended to provide for the conservation and 
management measures for highly migratory fish stocks in western and central 
Pacific, all the fishing fleets should be bound by these measures but the 
Convention should not become an opportunity for fishing entities to raise status. 
Fishing entities could be involved in the work of the Commission but can do so 
only in the capacity of observer.
76 
Subsequently, the chairman held several informal and bilateral private meetings, but the 
ROC and the PRC never met face to face.
77  During the negotiation process, Taiwan felt 
that it had already made important political and legal compromises in its agreement to 
participate under the identity of a fishing entity and the name Chinese Taipei as its official 
nomenclature.
78 
The chairman indicated that most other participants did not accept the PRC’s 
insistence on observer status for fishing entities.
79  With respect to the decision-making 
matters, the PRC argued that Taiwan could not help decide the election of chairman and 
                                                      
76  The full text of statement is available at 
http://www.spc.int/coastfish/Asides/Conventions/MHLC/MHLC7rep.pdf (visited on 09/11/2010), p. 14. 
77  Hu, supra note 37, p. 165. 
78  Lodge, supra note 48, p. 193. 
79  Ibid.  
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vice-chairman, location of headquarters, appointment of executive director and adoption of 
rules, financial regulations and a budget.
80  Taiwan successfully argued that it was unfair to 
exclude it from deciding the budget and financial regulations because it would be a major 
contributor to the budget of the commission. The PRC agreed to comprise that Taiwan 
could participate in the election of a chairman, provided that the chairman was selected 
from the contracting parties.
81  In addition, while considering whether the convention 
should list all the matters in which Taiwan could participate in decision-making or the 
matters in which Taiwan could not, the Chairman proposed the latter.
82  As a result, the 
matters in which Taiwan could not participate were only the location of the headquarters 
and the appointment of the executive director. 
    Regarding the form and the nomenclature of the instrument that Taiwan could sign, 
the chairman preferred to use ‘declaration’ instead of ‘protocol’, which the PRC viewed 
with concern because it had connotations of a treaty.
83  Taiwan could not accept 
‘declaration’ because of its unilateral connotation. Instead of ‘declaration’, Taiwan 
suggested ‘Arrangement to Facilitate the Participation of Fishing Entities’, which the 
chairman immediately accepted with slight modification as ‘Arrangement for the 
Participation of Fishing Entities’.
84 
    During discussion of the remaining problems, it was agreed to put the detailed 
provisions concerning fishing entities into an annex to the convention.
85  Subsequently, a 
revised text of the Draft Convention on the Conservation and Management of Highly 
Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean was proposed and adopted 
on 4 September 2000. Taiwan signed the arrangement as a fishing entity by the name of 
‘Chinese Taipei on 5 September 2000 and became a member when the WCPFC was 
established on 19 June 2004. 
 
B. High Seas Boarding and Inspection 
Pursuant to Article 26 of the WCPFC Convention, the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection 
Procedure was adopted in 2006. In the procedure, the subjects which can be inferred to 
have the rights to board and inspect other members’ vessels are defined by the term 
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‘contracting party,’ and the subjects which can be inferred to have obligations to accept 
being boarded and inspected are described by the term ‘member of the commission’. As a 
result, contracting parties of the WCPFC Convention and the members of the commission 
might have different legal status under the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure. 
    During the drafting of the Procedure, it was not decided whether the subject of the 
procedure was ‘member of the commission’ or ‘contracting parties’. Taiwan suggested not 
adopting the latter. In a letter to the Convener of the Intersessional Working Group on High 
Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures, Mr. William Gibbons-Fly, Taiwan expressed its 
position that the authority to board and inspect fishing vessels on the high seas in the 
convention area should be available to all members of the commission.
86  It mentioned:   
[T]he restriction of the competence to board and inspect fishing vessels on the 
high seas in the Convention Area to Contracting Parties alone was not sustainable 
and was subsequently defeated, and thus not appeared in the final draft for the 
adoption. … It should not be argued again that the right to boarding and 
inspection is to be limited to Contracting Parties alone if the WCPFC Convention 
is going to be interpreted in good faith.
87 
However, the final version of the Boarding and Inspection Procedure was adopted as it still 
stands. It can be assumed that Taiwan objected to this outcome, but there is no record of 
how the decision was made or of the turning point from favouring member of the 
commission to contracting parties. 
Pursuant to Article 6 of the Procedure and Paragraph 8 of the Revised Procedure in 
2007, Taiwan and a contracting party which exchange notifications may board and inspect 
each other’s vessels.
88  Nevertheless, it is unclear whether the vessels of Taiwan can be 
boarded and inspected by a contracting party which does not make a notification, in other 
words, whether Taiwan needs to comply with the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection 
Procedure if there is no notification. For Taiwan, Article III of the Regulations for Coast 
Guard Administration to Conduct WCPFC High Seas Boarding and Inspection 
                                                      
86  See WCPFC-TCC2-2006-12, High Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures (Attachment 2-Chinese Taipei 
Comments 16 March 2006) and WCPFC-TCC2-2006-12, High Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures 
(Attachment 2–Chinese Taipei Comments 17 March 2006), available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc-tcc2-2006-12/high-seas-boarding-and-inspection-procedures-attachments 
(visited on 15/08/2012). 
87  WCPFC-TCC2-2006-12, High Seas Boarding and Inspection Procedures (Attachment 2–Chinese Taipei 
Comments 17 March 2006), p. 4. 
88  For an analysis of Article 6 of the Procedure and Paragraph 8 of the Revised Procedure in 2007, please 
see Chapter 6, pp. 111–118, of this thesis.  
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Procedures,
89  dated 1 May 2010, corresponds to the related regulations of WCPFC but 
fails to further explain them. This articles states that ‘[t]he boarding and inspection 
activities performed under the regulations are only applicable to fishing vessels whose 
countries agree to apply the WCPFC boarding and inspection procedures on high seas with 
Republic of China’. The answer is not revealed in the related regulations of either the 
WCPFC or Taiwan. 
In practice, Taiwan has 13 registered inspection vessels. The first nine were circulated 
by the executive director of WCPFC on 15 May 2008 and qualified to start boarding and 
inspection on 14 July 2008. Two other vessels were circulated on 1 June 2010 and on 23 
March 2011 respectively, and qualified to start boarding and inspection on 1 August 2010 
and 21 May 2011. The last two were circulated on 3 April 2013 and qualified to start 
boarding and inspection on 1 June 2013 (See Table 7.1).
90  With respect to notification 
from the contracting parties, by June 2012 six states—New Zealand (1 August 2008), Cook 
Islands (21 November 2008), the United States (12 August 2009), Japan (7 October 2009), 
France (4 December 2009) and Australia (on 29 September 2010)—had sent notification 
letters to the commission, expressing their consent to apply the WCPFC Boarding and 
Inspection Procedure between Taiwan and them.
91  The 1–6 October 2009 Report of the 
Fifth Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee (TCC5) mentions the conduct 
of boarding and inspection by Taiwan. It states that ‘Chinese Taipei deployed an inspection 
vessel for 89 days beginning in 6 October 2008 and has deployed two inspection vessels in 
2009. These vessels have focused on HSBI [High Seas Boarding and inspection] of 
Chinese Taipei and other vessels in the high seas pockets and on instructing the vessels to 
comply with WCPFC CMMs [Conservation and Management Measures]’.
92 
In 2010, two inspection vessels of Taiwan boarded and inspected two US-flagged 
vessels and 16 Chinese Taipei-flagged vessels, but no violations were observed.
93  In 2011, 
                                                      
89  The full text can be found on the official website of the Coast Guard Administration in Taiwan, 
http://www.cga.gov.tw/wralawgip/cp.jsp?displayLaw=true&lawId=8a8181d92b5668a7012b5c2785200005
&printPage=true (visited on 06/07/2012). 
90  Details about these vessels, including their registration number, port of registry, vessel length, hull 
material, contact phone number and photographs, can be found on the official WCPFC website, 
http://www.wcpfc.int/high-seas-boarding-inspection (visited on 27/05/2013). 
91  These notifications are available at the official WCPFC website, 
http://www.wcpfc.int/high-seas-boarding-inspection (visited on 27/05/2013). 
92  See the Summary Report of the Fifth Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee, p. 30, 
available at http://www.wcpfc.int/meetings/2009/5th-regular-session-technical-and-compliance-committee 
(visited on 05/07/2012). 
93  See the Summary Report of the Sixth Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee, p. 30, 
  
141 
 
Taiwan deployed three vessels for a total of 270-day patrols and conducted boarding and 
inspection of 44 Chinese Taipei-flagged vessels, but no violations were found.
94 
 
 
Table 7.1 
  Name of Taiwanese 
Inspection Vessel 
Circulation Date by 
Executive Director 
Starting Date of Boarding and 
Inspection Pursuant to CMM 
2006–08 
1  SHUN HU NO.1  15 May 2008  14 July 2008 
2  SHUN HU NO.2  15 May 2008  14 July 2008 
3  SHUN HU NO.3  15 May 2008  14 July 2008 
4  HO HSING  15 May 2008  14 July 2008 
5  WEI HSING  15 May 2008  14 July 2008 
6  TAI PEI  15 May 2008  14 July 2008 
7  NAN TO  15 May 2008  14 July 2008 
8  KIN MEN  15 May 2008  14 July 2008 
9  LIEN CHIANG  15 May 2008  14 July 2008 
10  YU SHIUN NO.2  1 June 2010  1 August 2010 
11  HSUN HU NO.7  23 March 2011  21 May 2011 
12  HSUN HU NO.8  3 April 2013  1 June 2013 
13  HSUN HU NO.9  3 April 2013  1 June 2013 
Source: WCPFC website, http://www.wcpfc.int/high-seas-boarding-inspection (visited on 27/05/2013). 
 
    It is worth noting that, in the 7
th Meeting of the WCPFC, the PRC sent a letter to the 
WCPFC executive director, objecting to the viewpoint of Taiwan and a contracting party
95 
that reciprocally implemented the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
available at http://www.wcpfc.int/meetings/2010/6th-regular-session-technical-and-compliance-committee 
(visited on 05/07/2012). 
94  See the Summary Report of the Seventh Session of the Technical and Compliance Committee, p. 25, 
available at http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/TCC7-Summary-Report-%28Rev-1%29 (visited on 28/05/2013). 
95  The PRC did not name the state, but from its description comparing the notifications of those six states, 
it can be inferred to refer to the United States. The notification of the United States can be found at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/high-seas-boarding-inspection (visited on 06/07/2012).  
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Dear Mr. Chairman: 
………. 
China noted that a Contracting Party stated in its notification to the Commission 
that ‘absent a notification by a Contracting Party of its intent to apply the 
Procedures on a reciprocal basis as between the Contracting Party and a Fishing 
Entity, the Procedures are not in effect as between the Contracting Party and the 
Fishing Entity’. (emphasis added) 
 
China also noted that a Fishing Entity echoed that above-mention viewpoint. In its 
response to some Contracting Parties’ notification under paragraph 6 of the 
Procedures, the Fishing Entity emphasized that in the absent a notification by a 
Contracting Party of its intent to apply the Procedures in its entirety as between 
that Contracting Party and a Fishing Entity on a reciprocal basis, the Procedures 
are not in effect as between the Contracting Party and the Fishing Entity. 
China wishes to point out that nothing in the Procedures provides that the high 
seas boarding and inspection activities between a Contracting Party and a Fishing 
Entity are conducted on a reciprocal basis. China does not accept the viewpoint of 
the Contracting Party and the Fishing Entity in this regard.
96 
It is clear that the PRC would not like to see the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection 
Procedure applied between Taiwan and a contracting party only if the contracting party 
gave notification. In other words, the PRC thought that, if a contracting party exchanged 
notification under Article 6, then this contracting party and Taiwan could board and inspect 
each other’s vessels. However, if a contracting party did not make a notification, then it 
could still board and inspect Taiwanese vessels, but Taiwan would not have the right to do 
the same to that contracting party. 
    Interestingly, Taiwan’s statement responding to the PRC’s letter did not directly touch 
the point which concerned the PRC. 
The WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedures (hereafter CMM 2006-08) were 
adopted in accordance with Article 26 of the WCPFC Convention. These 
procedures set out the WCPFC’s ‘boarding and inspection scheme’ and are 
                                                      
96  See WCPFC-2010-IP-08, available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc7-2010-ip-08/chinas-letter-wcpfc-executive-director (visited on 
06/07/2012).  
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supposed to ‘effectively discharge the obligations of the members of the 
Commission under the Agreement and this Convention to ensure compliance with 
the conservation and management measures established by the Commission’. 
These provisions, as contained in CMM 2006-08, have been very successful on 
avoiding political issues. 
 
According to paragraph 6 of the CMM 2006-08, a Contracting Party of the 
WCPFC can decide whether or not to apply these procedures ‘in their entirety’ 
with respect to a Fishing Entity. Thus far, six Contracting Parties have taken this 
approach, which ensures full compliance with the conservation and management 
measures established by the Commission.
97 
Taiwan avoided causing a dispute with the PRC which could reopen the political issue 
without favouring Taiwan given the PRC’s political power and influences. Furthermore, 
once this issue were handled in the way the PRC suggested, it would be disadvantageous to 
Taiwan. Therefore, the best strategy for Taiwan is to maintain the ambiguous state of 
affairs so that it can have greater flexibility in dealing with interpretations of the related 
provisions. 
 
4.2 Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission 
During 15–16 October 1998, the IATTC adopted the resolution The Participation of 
Taiwan in the work of the Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission,
98  welcoming 
Taiwan’s commitment to participate actively in the work of the IATTC and recommending 
that member governments find the most appropriate mechanisms to enable Taiwan’s active 
participation. Hence, Taiwan was invited to participate as a negotiating partner on equal 
footing with other IATTC convention parties in the meetings of the ad hoc working group, 
established in 1998 with the aim to modify the 1949 IATTC Convention.
99  For Taiwan, the 
                                                      
97  See WCPFC-2010-IP-16. The full text is available at 
http://www.wcpfc.int/doc/wcpfc7-2010-ip-16/chinese-taipeis-letter-wcpfc-chairman (visited on 
06/07/2012). 
98  See the Resolution 98-09, available at 
http://www.ofdc.org.tw/fishserv/File/Rule/IATTC_Resolutions_E/98-09.pdf (visited on 15/06/2012). 
99  About the establishment of the Working Group, see the Resolution 98-02, available at 
http://www.ofdc.org.tw/fishserv/File/Rule/IATTC_Resolutions_E/98-02.pdf (visited on 15/06/2012). On 
Taiwan’s participation. see Hu, supra note 37, p. 167; Dustin Kuan-Hsiung Wang, ‘Taiwan’s Participation in 
Regional Fisheries Management Organizations and the Conceptual Revolution on Fishing Entity: The Case of 
the IATTC’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 210.  
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moment offered an advantageous opportunity to seek status as a contracting party in the 
IATTC because five existing contracting parties or members had diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan, and US policy supported Taiwan in joining international organisations with a 
functional purpose, such as RFMOs.
100  In January 1999, at the second session of the 
working group, the question of Taiwan’s participation was first raised. The Nicaraguan 
delegate proposed that the term ‘parties’ should encompass three categories: states, 
regional economic integration organisations and separate customs territories.
101  Taiwan 
found this proposal acceptable because it could participate in the new IATTC Convention 
as a party under the identity of a separate customs territory, following the model from the 
WTO Agreement
102. Taiwan preferred the WTO model because it enjoyed full membership 
and equal status with other states in the WTO and hoped to replicate this formula in the 
IATTC.
103  Moreover, the WTO model had been accepted by international forums and in 
domestic legislation and so could set a precedent that might make it easier to overcome 
political difficulties, both internationally and locally.
104 
However, the Ecuadorian delegate noted that the term ‘separate customs territories’ 
was from the WTO, which was designed to deal with trade issues, and questioned whether 
it was appropriate for used in a fishery resources management organisation.
105  In response, 
the Taiwan delegate argued that the international trade of fish and fish products were also 
an important link in the fishery and cited the regulations of the 1995 Code of Conduct for 
Responsible Fisheries as a supporting example.
106  In addition, the French delegate 
proposed that Taiwan be included in the IATTC and referred to the term ‘fishing entity’ 
                                                      
100  Ho, supra note 21, pp. 142-143. 
101  This proposal was supported by Costa Rica and El Salvador, whereas Venezuela proposed that ‘parties’ 
should include only states and regional economic integration organisations. See Wang, supra note 99, p. 
210. 
102  The full text of the WTO Agreement can be found on the official WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/04-wto.pdf (visited on 16/08/2012). 
103  Wang, supra note 99, p. 211. 
104  Ibid. 
105  Ibid. 
106  Ibid. The Taiwanese delegate cited the example of Article 1.2 and Article 1.3 of the 1995 Code of 
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries. Article 1.2 states: ‘The Code is global in scope, and is directed toward 
members and nonmembers of FAO, fishing entities, sub regional, regional and global organisations, 
whether governmental or non-governmental, and all persons concerned with the conservation of fishery 
resources and management and development of fisheries, such as fishers, those engaged in processing and 
marketing of fish and fishery products and other users of the aquatic environment in relation to fisheries’. 
Article 1.3 reads: ‘The Code provides principles and standards applicable to the conservation, management 
and development of all fisheries. It also covers the capture, processing and trade of fish and fishery 
products, fishing operations, aquaculture, fisheries research and the integration of fisheries into coastal 
area management’.  
145 
 
from the 1995 Fish Stock agreement.
107  Although the UNFSA used the term ‘fishing 
entities’, Taiwan was still not sure of the status of ‘fishing entities’ in RFMOs. Hence, 
Taiwan did not rule out the possibility of accepting the identity of a fishing entity but 
preferred the WTO model. 
    At the Third session of the Working Group in October 1999, the Chairman proposed a 
‘Single Negotiation Text’, which defined the term ‘parties’ of the amended IATTC 
Convention as ‘the States, regional economic integration organisations and separate 
customs territories which have consented to be bound by this Convention and for which 
this Convention is in force’.
108  Mexico suggested bracketing the definition of parties and 
discussion on it after solving other issues, which Colombia supported and the chairman 
agreement.
109  As a result, at the fourth session of the working group in May 2000, the 
chairman offered the ‘Revised Chairman’s Text’ defining ‘parties’ as ‘the States, regional 
economic integration organizations [and separate customs territories] which have 
consented to be bound by this Convention and for which this Convention is in force’.
110 
    During the fourth meeting, Mexico suggested taking the MHLC as a reference as the 
MHLC and the IATTC both dealt with fisheries conservation and management in their 
respective regions.
111  It is supposed that Mexico would prefer that Taiwan participate 
under the identity of a fishing entity, instead of separate customs territories, because in the 
discussion at the MHLC, Taiwan agreed to join the WCPFC under the identity of a fishing 
entity. In response to the Mexican proposal, the US delegate noted that the two subregions 
to be governed by the WCPFC and the IATTC were in different geographical areas, 
involved different participants and had different histories; hence, similar considerations 
would not necessarily be involved in the designing of the two conventions.
112 
                                                      
107  Ibid. 
108  Ibid. 
109  Ibid. The US delegate stated that the term ‘separate customs territory’ was acceptable and presumed 
that the Mexican proposal was to reserve the issue for future discussion, rather than reject the term. The 
Mexican delegate agreed with the U.S. statement. Having diplomatic relations with Taiwan, Nicaragua 
noted that the term ‘separate customs territories’ was used in several international instruments, such as 
the WTO Agreement, 1995 Grains Trade Convention and 1999 Food Aid Convention. The full text of the 
1995 Grains Trade Convention is available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/world/agreements/downloadFile.do?fullText=yes&treatyTransId=13582 (visited on 
15/08/2012), and the full text of the 1999 Food Aid Convention at 
http://www.foodaidconvention.org/Pdf/convention/iga1995.pdf (visited on 15/08/2012). 
110  Wang, supra note 99, p. 212. 
111  Ibid. 
112  Ibid.  
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    One week before the fifth session, it had become clear that Taiwan participated in the 
MHLC negotiation using the term ‘fishing entities’, so many delegates in the working 
group preferred applying this model in the IATTC.
113  The situation did not favour 
Taiwan’s participation under the WTO model. The WCPFC model was not the best result 
for Taiwan, so the Taiwanese delegate tried to win for the WTO model in the IATTC but 
was ready to accept the WCPFC model as a fall-back. At the fifth session of the working 
group in September 2000, the chairman proposed a ‘Main Pending Issues’ paper, offering 
four definitions of the term ‘parties’.
114  In the first definition, states, fishing entities and 
separate customs territories could equally become parties. This was the result that Taiwan 
had sought in the IATTC; therefore, it was Taiwan’s first choice. The second option copied 
the WCPFC model, creating the distinct concepts of convention parties and members of the 
commission. In addition, this definition replaced the term ‘separate customs territories’ 
with the phrases ‘[entity] [fishing entity] [entity/fishing entity]’. Under this option, Taiwan 
could become a member of the commission only as a fishing entity, not a convention party, 
resulting in an unequal status with them. The third option was derived from the ICCAT 
model, in which Taiwan, as a fishing entity, was restricted to being an observer. The last 
definition suggested adopting the rules of general international law and the decisions of the 
commission, resulting inflexibility and ambiguity. This option could be the most 
disadvantageous for Taiwan as it might be limited to the traditional concept of state, 
leading to the rejection of Taiwan’s participation even as a fishing entity. For Taiwan, the 
second option was not fully satisfactory but still acceptable as it could at least possess the 
same status as in the WCPFC; however, the last two options were not acceptable or 
feasible solutions.
115 
At the Sixth session of the working group, the chairman provided the ‘Chairman’s 
Consolidated Text’
116  which corresponded to the second option, the WCPFC model. In an 
informal talk with Taiwan, the chairman explained this model and that it was specially 
                                                      
113  Ibid., p. 213. The Taiwanese delegate also felt that Taiwan’s participation in the IATTC could not 
supersede its participatory status in the WCPFC. See Ho, supra note 21, p. 143. 
114  The content of these four options is discussed in Chapter 3, pp. 53–54, of this thesis. 
115  Wang, supra note 99, p. 213. 
116  Article I of the ‘Chairman’s Consolidated Text’ defines ‘parties’ as ‘the States and regional economic 
integration organisations which have consented to be bound by this Convention and for which this 
Convention is in force, in accordance with the provisions of Articles XXVI, XXVII, XXVIII, and XXXIX of this 
Convention’, ‘Members of the Commission’ refers to ‘the Parties and any [separate customs territory] 
[entity] [fishing entity] [entity/fishing entity] which has expressed in accordance with the provisions of 
Article.. of this Convention its formal commitment to implement and comply with this Convention and any 
conservation and management measures adopted pursuant thereto’. See ibid., p. 214.  
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designed for Taiwan to avoid political obstacles. He suggested that continuing to struggle 
for other rights with political implications might not favour Taiwan’s interests in the 
IATTC.
117  In the Chairman’s Consolidated Text, the term ‘separate customs territories’ 
does not appear in the definition of either parties or members of the commission. However, 
Article Blank regulates the participation of ‘[a]ny [separate customs territory] [entity] 
[fishing entity] [entity/fishing entity] whose vessels fish for highly migratory species in the 
Convention Area’.
118 
    In the opening speech of the seventh session, the chairman expressed support for 
Taiwan’s participation, arguing that it would increase the effectiveness of the conservation 
and management fishery in the IATTC. He further noted that ‘the IATTC was an 
independent regional organization in that there was no linkage between the IATTC and the 
United Nations. As a consequence, the issue of incorporating Taiwan’s participation in the 
work of the IATTC had to be discussed independently from political issues connected with 
the United Nations’.
119  Most delegates agreed with the chairman’s speech, but Mexico, 
which spoke for the PRC, indicated that it would not accept Taiwan’s participation, 
whether as a party or as a member of the commission.
120  The Taiwanese delegate 
responded that ‘Taiwan had tried to avoid certain political considerations through 
promoting the designation of “separate customs territory” or “fishing entity” rather than 
statehood. For Taiwan, seeking status as a “Separate Customs Territory” or “Fishing 
Entity”, rather than statehood, demonstrated that as one of the major distant-water fishing 
nations in the world Taiwan was committed to circumventing sensitive political barriers 
and to work with members of the IATTC on the long-term conservation and the sustainable 
                                                      
117  Ibid., p. 213. 
118  The full text can be seen in Wang, supra note 99, p. 214; and Hu, supra note 37, p. 170. Wang argues 
that Taiwan does not believe that it fits this definition because juxtaposing ‘entity’ and ‘fishing entity’ leads 
to the implication that ‘fishing entity’ has the same standing as ‘entity’, which in UNCLOS means 
self-governing associated states or territories which enjoy full internal self-government but have not 
attained full independence. Therefore, Taiwan avoids using the term ‘entity’ to refer to itself because it 
believes that ‘entity’ carries a connotation of being something other than a state. It prefers the term ‘fishing 
entity’ and supports the distinction between these terms. However, in Serdy’s view, ‘fishing entity’ is a 
subset of ‘entity’. Both terms indicate an actor which is different from a state. In this case, the author holds 
that, if Taiwan prefers to emphasise that ‘entity’ and ‘fishing entity’ are both non-state actors but have 
different meaning in RFMOs, then putting ‘entity’, ‘fishing entity’ or other terms together implies that each 
concept has different meaning and explanations which would not limit Taiwan’s status inside or outside the 
RFMOs. Also see Serdy, supra note 68, pp. 194-195. 
119  The original document is not accessible by the public, so the chairman’s speech is recounted from the 
article by Wang, supra note 99, p. 215. 
120  Ibid.  
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utilization of the tuna stocks’.
121  So far, the atmosphere was favourable to Taiwan’s 
participation, so the issue in the future would be what identity and name Taiwan would 
use.
122 
    In addition, it is worth noting that the PRC requested to join as an observer in the 
eighth session of the Working Group and received a positive response from the 
chairman.
123  At the eighth session, the definition of ‘members of the commission’ in the 
‘Chairman’s Consolidated Text’ had been changed, removing the bracketed options and 
leaving only ‘fishing entity’ without brackets. During this session, the PRC reiterated its 
One China Policy, firstly asking to change the accepted practice of the table setting; it 
requested to remove all name boards and national flags from the meeting table.
124  The 
request was not met, whereupon the PRC delegate declared that: 
Taiwan does not have the qualifications to join [IATTC], neither should it be 
admitted to the Meetings as an observer in the name of Taiwan. … China suggests 
the settlement of the Taiwan issue in other regional fisheries management 
organizations be followed.
125 
In response to the PRC, Taiwan argued that:   
It is not a deviation to see all regional economic integration organizations, 
members of WTO, or fishing entities to become Contracting Parties to the IATTC. 
Rather, having an inclusive, comprehensive regime with a universal participation 
of all active actors in this regional fisheries management organization secures the 
effectiveness of the Convention and the organization themselves.
126 
Some states with diplomatic relations with Taiwan declared their support for its 
participation, and the United States stated that Taiwan’s participation would not conflict 
with the US-defined ‘One China Policy’.
127  Then, the PRC delegate proposed a MHLC 
Annex approach, which suggested adopting the WCPFC formula and including Taiwan’s 
participation in the Annex of the Convention.
128  China’s proposal was rejected by some 
delegates and the chairman, who did not want to copy the WCPFC Convention 
                                                      
121  Ibid. 
122  Ibid. 
123  Ibid. 
124  Hu, supra note 37, p. 167. 
125  Wang, supra note 99, p. 215. 
126  Ibid.; for more details of Taiwan’s response, see Hu, supra note 37, pp. 167-168. 
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experience.
129  Furthermore, at the Eighth session, the chairman asked Taiwan if would 
accept membership status under the identity of fishing entity, and the Taiwanese delegate 
stated that: 
It will be acceptable provided if Taiwan can be assured of obtaining ‘full 
membership and equal participation’.
130 
    Before the ninth session, the chairman offered a Revised Consolidated Text, in which 
Article I defined ‘parties’ and ‘members of the commission’, confirming that the WCPFC 
model would be the final version. The definition of fishing entity given in Article I and the 
provisions concerning its participation were regulated in Article XXVIII. It was clear that 
Taiwan’s participation would follow the WCPFC model, making it a member of the 
commission, not a party. However, the issues concerning the status of fishing entities 
within the IATTC were still not settled. The chairman insisted on the ‘transparency’ 
principle in dealing with the difficult political issue between Taiwan and the PRC; 
therefore, the chairman hosted an informal, closed-door tripartite meeting between Taiwan 
and the PRC during the ninth and 10
th sessions of the working group.
131  These unofficial 
and unprecedented meetings offered an opportunity for the two sides to negotiate their 
important interests concerning RFMOs face to face. During the tripartite meeting, Taiwan 
concentrated on the substance of fishing entities’ status in the IATTC, while the PRC 
objected to Taiwan possessing at least two rights: involvement in the depositary procedure 
and being elected as the chair or a vice-chair of the commission.
132  Additionally, the PRC 
proposed a list of the names which it found acceptable for Taiwan’s participation: Taiwan, 
Province of China; Taiwan, China; Chinese Taiwan; Chinese Taipei; and Taipei, China.
133 
Taiwan finally accepted Chinese Taipei as its designation because that name had been used 
in other international organisations. 
    At the 70
th IATTC Meeting in June 2003, the draft of the Antigua Convention 
completed by the working group was adopted. Taiwan, with the identity of a fishing entity 
and the designation of Chinese Taipei, signed an Instrument for the Participation of Fishing 
Entities in Washington on 14 November 2003 and become a member of IATTC once the 
                                                      
129  Ibid. 
130  Ibid., p. 169. 
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132  Wang, supra note 99, p. 216. 
133  Ibid. According to Wang’s observation, Taiwan would not accept any item of the list because it wanted 
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Antigua Convention entered into force on 27 August 2010.
134  Although neither Taiwan 
nor the PRC were satisfied with the result, it was the best approach that could be accepted 
by both. 
Notwithstanding Taiwan’s membership in the IATTC, its conflict with the PRC has 
not ceased. Before the 81
st Meeting of the IATTC, the first after the Antigua Convention 
entered into force, the PRC sent the Secretariat a letter which restated its One China Policy 
and requested some arrangement be made by the commission: 
1. The use or appearance of the so-called ‘National Flag’, ‘National Emblem’ 
or ‘National Anthem’ of Taiwan authority is forbidden. 
2. Chinese Taipei, as a fishing entity, should be arranged to be seated after the 
participating States. In the meeting documents, inter alia, the name list of 
participants, Chinese Taipei should also be listed after the participating States. 
3. In all meeting activities, publications, documents, materials and other 
relevant items, the use of any terms that have sovereign implication such as 
‘Republic of China’, ‘R.O.C’, ‘Taiwan’, ‘Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ and 
‘Executive Yuan’ etc. is forbidden.
135 
In response to the PRC’s request, Taiwan also sent a letter that reiterated its concessions to 
the IATTC and opposed any political manoeuvring in the IATTC: 
[T]he adoption of the Antigua Convention itself is an achievement of collective 
wisdom by the original drafters and negotiators. Taiwan made tremendous 
concessions during the negotiations that led to the adoption of the Antigua 
Convention by, for instance, agreeing to use ‘Chinese Taipei’ as its designation. 
 
IATTC is a [RFMO] … not a political forum to settle so-called ‘one China issue’. 
We do not like to see such political maneuvering made by the Chinese Delegation 
occurring in a body like IATTC. Such political maneuvering will not contribute to 
the work of the IATTC but will only damage the cooperative spirit shown in the 
past negotiations and the goals of the IATTC in the years to come. 
 
                                                      
134  See Chapter 3, p. 57, fn 49, of this thesis. 
135  The full text of PRC’s letter can be found in the Report of the IATTC 81st Meeting, Appendix 5a, pp. 
96–97, available at 
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As a member of the IATTC, … Chinese Taipei cannot accept any unequal 
treatment in sitting arrangement or presentation in any activities, publications, 
documents, materials of the IATTC, suggesting any differentiation from any other 
members of the IATTC.
136 
Ironically, while at MHLC6 in 2000, Taiwan had mentioned its presidential election and 
emphasised its democratic development in democracy, and China opposed politicising 
fishing issues.
137  However, in the IATTC arena, they reversed positions on politicisation. 
This dispute again revealed the difficulty of dealing with the irreconcilable positions of 
China and Taiwan. 
    After consultation, the chair announced that the commission did not agree to China’s 
requests regarding meeting arrangements.
138  In response, China stated that, under these 
circumstances, China could not agree to any formal resolutions offered for adoption.
139 
Several delegations urged China to be more flexible, but China stated that it could not 
modify its position on formal resolutions, given the importance for China of the issue of 
meeting arrangements relative to Chinese Taipei. Eventually, China clarified that, although 
it would not agree to formal commission resolutions, it would not object to less formal 
recommendations that other members wished to pursue.
140  In fact, no evidence shows that 
China engages in further activity to affect the IATTC’s functioning in practice. 
 
4.3 International Scientific Committee for Tuna and Tuna-like Species in the North Pacific 
Ocean 
In the first meeting of the ISC in May 1996, Taiwan was invited as an observer under Part 
B of the ISC Guidelines. These specified that members are ‘coastal states of the region and 
states with vessels fishing for tuna and tuna-like species in the region’ and that observer 
participants are ‘relevant intergovernmental fishery organisations, relevant 
intergovernmental marine science organisations, and other entities with vessels fishing for 
tuna and tuna-like species in the region’.
141  While discussing the issue of the ‘expansion 
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of participants’, Taiwan expressed its interest in becoming a member, instead of an 
observer participant. Taiwan stated that ‘we would like to see collective and cooperative 
efforts and respectable participation on a non-discriminatory basis in any regional or 
subregional fisheries organization or arrangement’.
142 
Subsequently, Taiwan proposed an amendment to the guidelines during the second 
meeting of the ISC in January 1999.
143  It modified Part B of the guidelines, deleting the 
item concerning other entities with vessels fishing for tuna and tuna-like species in the 
region in the part of observer participants and adding ‘economies of the region’ and 
‘economies with vessels fishing for tuna and tuna-like species in the region’ in the part on 
members (see Table 7.2).
144  In other words, Taiwan tried to participate as a full member 
under the identity of ‘economy’, following the APEC model. The assumption was that as 
APEC members, all the ISC members would be willing to accept the concept of economy. 
As, well under the APEC, each economy has equal status, which implied that Taiwan was 
equal to other ISC members even though it participates under the identity of economy 
rather than state.
145  The United States declared that it could accept this proposal provided 
that the ISC was a technical body and did not take legally binding actions.
146  The Japanese 
delegation stated that this issue should be resolved through mutual understanding among 
members.
147  In addition, the PRC expressed its opposition, arguing that the ISC was still 
in the developmental stage and not at the time to extend its membership.
148  The PRC 
proposed a slight modification in the part on observer participants, changing ‘other entities 
with vessels fishing for tuna and tuna-like species in the region’ to ‘other entities, fishing 
entities with vessels fishing for tuna and tuna-like species in the region (see Table 7.2)’. 
This change implied that the PRC would like Taiwan to join as an observer rather than a 
member.
149  Responding to the PRC proposal, Taiwan contended that its proposal based on 
the APEC formulation was a more appropriate solution.
150  The chair suggested that ‘the 
delegations should consult with higher authority in their governments with regard to this 
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issue and that consultation between governments should be encouraged so that the issue 
can be solved before the next ISC meeting’.
151  The amendment was not adopted. 
    Since this amendment was not adopted, Taiwan proposed another (see Table 7.2) 
during the third meeting in 2002. This amendment would allow fishing entities to be 
qualified directly as members rather than observer participants.
152  This proposal indicated 
that Taiwan had given up on the APEC model and decided to participate under the identity 
of fishing entity. The chair accepted Taiwan’s request to circulate its new version of the 
Guidelines to all participants before the adjournment of the meeting.
153  The proposal was 
adopted, making Taiwan able to become a member of the ISC.
154  During the meeting, the 
Taiwanese delegate expressed its government’s willingness to join the ISC: 
After deliberation, we have come to a conclusion to amend the existing Guidelines to 
incorporate Taiwan as a full Member of the ISC. I trust that this amendment reflects 
the general recognition by all of the participants of the ISC of Taiwan’s contribution in 
this body. I am encouraged by this latest development, and I would like to share with 
you that Taiwan will regard itself as a constructive force in this body in the days to 
come.
155 
Interestingly, the PRC did not attend this meeting.
156 
 
5. Conclusion 
The promulgations of the territorial sea and EEZ by the Taiwan government did not 
encounter the opposition or protest from the PRC. In geographical strategy, the PRC 
clearly has adopted the strategy of maintaining the status quo, rather than triggering a war. 
Under the One China Policy, Taiwan as a de facto state is still able to participate in the 
international community. Although the PRC strongly prevents Taiwan from being 
recognised as a state, it seldom opposes bilateral treaties between Taiwan and other states. 
Even the fishery agreement concerning the overlapping EEZs between Taiwan and Japan 
did not face opposition from the PRC. However, in multilateral treaties, the PRC strongly 
opposes Taiwan becoming a contracting party even under a different identify than a state. A 
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possible reason for China’s opposition is that involvement in the process of negotiating, 
preparing, drafting and signing a multilateral treaty could help Taiwan to increase its 
visibility in international forums, which is one of Taiwan’s diplomatic strategies. One way 
for the PRC to stop Taiwan’s strategy is to block Taiwan from concluding multilateral 
treaties. With respect to a bilateral treaty, it is reasonable for the PRC not to recognise but 
rather to ignore the treaty between Taiwan and the other state. However, many states are 
involved in a multilateral treaty, so the PRC cannot unilaterally deny the existence or 
legality of the treaty. The most important reason might be that in a multilateral treaty, the 
PRC and Taiwan might both become contracting parties, which implies that the PRC and 
Taiwan have the same status vis- à-vis other states. This could support the impression that 
Taiwan is a de facto state and work against the PRC’s claim that Taiwan is a part of China 
and rightfully controlled or ruled by the PRC. Moreover, although the majority of states do 
not de jure recognise Taiwan as a state, the issue over whether Taiwan is a state will likely 
be raised in a multilateral treaty, and Taiwan tends to be regarded as a de facto state by the 
contracting parties though it does not sign or accede to the treaty under the identity of a 
state. 
    The diplomatic competition between Taiwan and the PRC affects Taiwan’s 
participation in RFMOs. Taiwan never ceases to maintain that it is a state with the name of 
ROC. However, given the events of history, Taiwan is forced to participate in RFMOs as a 
fishing entity based on its functional aspect rather than the status of a state. Throughout its 
participation in RFMOs, Taiwan has shown flexibility by using different names and the 
identity of a fishing entity. Although unsatisfied, Taiwan successfully became a member of 
the WCPFC, IATTC and ISC. However, Taiwan failed to acquire the status of contracting 
parties, even members, in some RFMOs. Taiwan’s participation in those RFMOs is 
discussed in the following chapter. 
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Table 7.2 
Original Provision of Part B in the 
ISC Guidelines 
Amendment Proposed by Taiwan 
(in the 2
nd Meeting, not 
adopted) 
Amendment Proposed by the PRC  Second Amendment Proposed 
by Taiwan (adopted) 
B. Membership 
1. Member 
a. Coastal states of the 
region 
b. States with vessels fishing 
for these species in the 
region 
2. Observer participants 
a. Relevant 
intergovernmental fishery 
organisations 
b. Relevant 
intergovernmental marine 
science organisations 
c. Other entities with 
vessels fishing for those 
species in the region 
B. Membership 
1. Member 
a. Coastal states/ Economies 
of the region 
b. States/ Economies with 
vessels fishing for these 
species in the region 
2. Observer participants: 
a. Relevant 
intergovernmental fishery 
organisations 
b. Relevant 
intergovernmental marine 
science organisations 
c. (Delete) 
B. Membership 
1. Member 
a. Coastal states of the 
region 
b. States with vessels fishing 
for these species in the 
region 
2. Observer participants 
a. Relevant 
intergovernmental fishery 
organisations 
b. Relevant 
intergovernmental marine 
science organisations 
c. Other entities, fishing 
entities with vessels fishing 
for those species in the 
region 
B. Membership 
1. Member 
a. Coastal states/ fishing 
entities of the region 
b. States/ fishing entities 
with vessels fishing for 
these species in the 
region 
2. Observer participants 
a. Relevant 
intergovernmental 
fishery organisations 
b. Relevant 
intergovernmental 
marine science 
organisations 
c. (Delete) 
 
Source: Reports of the First, Second and Third Meetings of the ISC, http://isc.ac.affrc.go.jp/reports/index.html (visited on 12/06/2012).  
156 
 
CHAPTER 8 Quasi-Membership, Observer and Invited Expert 
 
1. Introduction 
Taiwan, as a fishing entity, participates as a member in RFMOs such as the WCPFC, 
IATTC, and ISC as discussed in chapter seven. However, Taiwan cannot become a member 
in some RFMOs, including the CCSBT and ICCAT, due to constraints in their regulations. 
For Taiwan’s participation, CCSBT established an Extended Commission
1  which largely 
replaced the functions of the original commission. Although Taiwan is an observer in the 
CCSBT, it can be involved in the whole commission as a member of the Extended 
Commission; therefore, its status here is that of a quasi-member. In the ICCAT, Taiwan 
changed from an observer to a cooperating fishing entity, which helped normalise
2  its 
status. In addition, the IOTC stands a special example because Taiwan participates not as a 
fishing entity but through various individuals selected as invited experts. The IOTC almost 
fully excludes Taiwan from participation as it falls inside the FAO framework and is the 
only tuna RFMO that cannot find a solution for Taiwan’s participation. In recent years, the 
IOTC unsuccessfully tried to rid itself of FAO control so as to bring Taiwan into its 
conservation and management measures. Following the discussion of Taiwan’s 
participation in RFMOs as a member, this chapter focuses on the process by which Taiwan 
gained special status other than a member in the CCSBT, ICCAT and IOTC. 
 
2. Taiwan’s Participation in RFMOs as a Quasi-Member, Observer and through 
Invited Experts 
2.1 Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna 
The CCSBT was established in 1994 with the purpose of ensuring the conservation and 
optimum utilisation of SBT.
3  The catch of Taiwan’s vessels fishing for SBT increased 
from 80 tonnes in 1969 to 1920 tonnes in 1994, which ranked as the third largest catches at 
that time.
4  It is important for the CCSBT to invite Taiwan to participate in its conservation 
                                                      
1  Regarding the Extended Commission of the CCSBT, see Chapter 3, pp. 60–61, of this thesis. 
2  Before using the identity of a cooperating fishing entity, Taiwan participated in the ICCAT as an observer 
with the identity of a State. However, China opposed this status. Thus, the identity of cooperating fishing 
entity provided a way for both Taiwan and China to accept Taiwan’s participation in the ICCAT. 
3  Regarding the objective of the convention, see Article 3 of the CCSBT Convention. SBT refers to southern 
bluefin tuna, as defined in Chapter 3, p. 59, of this thesis. 
4  In 1994, the largest catch was by Japan, with 6063 tonnes; and the second was by Australia, with 4700 
tonnes. About estimates of the global SBT catch, see ‘Global Southern Bluefin Tuna Catch By Flag’ on the 
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and management procedure. However, it is unlikely that Taiwan may directly apply to 
accede to the 1993 CCSBT Convention. Under Article 18 of the 1993 convention, the 
convention is only open to states to accede, and the existing parties recognise the PRC and 
its One China Policy in which it claims sovereignty over Taiwan. Therefore, it seems that 
this problem could be solved if Taiwan participated under another identity, such as a 
fishing entity, rather than a state. However, this would require amending of Article 18 of 
the 1993 convention to allow accession by fishing entities, and the process of amending a 
multilateral treaty mighty cost a long time because it needs the approval of each party’s 
parliament.
5  Hence, amending the 1993 convention faces a certain degree of difficulty. 
    Pursuant to Article 14(1) which states that ‘any State or entity not party to this 
Convention, whose nationals, residents or fishing vessels harvest southern bluefin tuna’ 
may be invited to send observers to meetings of the commission and Scientific Committee, 
Taiwan has participated as an observer since the first CCSBT meeting in 1994. The 
commission then noted Taiwan’s desire to have greater participation than as merely an 
observer.
6  However, since no party recognised Taiwan, the CCBST considered 
establishing the co-operation relation with Taiwan. At the First Special Meeting in 1996, it 
stated: 
It was agreed that active communication with non-parties was important and the 
Commission agreed that the Chair would write to …. Taiwan offering to engage in 
discussions regarding … co-operation with the Convention. Following this, 
consideration would be given to representatives from Commission members 
visiting their fisheries or other authorities to encourage participation in the 
Commission, or in Taiwan’s case, given that none of the parties currently 
recognises Taiwan, close co-operation with Commission initiatives.
7 
    Taiwan might have been aware of the commission’s intention; hence, in the Third 
Meeting of the CCSBT in September 1996, it agreed to restrict future catches to no more 
                                                                                                                                                                 
official CCSBT website, http://www.ccsbt.org/site/sbt_data.php (visited on 15/08/2012). 
5  See Andrew Serdy, ‘Bringing Taiwan into the International Fisheries Fold: The Legal Personality of a 
Fishing Entity’, in James Crawford and Vaughan Lowe, eds., The British Year Book of International Law 2004 
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2005, Vol. 75), p. 191. 
6  Ibid., p. 188. 
7  See the Report of the First Special Meeting of the CCSBT, available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_02/report_of_special_m
eeting1_part2.pdf (visited on 15/08/2012). Also see the Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the CCSBT 
(the Second Session), available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_04/report_of_ccsbt4_pa
rt2.pdf (visited on 17/08/2012), p. 1.  
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than the 1995 level of 1447 tonnes, starting in 1996.
8  In addition, since the UNFSA had 
been adopted in 1995, Taiwan’s observer noted Taiwan’s rights to join regional 
management regimes under it.
9  Taiwan did not explicitly indicate which UNFSA articles 
granted this right. After the adoption of the 1995 agreement, the Taiwanese government 
considered whether it should accept the position of fishing entities and eventually decided 
to adopt it as the concept was still unclear and the acceptance of it might lead to the 
implication of Taiwan was giving up of statehood.
10  However, the first time that Taiwan 
used the identity of a fishing entity was in the MHLC2 in June 1997.
11  Hence, it can be 
supposed that Taiwan was referring to Articles 1(3), 8(3) and 17(3) of the UNFSA.
12 
    Due to Taiwan’s special political position in the international community, it still had 
difficulty becoming a member of the CCSBT despite self-restraint on catches. At the 
Fourth Annual Meeting in 1998, Japan’s view shows that the CCSBT was considering 
formalisation of its cooperation relation with Taiwan. 
Japan stated that due to the sensitive nature of its relationship with Taiwan, it 
needed further time to decide on the appropriate form of an instrument. The 
position of the Japanese Government was to consider the above approach on its 
merits, incorporating political and legal concerns. It expressed its support for the 
Commission seeking cooperation with Taiwan, and undertook to provide general 
comments on the Commission’s proposed approach, and the most appropriate type 
of instrument to use. … Japan suggested that the first step would be to seek a 
strong commitment from Taiwan that it would cooperate with the Commission.
13 
                                                      
8  See the Report of the Third Annual Meeting of the CCSBT (First Session), Attachment K, available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_03/report_of_ccsbt3_pa
rt1.pdf (visited on 15/08/2012). 
9  Ibid. 
10  See Peter S.C. Ho, ‘The Impact of the Fish Stocks Agreement on Taiwan’s Participation in International 
Fisheries Fora’, Ocean Development and International Law, Vol. 37(2006), p. 144.   
11  It can be found in Taiwan’s opening statement at the MHLC2. See Chapter 7, p. 129, of this thesis. 
12  See Serdy, supra note 5, p. 189. Regarding the text of Articles 1(3) and 17(3) of the UNFSA, see Chapter 1, 
p. 22, of this thesis. Article 8(3) of the UNFSA reads: ‘Where a subregional or regional fisheries management 
organization or arrangement has the competence to establish conservation and management measures for 
particular straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks, States fishing for the stocks on the high seas 
and relevant coastal States shall give effect to their duty to cooperate by becoming members of such 
organization or participants in such arrangement, or by agreeing to apply the conservation and 
management measures established by such organization or arrangement. States having a real interest in 
the fisheries concerned may become members of such organization or participants in such arrangement. 
The terms of participation in such organization or arrangement shall not preclude such States from 
membership or participation; nor shall they be applied in a manner which discriminates against any State or 
group of States having a real interest in the fisheries concerned’. 
13  See the Report of the Fourth Annual Meeting of the CCSBT (Second Session), supra note 7, pp. 1–2.  
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    Taiwan acknowledged the possible direction of the CCSBT concerning its 
participation and argued that, since it agreed to limit its catches, it should have the same 
rights as other members. Taiwan further expressed its desire to become a full member of 
the CCSBT.
14  However, in the subsequent discussion with Taiwanese delegation, the 
CCSBT thought that the political reality should be taken into consideration and clearly 
stated that Taiwan’s participation as a full member was not allowed by the 1993 
convention.
15 
The Commission had noted their interest in becoming a full member of the 
Commission. However, the Convention did not allow for this. They would also be 
aware of the political reality of this situation; the parties were not in a position to 
have Taiwan accede to the Commission with member status; [h]owever, the 
Commission wished to conclude an arrangement that provided for their 
cooperation with and participation in the work of the Commission. This would 
include the privileges and responsibilities that would accrue to a co-operating 
party.
16 
Taiwan’s delegation responded that it was aware of the difficulties associated with 
accession to the convention but they hoped to learn the differences between the status of a 
cooperating party and a member and to be treated in an equitable manner with other 
members in the framework of the commission.
17  The CCSBT claimed that it 
acknowledged Taiwan’s desire for equal participation and was looking to provide a way for 
it to have similar privileges and responsibilities as members.
18 
                                                      
14  In the opening statement at the Fifth Annual Meeting of the CCSBT, Taiwan’s observer stated: 
‘[O]bligation and right should be closely linked together. While performing obligation, we should have equal 
right as the same with other fishing nations. I would like to reiterate that Taiwan is very willing to cooperate 
with other countries for the conservation and management of marine living resources. Thus, we seek the 
accession to become a full member of CCSBT’. See the Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the CCSBT 
(First Session), Attachment 9, available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_05/report_of_ccsbt5_pa
rt1.pdf (visited on 15/08/2012). 
15  However, per Serdy’s view, Article 18 of the 1993 convention only concerns the accession of a state, so 
the real obstacle to Taiwan’s becoming a full member is not the convention itself but the political conflict 
between Taiwan and the PRC, which creates the recognition issue among the parties, PRC and Taiwan. See 
Serdy, supra note 5, p. 189. 
16  See the Report of the Fifth Annual Meeting of the CCSBT (Second Session), Attachment G, available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_05/report_of_ccsbt5_pa
rt2.pdf (visited on 15/08/2012). 
17  Ibid. 
18  Ibid.  
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    In October 1999, a CCSBT delegation visited Taiwan to discuss participation and 
fishing quotas.
19  The delegation suggested a quota of 1250 tonnes and status as a 
cooperating non-member subject to a contribution to the CCSBT’s annual budget.
20 
Taiwan refused this proposal because the offered fishing quota was far below its 
self-imposed limit of 1450 tonnes. Taiwan considered that, if its status was as a 
non-member, then it might agree to make contributions or donations voluntarily but could 
not accept the obligation to contribute to the organisation’s budget being imposed on it.
21 
Although the negotiation was not successful, it is noted that Taiwan could accept 
participating as a cooperating non-member. The problem that still needed to be resolved 
was the quota and other details. 
    However, at the Sixth Annual Meeting in November 1999, Taiwan made a surprise 
move, delivering a letter applying for becoming a party to the 1993 convention and stating 
that, ‘if an arrangement is needed to make our Party status possible, we would only accept 
an arrangement that is fair, workable, and duly respecting Taiwan’s status’.
22  While 
analysing Taiwan’s application, Andrew Serdy writes: 
In doing so it should be noted that Taiwan was not purporting to accede to the 
1993 Convention; this would have required lodging an instrument of accession 
with Australia as depositary. It can, however, be taken as an implied request to the 
Parties to amend the Convention so as to allow entities other than States to accede. 
Taiwan may have had in mind the first draft of the new convention being 
negotiated in the [IATTC].
23 
Indeed, during negotiations in 1999, Taiwan was aware of and seemed willing to accept the 
CCSBT’s position that Taiwan should be a cooperating non-member, but still applied for 
accession. Taiwan knew that its application would not be accepted, so its purpose might 
have been to put on record its application for the status of a state. Actually, as Taiwan 
hoped to accede to the convention with the identity of a state, its moves conform with 
Article 18 of the convention. Thus, the convention itself does not prohibit Taiwan from 
                                                      
19. Ho, supra note 10, p. 141. 
20  Ibid. 
21  Ibid. 
22  See the Report of the Sixth Annual Meeting of the CCSBT (First Session), Attachment H, available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_06/report_of_ccsbt6_Pa
rt1.pdf (visited on 17/08/2012). 
23  Serdy, supra note 5, p. 190.  
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being a full member of commission. The real obstacle was the uncertain status of Taiwan 
due its conflict with China over recognition.
24 
    In October 2000, the CCSBT sent another delegation to Taiwan, which proposed a 
draft resolution concerning the establishment of an Extended Commission, of which 
Taiwan could become a member.
25  The Extended Commission would meet annually 
before the CCSBT annual meeting and perform nearly the same function as the 
commission, such as deciding upon a total allowable catch and its allocation among the 
members. Then the CCBST proper would adopt and implement the decisions of the 
Extended Commission while reserving the right to reject those decisions. Taiwan believed 
that this resolution lacked a concrete legal foundation for the establishment of the 
Extended Commission and so could be easily revoked or replaced by another resolution.
26 
In addition, Taiwan was concerned that accepting the proposal would undermine its 
attempts to participate in other RFMOs as a contracting party or member.
27  The CCSBT 
delegation responded that, considering the existing political environment, the proposal was 
the best compromise possible. The CCBST assured that the commission would serve as a 
rubber stamp for of the Extended Commission’s decisions unless they were highly 
controversial. The CCBST also argued that after the resolution was adopted, it would be 
accepted by any new members of the CCSBT.
28 
    At the Seventh Annual Meeting, Taiwan referred to the visiting CCSBT delegation 
and clearly expressed its desire to achieve equal status with other members: 
In various occasions, we have repeatedly expressed that obligation of a fishing 
nation should be commensurate with its right. We have also expressed that we have 
the strong willingness to participate as a member on an equal basis as other 
members in CCSBT. CCSBT organized a delegation to visit Taipei last October, 
and thoroughly exchanged views with us on a new proposal presented by CCSBT 
to accommodate Taiwan in the regime. … My government is prudently evaluating 
                                                      
24  Ibid., p. 189. 
25  Ho, supra note 10, p. 141. 
26  Ibid. 
27  Ibid. 
28  Ibid. Pursuant to Article 8(7) of the CCSBT Convention, ‘all measures decided upon under paragraph 3 
above shall be binding on the Parties’. The ‘Parties’ to which Article 8(7) refers include any new entrants 
which accede to the Convention; thus, a new entrant to the CCSBT is bound not only by the convention 
itself but also by past decisions. This is what Serdy called ‘Acquis Commissionaire’. For further details, see 
Andrew Serdy, ‘Postmodern International Fisheries Law, or We Are All Coastal States Now’, The 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly, Vol. 60(April 2011), pp. 400–404.  
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the CCSBT’s proposal because of its complicated nature and involvement in our 
domestic legal and political circumstances. What Taiwan intends to secure is an 
equal status and full participation as other parties to the Convention in the CCSBT 
regime.
29 
Then, during the same meeting, the Resolution to Establish an Extended Commission and 
an Extended Scientific Committee was adopted.
30  Taiwan expressed its willingness to 
become a member of the Extended Commission.
31 
At the Eighth Meeting of the Commission in October 2001, Taiwan stated that it 
would apply to be a member of the Extended Commission and the Extended Scientific 
Committee for CCSBT under the name of either Chinese Taipei or the Fishing Entity of 
Taiwan as soon as possible.
32  The executive secretary responded that: 
Taiwan should lodge a formal application for Membership of the Extended 
Commission by an Exchange of Letters as provided for in Paragraph 6
33of the 
Resolution to Establish an Extended Commission and Extended Scientific 
Committee … by 31 December 2001. The Commission will correspond with 
Taiwan shortly to initiate this process.
34   
Then, at the Ninth Meeting in October 2002, the chair announced that Taiwan’s 
membership in the Extended Commission as a fishing entity would became effective on 30 
August 2002.
35  Therefore, Taiwan has two identities in the CCSBT: a member of the 
                                                      
29  See the Opening Statement by Taiwan in the Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the CCSBT, 
Attachment D-5, available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_07/report_of_ccsbt7.pdf 
(visited on 19/08/2012). 
30  Ibid., Attachment I. 
31  See the Report of the Seventh Annual Meeting of the CCSBT. 
32  See Statement made by Taiwan in the Plenary in the Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the 
Commission, Attachment F, available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_08/report_of_ccsbt8.pdf 
(visited on 19/08/2012). 
33  Paragraph 6 of the Resolution to Establish an Extended Commission and Extended Scientific Committee 
reads: ‘Any entity or fishing entity, vessels flagged to which have caught SBT at any time in the previous 
three calendar years, may express its willingness to the Executive Secretary of the Commission to become a 
member of the Extended Commission. The Executive Secretary of the Commission, on behalf of the 
Commission, will conduct an Exchange of Letters with the representative of such entity or fishing entity to 
this effect. In so doing, the applicant shall give the Commission its firm commitment to respect the terms of 
the Convention and comply with such decisions of the Extended Commission as become decisions of the 
Commission pursuant to paragraph 4’. 
34  The full text can be found in the Report of the Eighth Annual Meeting of the Commission, supra note 32. 
35  See the Report of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Commission, p. 1, available at 
http://www.ccsbt.org/userfiles/file/docs_english/meetings/meeting_reports/ccsbt_09/report_of_ccsbt9.pdf 
(visited on 19/08/2012).  
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Extended Commission and an observer in the CCBST proper. To avoid the possibility of 
being forced to accept a decision adopted without Taiwan’s agreement, Taiwan wrote a 
note to the CCSBT Secretariat.   
The Fishing Entity of Taiwan understands that in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure of the Commission and Extended Commission, all decisions must be 
taken by a unanimous vote of Members present. Furthermore, any decision made 
by the Commission or any of its subsidiary bodies on an issue on which unanimity 
in the Extended Commission has not been achieved, or any issue that has not been 
deliberated in the Extended Commission, shall not be binding on Members of the 
Extended Commission which are not Members of the Commission.
36 
Despite knowing that there was almost no possibility of becoming a full member of the 
CCBST, Taiwan was still dissatisfied with its status in the CCSBT and hoped to become a 
full member.
37 
    It is worth noting that Taiwan’s agreement to accept this resolution came after the 
adoption of the WCPFC Convention, to which Taiwan was not allowed to accede as a 
contracting party but, rather, as a full member. This formula set a better precedent than the 
CCSBT Extended Commission for Taiwan’s participation in other RFMOs.
38  Hence, the 
possibility of the consequence that had concerned Taiwan—creating a precedent that would 
be an obstacle to joining other RFMOs—was reduced. However, it was obvious that, for 
Taiwan, the outcome of its participation in the CCSBT is not sufficient. In the WCPFC, 
Taiwan at least became a member even in the face of the PRC’s challenge. 
 
2.2 International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas 
Taiwan’s involvement in the ICCAT was first recorded at the First Regular Meeting of the 
ICCAT which Taiwan did not attend but contributed an informal report entitled Taiwan’s 
Tuna Fisheries and Tuna Fisheries Research, 1970 to the Standing Committee on Research 
and Statistics.
39  At that time, Taiwan was still recognised as a state and was recorded 
under its national name, the ROC. The next year, the UN adopted Resolution 2758, which 
                                                      
36  Ho, supra note 10, p. 142. 
37  See Taiwan’s Opening Statement at CCSBT9 and Statement by the Fishing Entity of Taiwan to the 
Admission in the Report of the Ninth Annual Meeting of the Commission, supra note 35, Attachment 5-2 
and Attachment 1. Also see Serdy, supra note 5, p. 199. 
38  Ho, supra note 10, p. 142. 
39  See the Report of the First Regular Meeting of the ICCAT, p. 49, 121, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_70-71_II.pdf (visited on 22/08/2012).  
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gave Taiwan’s seat to the PRC.
40  Hence, Taiwan could participate in the ICCAT as a 
contracting party before 1971 but did not do so. Presumably, Taiwan did not foresee that its 
UN seat would be taken away soon. In addition, fisheries conservation and management 
was not yet a major concern of Taiwan. In 1972, the Taiwanese government began to 
attend the meetings of the ICCAT as an observer.
41  However, Taiwan’s attendance was 
voluntary, so the obligations of continuing to attend the ICCAT annual meetings were not 
imposed on it.
42 
At the Thirteenth Regular Meeting in 1993, the ICCAT adopted Guidelines and 
Criteria for Granting Observer Status at ICCAT Meetings, which stipulated that 
non-contracting parties identified as harvesting tunas or tuna-like species in the ICCAT 
convention area should be invited as observers.
43  After the Guidelines, the PRC began to 
attend as an observer starting in the 1994 Ninth Special Meeting of the ICCAT.
44  During 
that meeting, the Resolution on Coordination with Non-Contracting Parties was adopted, 
urging non-contracting parties fishing in the convention area to become cooperating 
parties.
45  A cooperating party could also attend the ICCAT meetings as an observer. 
However, the main difference in observer and cooperating party status is the voluntary 
agreement to conform to the ICCAT decisions.
46  The US delegate encouraged Taiwan to 
become a cooperating party, and Taiwan expressed willingness to do so provided that its 
interests were dealt with on an equal basis.
47 
    From the start, Taiwan regarded itself as a state attending the ICCAT Meetings as an 
observer. Even after the UN Resolution 2758 in 1971, Taiwan’s statehood was still not 
mentioned by other contracting parties; neither did it become an issue in the ICCAT. So far, 
the PRC had not participated in the ICCAT, either as a contracting party or an observer. 
Taiwan’s participation as an observer became an issue only after the PRC acceded to the 
                                                      
40  Regarding Resolution 2758 and the reason why the PRC replaced Taiwan’s seat in the UN, see Chapter 7, 
pp. 120–122, of this thesis. 
41  See the Report of the Second Regular Meeting of the ICCAT, p. 37, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_72-73_I.pdf (visited on 22/08/2012). 
42  On Taiwan’s attendance at ICCAT meetings from 1972 to 1993, see Serdy, supra note 5, pp. 200–201. 
43  See the Report of the Thirteenth Regular Meeting of the ICCAT, Annex 19, pp. 137–139,available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_92-93_II.pdf (visited on 23/08/2012). 
44  See the Report of the Ninth Special Meeting of the ICCAT, Participant List, p. 69, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_94-95_I_1.pdf (visited on 23/08/2012). 
45  Ibid., Annex 10, p. 97. 
46  See paragraph 1 of the Resolution on Coordination with Non-Contracting Parties. 
47  See the Report of the Fourteenth Regular Meeting of the ICCAT, pp. 195–196, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_94-95_II_1.pdf (visited on 23/08/2012).  
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ICCAT Convention in 1996, leading to the emergence of the term ‘fishing entities’ in the 
ICCAT. During the Tenth Special Meeting of the ICCAT in 1996, a series of intense 
disagreements between the PRC and Taiwan occurred. The PRC protested the use of the 
name ‘Taiwan’ by the ICCAT and objected that Taiwan was categorised as ‘non-member 
country’ in some ICCAT documents, which did not accord with the PRC’s One China 
Policy.
48 
According to paragraph 3 of Article XI of the Convention
49  and Rule 5 of the 
Rules of Procedure
50, only international organizations and a government which is 
a member of the United Nations or any specialized agency of the United Nations 
and which is not a member of the Commission may be invited to send observers to 
the meeting of the Commission. Therefore, the invitation to and admission of 
Taiwan of China as an observer do not conform to the Convention and Rules of 
Procedure, and are also in violation of the Resolution 2758 (XXVI) of the United 
Nations General Assembly, and should be rectified immediately.
51 
In response to the PRC’s statement, Taiwan explained its position: 
Taiwan expressed [its] hope that Taiwan and the [PRC] would be able to work 
together in friendly cooperation. He noted that this was the first time that a 
political issue of this nature had been raised at ICCAT. While the official name of 
his country is the name the ‘Republic of China,’ it has always accepted, as a 
compromise with ICCAT, the name of ‘Taiwan’. The [ROC] has been in existence 
since 1912, thirty-eight years before the [PRC], and that this latter has 
unilaterally claimed the territory of Taiwan.
52 
The executive secretary explained that the secretary follows the established practices of 
accepting names that the non-contracting parties use, without any implication of 
                                                      
48  See the Report of the Tenth Special Meeting of the ICCAT, pp. 42-43, 52, 143, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_96-97_I_1.pdf (visited on 24/08/2012). 
49  Article XI(3) of the ICCAT Convention reads: ‘The commission may invite any appropriate international 
organization and any Government which is a member of the United Nations or of any Specialized Agency of 
the United Nations and which is not a member of the Commission, to send observers to meetings of the 
Commission and its subsidiary bodies’. 
50  Rule 5 of the Rules of Procedure has nearly the same stipulation as Article XI(3) of the ICCAT Convention 
but further states: ‘Observers may, with the authorization of the Chairman, address the meeting to which 
they are invited and otherwise participate in its work, but without the right to vote’. 
51  See the Statement by the People’s Republic of China, in the Report of the Tenth Special Meeting of the 
ICCAT, supra note 48, at Annex 6-3, p. 101. 
52  See the Report of the Tenth Special Meeting of the ICCAT, supra note 48, p. 43.  
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recognition.
53  The executive secretary indicated that the ICCAT has no competence to 
solve international political problems.
54  In addition, the chairman of the ICCAT meeting 
stated that the ICCAT ‘felt the need to cooperate with Taiwan, as it has existed as a ‘fishing 
reality’ for many years’.
55 
    At the Fifteenth Regular Meeting of the ICCAT, Taiwan and the PRC made mutual 
concessions. Firstly, Taiwan as an observer changed its name to Chinese Taipei.
56  The 
ICCAT adopted the Resolution by ICCAT on Becoming a Cooperating Party, Entity or 
Fishing Entity,
57  which expands the category of non-contracting parties from ‘Cooperating 
Parties’ in the 1994 resolution to ‘Cooperating Party, Entity or Fishing Entity’. This was 
the first time that the ICCAT adopted the term ‘fishing entity’, which was also the only 
position that both Taiwan and the PRC could accept. As the PRC stated: 
We cannot accept Chinese Taipei being admitted to ICCAT meetings as an 
observer under the name of ‘Taiwan’, which means splitting China and creates 
‘one China, one Taiwan’ within ICCAT. 
 
However, in order to help achieve the objectives of conservation, management and 
sustainable utilization of tuna resources in the Atlantic Ocean, and to take into 
consideration the fact that fishermen of Taiwan harvest tunas in the Convention 
area, the Chinese Delegation, in the spirit of cooperation … may accept Chinese 
Taipei attending ICCAT meetings as a fishing entity in the capacity of an observer 
under the designation of ‘Chinese Taipei’.
58 
    At first the Taiwanese government had considered not accepting being a fishing entity 
because it thought that it had conceded in agreeing to the designation of Chinese Taipei and 
did not want its statehood to be denied further.
59  Despite these considerations, Taiwan did 
agree to the position of a cooperating fishing entity.
60  One possible reason is that Taiwan 
had used the identity of fishing entity in MHLC2, which could be a precedent and 
                                                      
53  Ibid., p. 143 
54  Ibid. 
55  Ibid., p. 43 
56  There is no record explaining the process of how and why Taiwan decided to agree to change its name. 
57  On the source and other information about the resolution, see Chapter 3, p. 48, of this thesis. 
58  See the Report of the Fifteenth Regular Meeting of the ICCAT, Annex 6-2, p. 84, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_96-97_II_1.pdf (visited on 24/08/2012). 
59  Ho, supra note 10, p. 138. 
60  See the Report of the Sixteenth Regular Meeting of the ICCAT p. 27, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_98-99_II_1.pdf (visited on 24/08/2012).  
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overcome Taiwan’s concerning about downgrading its statehood. The identity of 
cooperating fishing entity helped Taiwan move past the controversial issue of whether it 
should have observer status and normalise its status under the ICCAT Convention. 
    Despite becoming a cooperating fishing entity, Taiwan felt unsatisfied with this 
position compared to its status in other RFMOs. In the Twelfth Special Meeting of the 
ICCAT in 2000, Taiwan stated: 
Through years of cooperation with ICCAT, a resolution was finally adopted to 
enable us to attain Cooperating Status. For a party who is willing to become a 
member, but unable to do so, we see that the annual application for Cooperating 
Status is an underlying unfair treatment. Mr. Chairman, let me draw your attention 
to the recent development of a new [RFMO], which provides a mechanism for us 
to fully participate. … [I]t is our strong view that the arrangement of ICCAT 
should not be too far from that of the new fisheries convention. At least for the time 
being, we should not be required to apply annually for ‘Cooperating Status’.
61 
Therefore, Taiwan’s aim is to acquire the equal status as other full members. Surprisingly, 
there is no record concerning any opposition by the PRC to Taiwan’s statement. 
According to the 1997 resolution, the status of a cooperating party could not be 
continued automatically; rather, Taiwan had to apply for the status of cooperating fishing 
entity every year. To decrease this inconvenience, Taiwan in 2000 proposed amending the 
1997 resolution to allow the status of the cooperating party, entity or fishing entity to be 
renewed automatically unless revoked by the commission due to non-compliance with 
ICCAT conservation and management measures or the commission received a written 
request for withdrawal of the status.
62  In addition, Taiwan suggested that a state eligible to 
become a contracting party could acquire the status of cooperating party, entity or fishing 
entity for no more than three years.
63  There is no record of why Taiwan proposed this 
provision. Taiwan might regard it as another opportunity to apply for the status of a 
member or a contracting party, but if its application was rejected, Taiwan would also fail to 
keep its normalised status of cooperating fishing entity and return to the uncertain status of 
an observer. 
                                                      
61  See the Report of the Twelfth Special Meeting of the ICCAT, p. 72, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_00-01_I_1.pdf (visited on 27/08/2012). 
62  The full text of Taiwan’s proposal can be found in the Report of the Twelfth Special Meeting of the ICCAT, 
Appendix 2–Annex 10, pp. 251–252. 
63  Ibid.  
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    Taiwan’s proposal was not adopted, but the next year, another draft entitled 
Resolution by ICCAT on Becoming a Cooperating Party, Entity or Fishing Entity was 
adopted to replace the 1997 resolution.
64  Under the 2001 resolution, Taiwan could 
automatically renew its status of cooperating fishing entity annually, but its suggestion that 
the status of cooperating party would be guaranteed for no more than three years was not 
included in the 2001 resolution. In 2003, the 2001 resolution was replaced again by a 
Recommendation on Criteria for Attaining the Status of Cooperating non-Contracting Party, 
Entity or Fishing Entity in ICCAT. The 2003 resolution kept most regulations in the 2001 
resolution but listed details about the documents that the cooperating party, entity or 
fishing entity must provide.
65  Although the ICCAT has never updated its Convention or 
the Rules of the Procedure, the resolutions and Recommendation concerning the 
cooperating party, entity or fishing entity, inter alia the 2003 recommendation, formalised 
the criteria to apply to be a cooperating fishing entity, providing Taiwan gained the 
legitimacy to participate in the ICCAT’s operations. 
 
2.3 Indian Ocean Tuna Commission—An Effective Tool for Sustainable Fisheries 
Development or Another Battlefield for Political Conflicts? 
Since the late 1980s, Taiwan has been the major longline fleet fisher for bigeye tuna in the 
Indian Ocean, taking as much as 40% of the total longline catch.
66  Although its catches 
have decreased in recent years, Taiwan is still a major catcher of tuna in the Indian Ocean, 
so its participation is important for IOTC to effectively carry out its conservation and 
management measures. Under the IOTC Agreement
67, only UN members and specialised 
agencies, FAO members and associate members and members of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency can become a member of IOTC. In addition, the IOTC’s Rules of 
Procedure stipulate that the non-state actors eligible to be observers are intergovernmental 
and non-intergovernmental organisations; thus, fishing entities can be observers only if 
                                                      
64  The full text of the 2001 resolution can be found in the Report of the Seventeenth Regular Meeting of 
the ICCAT, Annex 9-23, p. 261, available at 
http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_00-01_II_1.pdf (visited on 27/08/2012). 
65  The full text of the 2003 resolution can be found in the Report of the Eighteenth Regular Meeting of the 
ICCAT, p. 167, available at http://www.iccat.int/Documents/BienRep/REP_EN_02-03_II_1.pdf (visited on 
27/08/2012). 
66  See the Report of 15th Session of the IOTC Scientific Committee, p. 84, available at 
http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2012/sc/IOTC-2012-SC15-R[E].pdf (visited on 29/05/2013). 
67  About the IOTC Agreement, see Chapter 3, p. 64, of this thesis.  
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they are also intergovernmental or non-intergovernmental organisations.
68  The IOTC falls 
under the UN/FAO framework which adopts the PRC’s One China Policy viewing Taiwan 
a province of the PRC, so it is impossible for Taiwan to participate in IOTC as a state or 
under other identity equivalent to a state. As well, any approach for Taiwan to participate 
as a fishing entity is lacking.   
    On 9 November 1999, Taiwan applied to the IOTC secretariat to become a full 
member and requested to be allowed to attend the Fourth Meeting of the IOTC as an 
observer government. The PRC strongly opposed this request, stating that it could only 
accept Taiwan’s attendance at IOTC meetings as an observer from a non-intergovernmental 
organisation.
69  At the Fourth Meeting in 1999, the FAO Legal Adviser reported that   
the [PRC] accepted that a non-intergovernmental organization representing the 
fishing interests of Taiwan Province of China be invited to participate in IOTC 
meetings.
70 
Unfortunately, this issue was not discussed further. At the Sixth Meeting in 2001, Taiwan 
began to attend the IOTC meeting under the identity of invited expert.
71  Theoretically, 
invited experts are individuals and thus have no link to an official delegation. Therefore, 
the IOTC still needs a proper route to allow Taiwan to participate. On 2 September 2002, 
in accordance with Resolution 99/04 on the Status of Cooperating Non-Contracting 
Parties
72  adopted at the Fourth Meeting of the IOTC in 1999, Taiwan applied to become a 
co-operating non-contracting party. It was opposed by the PRC mainly due to the 
nomenclature that Taiwan hoped to use: Taiwan, not Taiwan Province of China, as the PRC 
insisted.
73   
In 2003, Taiwan’s issue was discussed again but reached no result. With respect to 
Taiwan’s participation, the PRC stated that: 
[I]t has shown great flexibility to adjust the concerns of all members regarding 
this issue. China is a responsible fishing State and will not leave the fishing fleets 
                                                      
68  The full text of the Rules of Procedure can be found on the official IOTC website, 
http://www.iotc.org/English/info/rules_proced.php (visited on 03/09/2012). 
69  See Huang-Chih Chiang, ‘On Taiwan’s Participation in Regional Fisheries Organizations: A Dilemma 
between Substantive Fishing Interest and Independent Statehood’, Taiwan International Law Quarterly, Vol. 
2, No. 1(2005), pp. 56–57. 
70  See the report of the Fourth Meeting of the IOTC, available at 
http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/1999/s/IOTC-1999-S04-R[EN].pdf (visited on 03/09/2012). 
71  See the report of the Sixth Meeting of the IOTC, available at 
http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2001/s/IOTC-2001-S06-R[EN].pdf (visited on 03/09/2012). 
72  On the resolution, see Chapter 3, pp. 64–65, of this thesis. 
73  Chiang, supra note 69, pp. 57–58.  
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of Taiwan Province of China to operate in the Indian Ocean outside the IOTC. 
China is always willing to join other delegations and FAO in continuing efforts to 
explore ways on how to effectively manage the fishing fleets of Taiwan Province of 
China.
74 
    After many sessions discussing Taiwan’s problem, the IOTC took the huge step of 
deciding to place itself outside the FAO. This decision was reached in the Ninth Meeting in 
2005, at which the IOTC decided to hold a special session to explore how to create a more 
effective and efficient organisation through changing its relationship with the FAO. For the 
special session, a draft amendment to the IOTC Agreement and a draft declaration would 
be prepared for adoption, declaring that amendments to the agreement would not be 
considered as creating new obligations.
75  It was significant that the IOTC decided that the 
amendments would not involve new obligations because pursuant to Articles XX(4) and (5) 
of the IOTC Agreement, an amendment that does not involve new obligations can take 
effect immediately. Otherwise, the amendment can come into force only after acceptance 
by each member, which would lead to a complicated relation between the IOTC and its 
members.
76 
    In the Third Special Session in 2006, the IOTC members, in accordance with Article 
XX of the IOTC Agreement
77, reached consensus on the amendments, including the 
                                                      
74  See the report of the Eighth Meeting of the IOTC, available at 
http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2003/s/IOTC-2003-S08-R[EN].pdf (visited on 05/09/2012). 
75  Details of the IOTC decision concerning the Special Session can be found in the report of the Ninth 
Meeting of the IOTC, pp. 10–11, available at 
http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2005/s/IOTC-2005-S9-R[EN].pdf (visited on 05/09/2012). Clearly, the 
IOTC amendment did not favour the PRC’s position because it tried to create another route for Taiwan’s 
participation as an independent actor in the Indian Ocean management organisation, instead of maintaining 
the present situation in which Taiwan was categorised as a province of the PRC. However, there was no 
record revealing any objection by or attitude of the PRC on this issue. 
76  Article XX(4) of the IOTC Agreement reads: ‘Amendments not involving new obligations for Members of 
the Commission shall take effect for all Members from the date of their adoption by the Commission, 
subject to paragraph 3 above’. Article XX(5) reads: ‘Amendments involving new obligations for Members of 
the Commission shall, after adoption by the Commission, subject to paragraph 3 above, come into force in 
respect of each Member only upon its acceptance thereof. The instruments of acceptance of amendments 
involving new obligations shall be deposited with the Director-General. The Director-General shall inform all 
Members of the Commission and the Secretary-General of the United Nations of such acceptance. The 
rights and obligations of any Member of the Commission that has not accepted an amendment involving 
new obligations shall continue to be governed by the provisions of this Agreement in force prior to the 
Amendment’. 
77  Article XX of the IOTC Agreement regulates the amendment of the IOTC Agreement. It states: 
‘1. This Agreement may be amended by a three-quarters majority of the Members of the Commission. 
  2. Proposals for amendments may be made by any Member of the Commission or by the Director-General. 
Proposals made by a Member of the Commission shall be addressed to both the Chairperson of the 
Commission and the Director-General and those made by the Director-General shall be addressed to the 
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Proposed Amendments to the IOTC Agreement, Proposed Amendments to the IOTC Rules 
of Procedure and Draft Amended IOTC Financial Regulations.
78  These would change the 
IOTC’s relationship with the FAO, taking it from within the FAO framework and 
becoming independence while still cooperating with the FAO. Pursuant to Article XX(2) of 
the IOTC Agreement, the FAO director-general should have circulated these draft 
amendments among all members 120 days before the Tenth Meeting in May 2007 for 
consideration and formal adoption. However, the FAO director-general refused to circulate 
them, preventing those amendments from being adopted in the next IOTC meeting and 
making the amendment route was unsuccessful.
79  The FAO director-general claimed that 
it would be inappropriate to directly circulate an amendment to an agreement concluded 
under Article XIV of the FAO Constitution
80  without seeking guidance from the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Chairperson of the Commission, not later than 120 days before the Session of the Commission at which 
the proposal is to be considered. The Director-General shall immediately inform all Members of the 
Commission of all proposals for amendments. 
  3. Any amendment to this Agreement shall be reported to the Council of FAO which may disallow an 
amendment which is clearly inconsistent with the objectives and purposes of FAO or the provisions of 
the Constitution of FAO. 
  …… 
6. Amendments to the Annexes to this Agreement may be adopted by a two-thirds majority of the 
Members of the Commission and shall come into force from the date of approval by the Commission. 
7. The Director-General shall inform all Members of the Commission, all Members and Associate Members 
of FAO and the Secretary-General of the United Nations of the entry into force of any amendment’. 
78  The full text of these three amendments can be found in the report of the Third Special Session of the 
IOTC, Appendices IV, VI and VII, available at 
http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2006/s/IOTC-2006-SS3-R[EN].pdf (visited on 05/09/2012). 
79  William Edeson, ‘An International Legal Extravaganza in the Indian Ocean: Placing the Indian Ocean Tuna 
Commission outside the Framework of FAO’, The International Journal of Marine and Coastal Law, Vol. 
22(2007), pp. 487–488. 
80  Article XIV of the FAO Constitution describes the matters of the convention or an agreement relating to 
the FAO. Paragraph 3 reads:   
‘Conventions, agreements, and supplementary conventions and agreements shall: 
(a) be submitted to the Conference or Council through the Director-General on behalf of a technical 
meeting or conference comprising Member Nations, which has assisted in drafting the convention or 
agreement and has suggested that it be submitted to Member Nations concerned for acceptance; 
(b) contain provisions concerning the Member Nations of the Organization, and such nonmember States as 
are members of the United Nations, any of its specialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, and regional economic integration organizations, including Member Organizations, to which 
their Member States have transferred competence over matters within the purview of the conventions, 
agreements, supplementary conventions and agreements, including the power to enter into treaties in 
respect thereto, which may become parties thereto and the number of acceptances by Member Nations 
necessary to bring such convention, agreement, supplementary convention or agreement into force, 
and thus to ensure that it will constitute a real contribution to the achievement of its objectives. In the 
case of conventions, agreements, supplementary conventions and agreements establishing commissions 
or committees, participation by non-member States of the Organization that are members of the United 
Nations, any of its specialized agencies or the International Atomic Energy Agency or by regional 
economic integration organizations other than Member Organizations, shall in addition be subject to 
prior approval by at least two-thirds of the membership of such commissions or committees. Where any 
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Committee on Constitutional and Legal Matters (CCLM) and the FAO Council as to the 
legally correct course of action to take.
81  The FAO director-general’s view could expand 
the FAO’s power over the IOTC, leading to a controversial issue. Article XIV of the FAO 
Constitution did not endow the director-general with the rights to take this action; however, 
Article XX of the IOTC Agreement clearly stipulates that the IOTC Agreement could be 
amended and that the FAO director-general should immediately inform all members of the 
commission of all proposals for amendments. 
    At the Eleventh Meeting of the ITOC in 2007, the amendment was discussed,
82  and 
members expressed their opinions on changing the relationship between the IOTC and the 
FAO. China was concerned that: 
[G]iven the delay in the distribution of the amendments [it] did not have enough 
time to properly consider the matter and consequently [was] not able to put 
forward an opinion to the Commission at this time.
83 
On the other hand, Australia, the European Community, France, Japan, Korea, the 
Philippines, Sudan and the United Kingdom expressed a positive position on the 
amendment: 
[T]he change process should go ahead by implementing the changes to the IOTC 
Agreement as they were proposed in the 3rd Special Session. Inter alia they argued 
that any binding interpretation of the IOTC Agreement (such as the case that the 
proposed change could be effected under the current Agreement) can only be made 
by the IOTC Members; furthermore, the change process is practical, legally 
                                                                                                                                                                 
convention, agreement, supplementary convention or agreement provides that a Member Organization 
or a regional economic integration organization that is not a Member Organization may become a party 
thereto, the voting rights to be exercised by such organizations and the other terms of participation 
shall be defined therein. Any such convention, agreement, supplementary convention or agreement 
shall, where the Member States of the Organization do not participate in that convention, agreement, 
supplementary convention or agreement, and where other parties exercise one vote only, provide that 
the organization shall exercise only one vote in any body established by such convention, agreement, 
supplementary convention or agreement, but shall enjoy equal rights of participation with Member 
Nations parties to such convention, agreement, supplementary convention or agreement; 
(c) not entail any financial obligations for Member Nations not parties to it other than their contributions to 
the Organization provided for in Article XVIII, paragraph 2 of this Constitution’. 
81  The result was that the FAO Council endorsed the conclusions of the CCLM that the issue was 
unprecedented and so complex that it was needed to set up an informal group of legal experts to examine 
the matter. See Edeson, supra note 79, pp. 490, 492. 
82  See the report of the Eleventh Meeting of the IOTC, pp. 6–7available at 
http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2007/s/IOTC-2007-S11-R[E].pdf (visited on 05/11/2012). 
83  Ibid., p. 7.  
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acceptable, introduced no new obligations to Members and could be achieved 
quickly.
84 
At the conclusion of discussions, the members unanimously agreed on the desirability 
of creating a more effective and efficient commission and invited FAO to take immediate 
action on the draft amendments in preparation for their further consideration at the IOTC’s 
Twelfth Session.
85  However, this issue so far has never been discussed further. 
Although the attempt at amending the IOTC Agreement did not work, it raised many 
legal problems between the IOTC and the FAO, including the legality of the IOTC 
amending its own agreement to place itself outside the FAO framework; the legality of the 
FAO director-general’s refusal to circulate the amendments; and the fact if the IOTC has 
international personality, the legal controversy causes different point of views between two 
sides, leading to the deadlock.
86  In respect to the IOTC’s independence, the FAO suggests 
that the only way for the IOTC to withdraw from the FAO framework is for the IOTC 
members to terminate it and then establish a new commission under a new agreement.
87 
This procedure is unrealistic because the process of withdrawing from the agreement, 
terminating the IOTC, adopting a new agreement and establishing a new RFMO would 
take a long time. During this period, the fishing conducted by each state in the Indian 
Ocean could cause chaos due to the lack of management, seriously endangering the 
conservation of fishery resources. 
At present, as a temporary expedient, the invited experts from Taiwan may attend 
IOTC meetings, but the IOTC is still forced to close the door on Taiwan itself. The 
obstacles to Taiwan’s participation show that the IOTC became another battlefield in the 
conflict between the PRC and Taiwan, sacrificing the real interests of fishery conservation 
and management.
88 
 
                                                      
84  Ibid. 
85  Ibid. 
86  William Edeson discusses the related legal problems in depth and presents a detailed consideration of 
the IOTC and the FAO. See William Edeson, supra note 79, pp. 485–515; William Edeson, ‘Some Future 
Direction for Fishing Entities in Certain Regional Fisheries Management Bodies’, Ocean Development and 
International Law, Vol. 37(2006), pp. 251–261. 
87  See William Edeson, supra note 79, p. 488. 
88  In the latest IOTC Meeting in 2012, to leave an impression that Taiwan is part of the PRC, it continues to 
declare that all vessels of Taiwan are under the management of China and that China has full control of 
those vessels, although it does not in reality. See the Report of the Sixteenth Meeting of the IOTC, available 
at http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2012/s/IOTC-2012-S16-R[E].pdf (visited on 05/11/2012). 
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3. Conclusion 
Although Taiwan participates in RFMOs under the identity of fishing entity rather than a 
state, the PRC remains concerned about the nomenclature that Taiwan uses and seeks to 
avoid an understanding that Taiwan is an independent state. The nomenclature preferred by 
the PRC is Taiwan, Province of China, as used in the IOTC, because it indicates that 
Taiwan is part of China. On the other hand, Taiwan prefers its official name of the ROC in 
the RFMOs, followed by Taiwan, which reflects the reality that Taiwan is a state or at least 
does not link it to China. The nomenclature mutually acceptable to both the PRC and 
Taiwan is Chinese Taipei (see Table 8.1). For the PRC, the word ‘Chinese’ emphasises the 
relation between Taiwan and China, and the word ‘Taipei’ refers merely to one city in 
Taiwan, enabling Chinese Taipei to be regarded as a territory or region belonging to China. 
For Taiwan, the term ‘Chinese’ refers to Chinese culture, including Mandarin speakers, 
which Taiwan claims as its own culture, and to Taipei, the capital of Taiwan. Thus, 
‘Chinese Taipei’ indicates Taiwan’s capital, Taipei, and Chinese culture. In RFMOs in 
which the PRC participates, Taiwan can only use the nomenclature ‘Chinese Taipei’.   
The nomenclature of Taiwan in RFMOs is a petty matter but reflects the differential 
treatment of Taiwan in treaties to which the PRC is not a party. Under the CCSBT in which 
the PRC is not a contracting party or member, Taiwan can participate under the name 
Fishing Entity of Taiwan, which is closer to Taiwan’s second choice and does not imply 
that Taiwan is part of or under the control of China. In the case of the ICCAT, the PRC 
government replaced the Taiwanese government in its UN seat in 1971, but Taiwan still 
attended the 1972 ICCAT meetings as an observer with the identity of a state and the name 
Taiwan in 1972. At that time, the PRC was not a party of the ICCAT Convention, and the 
ICCAT never challenged or opposed Taiwan’s status as a state. However, when the PRC 
became a party of the ICCAT Convention in 1996, it protested the ICCAT allowing Taiwan 
to participate under the name Taiwan and that some ICCAT documents categorised Taiwan 
as a ‘non contracting nation’. Although the ICCAT explained that its practice did not imply 
any recognition, Taiwan was forced to change its name to Chinese Taipei. 
The diplomatic competition between the ROC and the PRC affects Taiwan’s 
participation in RFMOs, both those in which it is a member and those in which it cannot 
acquire the status of a member. Comparing Taiwan’s participation as a non-member in 
various RFMOs(see Table 8.1), Taiwan enjoys the best status, that of a quasi-member, in 
the CCSBT, which demonstrated its flexibility in effectively bringing Taiwan into its 
regime by establishing the Extended Commission. Doing so was possible mainly because    
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Table 8.1 
Taiwan’s Participation in RFMOs 
RFMOs  Date of 
Participation 
Status  Identity  Nomenclature 
CCSBT  20 May 1994  Observer  Entity  Taiwan Observer 
CCSBT 
Extended 
Commission 
30 August 2002  Member  Fishing entity  Fishing Entity of 
Taiwan 
IATTC  27 August 2010  Member  Fishing entity  Chinese Taipei 
ICCAT  1972  Observer  State  Fisheries of Taiwan 
2001  Cooperating 
fishing entity 
Fishing entity  Chinese Taipei 
IOTC  2001  Invited 
expert 
Individuals  Taiwan, Province of 
China 
ISC  29 January 
2002 
Member  Fishing entity  Chinese Taipei 
WCPFC  19 June 2004  Member  Fishing Entity  Chinese Taipei 
 
 
fewer states are involved, making the situation less complicated and reducing the PRC’s 
influence on the commission. Although Taiwan is only an observer of the CCSBT, it is 
nearly fully involved in the whole operation of the CCSBT through its member status in 
the Extended Commission. With respect to the ICCAT, Taiwan could not obtain the status 
of a member, so it sought to normalise its status as a cooperating fishing entity, which was 
an improvement over the unstable status of an observer and seems to be the best solution 
for participation in the ICCAT. At present, the IOTC is the only tuna RFMO that has not 
found a solution to enable Taiwan’s participation. Being within the FAO/UN framework 
which supports the PRC’s One China Policy leads to inflexibility and poses the main 
obstacle for both the IOTC and Taiwan. As far as the IOTC is concerned, bringing Taiwan 
into its regime would greatly benefit the effectiveness of its conservation and management 
because Taiwan is a major catcher in the Indian Ocean. Hence, the IOTC tried to place 
itself outside the FAO framework by amending the IOTC Agreement, causing a legal  
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controversy with the FAO. Thus, Taiwan attends IOTC meetings as an observer under the 
identity of invited experts, rather than a fishing entity. The IOTC’s attempt to placing itself 
outside the FAO reflects the necessity of Taiwan’s participation. Neither the IOTC nor the 
FAO should be willing to see the states under the IOTC regime burdened with the cost 
caused by the nonparticipation of the Taiwanese government. Hence, it is expected that a 
compromise will be found for Taiwan’s participation in the future. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Due to the political conflict with the PRC, Taiwan is not recognised as a state by most 
countries and so faces obstacles to participate in RFMOs under the identity of a state. 
However, to effectively carry out conservation and management regulations, regimes need 
the cooperation of Taiwan, with its high capability for fishing. In addition, Taiwan seeks to 
promote its international image as a good actor willing to cooperate with other states in 
order to benefit its competition with the PRC. Consequently, to participate in RFMOs, 
Taiwan compromised on its original intention to use the identity of a fishing entity through 
the focus on its function of fishing. Taiwan regards itself as a state but adopts the identity 
of fishing entity only in RFMO regimes. Notwithstanding, a position for fishing entities 
different than that of states has been created in international fishery regulations.
1 
    The 1995 UNFSA creates a door for fishing entities to participate in conservation and 
management regimes for straddling and highly migratory fish stocks through individual 
RFMOs. The lack of a definition of the term ‘fishing entity’ leads to the absence of 
standard criteria for the elements which constitute a fishing entity. Research question (a) 
asked why the issue of fishing entities is important and what the legal status of fishing 
entities is under the international law of the sea and RFMOs. Fishing entities are different 
than states, which can be bound not only by RFMOs but also by the UNFSA and UNCLOS. 
Without a route for fishing entities to become parties to the UNCLOS and the UNFSA, 
RFMOs are the only agencies that can prevent fishing entities from violating conservation 
and management measures. However, if fishing entities are not willing or able to join the 
RFMOs, they might stay outside conservation and management regimes. This would 
further reduce the effectiveness of the multi-protection net created by the UNCLOS, 
UNFSA and RFMOs, especially when a fishing entity plays a major role in fishing in many 
high sea areas. Thus, the issue of fishing entities is important.   
    Although fishing entities face difficulty becoming parties to the UNCLOS and the 
UNFSA, it cannot be denied that they possess international legal personality within 
regimes in which they are equivalent to states as the subject of regulations.
2  It means that 
a fishing entity, although other than a state, can still be the subject of the agreements which 
                                                      
1  Through viewing Taiwan as an illustration, a fishing entity can be defined as an actor or entity which 
possesses the same legal capability in fishing as a state. 
2  See Chapter 2, pp. 27–32, of this thesis.  
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create RFMOs. However, this gives rise to the problems that a fishing entity or 
international community might face under present fishery regulations, i.e. research 
question (c). Firstly, with respect to the conservation and management of straddling and 
highly migratory fish stocks, the UNCLOS, UNFSA and RFMOs form a multi-protection 
net, in which UNCLOS is the base, the UNFSA is the core and RFMOs are the units of 
implementation. States are inside the regime and required to be bound by these three 
systems of regulations. Of course, it is possible that a state is a party to only one or two of 
these instruments; however, the state is not excluded from these three treaties but still 
could be bound by all treaty systems. Due to the inability to become a party to the 
UNCLOS and UNFSA, fishing entities exist only at the RFMO level. Notwithstanding the 
principle of pacta tertiis nec nocent nec prosunt, if a fishing entity joins in the RFMOs, it 
might indirectly comply with the related UNCLOS and the UNFSA regulations. If it 
refuses to be involved in RFMOs, then there is no other international agreement that can 
force it to follow the related rules. In other words, RFMOs become the crucial element 
bringing fishing entities into the system; thus, a fishing entity can reduce the 
multi-protection function of the triangle system to a single layer of protection. This 
situation does not benefit the effectiveness of the conservation and management regime 
because it depends completely on the fishing entity’s willingness to comply. The fishing 
entity could be completely outside the regime if it refuses to participate in any organisation. 
This also influences the effectiveness of high seas enforcement measures by the UNFSA or 
RFMOs. 
    Furthermore, Article 21(2) of the UNFSA stipulates that states should through 
RFMOs establish a boarding and inspection procedure. Article 21(3) of the UNFSA states 
that, if a RFMO does not establish its own boarding and inspection procedure by two years 
after the adoption of the UNFSA, then the UNFSA Boarding and Inspection Procedure in 
Article 22 will apply automatically as between UNFSA parties. Under Article 21 of the 
UNFSA, the RFMOs are expected to establish their own boarding and inspection 
procedures. However, this article does not indicate whether the RFMOs to which it refers 
are those set up after the 1995 UNFSA or those that existed before 1995. If it refers to 
those established after 1995, then the UNFSA still needs to create a link to RFMOs which 
existed before because they have no obligation to cooperate with the UNFSA. Even 
RFMOs established after 1995 are not obliged to comply with the UNFSA. This uncertain 
relation between the UNFSA and RFMOs can cause some difficulties in implementing 
boarding and inspection procedure regulations within the UNFSA. In this situation, if a  
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state is a member of a RFMO and a state party of the UNFSA, it might be simpler to 
implement the boarding and inspection procedure between individual members. However, 
if a fishing entity can only become a member of a RFMO, then the problem is whether 
Article 22 of the UNFSA can apply to it. If the RFMO decides to comply with Article 21 of 
the UNFSA, then this fishing entity is indirectly bound by Articles 21 and 22. However, if 
a fishing entity is not willing to become a member of a RFMO which complies with Article 
21 of the UNFSA, then a loophole allows this fishing entity to escape high seas 
enforcement. 
As RFMOs are the main means for a fishing entity to participate in conservation and 
management regimes, the degree of a fishing entity’s engagement in individual RFMOs is 
worth assessing. Among the RFMOs discussed, a fishing entity could obtain the best status 
in the ISC because it distinguishes between members and non-members, instead of 
between contracting and non-contracting parties. A state and a fishing entity could join the 
ISC as members if they meet the qualifications in the ISC Charter. The fishing entity would 
have exactly the same status as other state members. The IATTC provides the second best 
status for fishing entities. Article 1(7) of the Antigua Convention clearly stipulates that 
members include contracting parties and fishing entities. Although a fishing entity may not 
become a contracting party of the Antigua Convention, it is guaranteed to enjoy the same 
rights and to discharge the same obligations as other state members through the 
convention’s mutatis mutandis approach. In addition, a fishing entity can be bound by the 
Antigua Convention through a signature or a commitment of an instrument, establishing 
clearer legal relations among the fishing entity, convention and other contracting parties. 
    Fishing entities’ status in the WCPFC is similar to in the IATTC. A fishing entity 
cannot become a contracting party but only be a member through the delivery of an 
instrument which is stipulated in the Annex of the WCPFC Convention, instead of the 
body text. As a member, the fishing entity has mostly the same rights as contracting parties, 
except for the eligibility to be elected as chairman and vice-chairman, decide the location 
of headquarters of the commission and appoint the executive secretary. The most 
interesting RFMO regarding the status of fishing entity is the CCSBT. To solve the 
difficulty of fishing entities’ participation and avoid the delay that might be caused by 
amending the CCSBT Convention, it established an Extended Commission, comprised of 
all existing CCSBT members and any fishing entity whose vessels conduct fishing 
activities for SBT in the CCSBT convention area. The decision making process was 
essentially transferred from the original CCSBT Commission to the Extended Commission,  
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in which the fishing entity has the same position as other state members. The CCSBT 
Commission could refuse to adopt the Extended Commission’s decisions, preventing them 
from being implemented. However, the membership of the two bodies is nearly identical, 
so it seems unlikely that the same members would reject a decision they had made. Thus, 
the Extended Commission has essentially taken over the function of the CCSBT 
Commission. A fishing entity may not be a contracting party or even a full member of the 
CCSBT but, through the Extended Commission, can fully participate in and influence the 
decisions of the CCSBT. 
    The clever design of the Extended Commission in the CCSBT is worth considering as 
an approach to the same difficulty of fishing entities’ full participation in the ICCAT and 
IOTC. However, these two RFMOs have many more members than the CCSBT, making it 
more difficult and complicated to create an extended commission of which all members 
approve and agree to join. In the ICCAT, a fishing entity cannot be a contracting party nor 
a member but only a cooperating fishing entity which does not enjoy the same rights as 
other members but discharges the same obligations. Although the ICCAT allows a fishing 
entity to participate in allocation of fishing quota, it has a status far lower than that of other 
members. The RFMO which assigns the worst position to fishing entities is the IOTC, 
which is inside the UN framework; hence, its membership is restricted to UN members and 
specialised agencies. The only way for a fishing entity to participate in the IOTC is to 
apply as a cooperating non-contracting party, which obliges the fishing entity to cooperate 
with the IOTC’s conversation and management measures and allows it to fish in the IOTC 
Convention area. However, the critical problem that the IOTC faces concerning fishing 
entities is posed by Taiwan, which is the major catcher of tuna in the Indian Ocean but 
excluded from the IOTC mainly due to its political dispute with China. Consequently, the 
effectiveness of the IOTC’s conservation and management measures is sacrificed for 
political reasons. 
Research question (b) asked whether fishing entities’ status in fisheries enforcement 
on the high seas is to that of a flag state or a non-flag state. Analysis of the UNFSA and 
RFMO regulations shows that a fishing entity can enjoy the freedom of fishing on the high 
seas. A fishing entity does not face barriers to acting in high seas enforcement against 
vessels as the equivalent of a flag state or to acting as the equivalent of a non-flag state in 
high seas enforcement through bilateral treaties with other entities or states. In other words, 
a fishing entity conducts high seas enforcement against its vessels as a flag state on the 
basis of its responsibility to ensure that its vessels do not violate rules. As a non-flag state,  
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a fishing entity can conclude bilateral treaties to conduct enforcement against other states’ 
vessels. Theoretically, a fishing entity can also do so through multilateral treaties, including 
through RFMOs. However, due to their different status compared to other state members 
and contracting parties, fishing entities’ position in high seas enforcement within RFMOs 
is more complicated. No matter whether at the bilateral or regional treaty level, non-flag 
state enforcement on the high seas by fishing entities is limited to boarding and inspection; 
further actions such as investigation or prosecution remain the jurisdiction of the flag state.   
    The WCPFC is the only RFMO which has adopted a boarding and inspection 
procedure involving fishing entities since the adoption of the UNFSA. Under the procedure, 
contracting parties of the WCPFC Convention can board and inspect each other’s vessels 
without any expression of their agreement because they have an obligation to conform to 
the procedure. However, as a member of the WCPFC, a fishing entity must deliver 
notification expressing its willingness to comply with the Boarding and Inspection 
Procedure, and if all other members express their willingness to apply the procedure with 
that fishing entity, then the rights and obligations stipulated by the procedure are 
established between the state members and the fishing entity. This process can lead to a 
problematic consequence: If a fishing entity is unwilling to comply with the procedure or if 
it delivers a notification but all or some state members do not express willingness to apply 
the procedure with that fishing entity, then the fishing entity can be legally outside the 
WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Regime. This measure not only returns the relation 
between the fishing entities and contracting parties in WCPFC boarding and inspection 
regime to the level of bilateral treaties but also creates a loophole for both fishing entities 
and state members. This situation is also linked to the research question (c). 
    Regarding the practices for enforcement by fishing entities on the high seas within the 
RFMOs to which research question (d) refers, only the WCPFC has established its own 
boarding and inspection procedure and has involved a fishing entity, namely Taiwan. 
Taiwan has applied the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure through notification 
with New Zealand, the Cook Islands, the United States, Japan, France and Australia. 
Taiwan has had 13 registered inspection vessels conducting high seas boarding and 
inspection since 14 July 2008 but has found no violations so far.   
    Due to the vulnerability of straddling and highly migratory stocks, states cooperate 
directly or through RFMOs to conserve and manage these fishery resources and protect 
them from commercial extinction or becoming endangered as species. The importance of 
these efforts has surpassed that of political conflicts between states because the growth and  
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decline in one species affects other species. The commercial extinction of one or more 
stocks could cause other species to become endangered and lead to an ecological disaster. 
Therefore, RFMOs should encourage fishing actors, including fishing entities, to 
participate in and comply with related regulations in order to increase the possibility of 
effectively solving the problem of fishery resources. Excluding these fishing actors by 
leaving them outside conservation and management regimes worsens and complicates the 
problem. In other words, if the common concern of states is to conserve and manage fish 
stocks, then RFMOs should be focused on their functional purpose, which is not to resolve 
political conflicts among states but to bring all actors fishing within their convention area 
under regulations in order to ensure that all actors comply with the conservation and 
management measures and fully participate in the organisations’ sustainable development 
schemes and policies. 
    The best way to prevent excluding fishing entities from the conservation and 
management regime is to amend the UNCLOS and UNFSA to allow fishing entities to 
become parties. Thus, RFMOs would not bear the crucial responsibility of deciding 
whether fishing entities are inside or outside the conservation and management regime. 
However, it can be presumed that amending these two international agreements would be 
difficult, complicated and time-consuming, requiring the agreement and ratification of 
many states. However, this circumstance suggests that new relevant international 
agreements should allow fishing entities to be parties. If the UNCLOS and UNFSA are not 
amended, a practical way to encourage fishing entities to participate in the conservation 
and management regime is to grant them the same status as other member states within 
RFMOs.   
    The best model is provided by the ISC, which creates no unnecessarily complicated 
disparities between members, non-members, contracting parties and non-contracting 
parties but only between states and fishing entities that are members or non-members. This 
simpler design is fair to each participant, including fishing entities. If a fishing entity as a 
member has the same obligations as other member states, it should also enjoy the same 
rights. This scheme indirectly encourages fishing entities to participate, which increases the 
effectiveness of conservation and management measures. This model could also be used to 
resolve the problems regarding the WCPFC Boarding and Inspection Procedure. If the 
procedure were amended to give the same status to contracting parties and members, then 
notifications would not be needed for the boarding and inspection procedure between 
fishing entities and other state members, but the WCPFC procedure itself could be applied  
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directly. High seas fisheries enforcement by fishing entities thus would move from the 
bilateral to the multilateral level. This change would not only make the conservation and 
management regime more effective but also set a positive model for other RFMOs in high 
seas fisheries enforcement by fishing entities. 
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